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Theater Immersion
Postmobilization Training in the First Army


We are in a war with no rear areas or front lines. We have to instill the Warrior Ethos into the mobilized soldiers we train. Every soldier must be able to function as an infantryman. Soldiers must have tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive training until their response is intuitive. When soldiers get off the bus at the [mobilization] station, they must feel they have arrived in Iraq or Afghanistan.

We have a non-negotiable contract with the American people to prepare [our] sons and daughters for war. We must use imagination and innovation to do this better than we ever have before. We cannot; we will not fail in this task.*

Between 11 September 2001 and the summer of 2003, the First and Fifth Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) mobilized and deployed thousands of Reserve Component (RC) soldiers from the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve for the Global War on Terrorism. In the First Army’s area of responsibility (AOR) alone, some 77,924 RC soldiers were trained and deployed from mobilization stations east of the Mississippi River. By the fall of 2004, this number grew to 191,491. Some soldiers and units were employed in the United States as part of Operation Noble Eagle; others deployed to combat zones as part of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. CONUSA mobilized additional ARNG and RC forces and deployed them to the Kosovo Force, the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Initially, most of these soldiers and units were combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) soldiers.

Dynamics changed during the summer of 2003. Entire ARNG-enhanced brigades were called up for duty in combat zones. In the First Army AOR, the 30th Brigade from North Carolina was the first such formation mobilized for employment in Iraq. The 30th Brigade began postmobilization training, with the 24th Infantry Division (ID) in oversight. The 2d Training Support Brigade (TSB) of the 78th Division, Training Support, heavily reinforced with trainers from the 78th and 87th Divisions, had the lead for training. The 30th Brigade executed postmobilization training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Drum, New York. This was a historic mission; it was the first time an entire ARNG-enhanced brigade mobilized and deployed to a war zone under the First Army’s auspices. The effort was a success, but the First Army experienced challenges and learned significant lessons.

During the summer of 2004, the First Army mobilized multiple ARNG brigades in the form of Tennessee’s 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and Mississippi’s 155th Brigade Combat Team (BCT). To avoid competing with active units for training resources on active posts, both formations mobilized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The 278th RCT trained at Camp Shelby from June through September then executed a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at the National Training Center (NTC) in October. After completing the MRX, the 278th RCT returned briefly to Camp Shelby then deployed to theater in November.

Similarly, the 155th BCT trained at Camp Shelby from July through October, executed an MRX at the NTC in November, and deployed to theater in December. Leading the First Army effort was a 24th ID command and control (C2) cell with the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division (heavily reinforced by elements of the 87th and 85th Divisions) as the lead trainer.

This approach created an economy of scale that saved resources, particularly training support brigade observer/controller-trainers (OC-Ts). Lessons learned during the 278th RCT’s training applied to the 155th BCT’s training. Both brigades mobilized at a single location. First Army introduced a new approach to postmobilization training—theater immersion—a training concept that is now the watchword for postmobilization training across the entire First Army AOR.

Reserve Component units called up for mobilization are of all shapes and sizes and perform myriad missions requiring varying training programs. For the most part, the combined forces land component commander (CFLCC) defines specific training requirements, but the list of CFLCC tasks is not all-inclusive. Unit commanders often arrive at mobilization stations with specific mission essential task lists (METL) they want particular emphasis or additional training on. In general, battalions or smaller units receive from 35 to 60 days of postmobilization training, but the precise number of training days varies based on the mission, destination, and latest arrival date in-theater.

The mobilization of brigade-size formations for combat in Iraq demanded a different approach. In wartime conditions, formations receive about 90 days of intense training from the individual level through brigade operations at the mobilization station. Postmobilization training covers a variety of CFLCC-mandated tasks ranging from individual to collective tasks and from stability- and support-focused operations through conventional combat missions. Reserve Component brigade training concludes with an intense MRX at one of the command training centers.

Theater Immersion

Theater immersion rapidly builds combat-ready formations led by competent, confident leaders who see first, understand first, and act first; battleproofed soldiers inculcated with the warrior ethos man the formations. Theater immersion places—as rapidly as possible—leaders, soldiers, and units into an environment that approximates what they will encounter in combat. At the soldier level, training is tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive, and designed to illicit intuitive soldier responses. It thrusts formations into a theater analog soon after they arrive at their mobilization station and places stress on the organization from individual to brigade levels. Theater immersion is a combat training center-like experience that replicates conditions downrange while training individual- through brigade-level collective tasks.

See first. Theater immersion’s most important component is a deliberate, continuous study of the contemporary operational environment (COE) in-theater, particularly a study of the threat. To facilitate this process and because of the evolving nature of the threat in Iraq, the First Army is refining Web-based collaborative information sites and quickly disseminating the latest intelligence and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to trainers. The intelligence officer of the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division with the First Army G2 studied daily intelligence reports from each brigade’s targeted employment area, myriad unit after-action reports (AARs); Center for Army Lessons Learned products; and Department of the Army (DA), G3, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force products to replicate and update TTP in the training area. The intelligence officer interviewed soldiers and leaders of all ranks and positions, from riflemen to brigade and division commanders, in-country to obtain the most recent views of the COE. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S3 and the First Army G3 studied the latest TTP and operational patterns of coalition forces to determine the best methods to counter and defeat the threat. Having 20 of its own soldiers deployed to Iraq as coalition military-assistance training teams greatly helped in this process. The teams provided almost daily updates to help craft the training environment and, with 3d Brigade and First Army combat veterans, were employed as OC-Ts soon after returning from Iraq.

Understand first. The training environment was grounded in an operational scenario updated with fragmentary orders and intelligence summaries and subscenarios for specific training events. Employing crawl-walk-run, eight-step, and multiechelon techniques, soldiers, leaders, and units progressed from individual to collective events and from vehicle and squad to battalion- and brigade-level operations. Collective events culminated at brigade level with a field training exercise (FTX) and peaked at battalion level with a 5-day Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP) that ended with a battalion live-fire coordination exercise (FCX). These events placed a premium on battle command and decisionmaking in a stability operations and support operations (SOSO) environment.

To approximate the environment in-country, the TSB commander and unit leaders executed two reconnaissance missions and predeployment site surveys to confirm training practices were appropriate to each brigade’s sector. Key trainers, like the TSB
executive officer and the command sergeant major (CSM) traveled to Jordan and Kuwait to ensure appropriate cultural awareness and reception, staging, and onward integration (RSOI) training.

**Act first.** The most obvious manifestation of theater immersion is the physical design of training sites. The Army constructed two fully functioning forward operating bases (FOBs) for the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) and 155th Brigade, as well as four villages, a highway overpass, and roads lined with guardrails. The villages included mosques, offices for civil authorities, markets, walled residences, tunnel complexes, traffic circles, and low-hanging telephone and electric cables typical of Iraqi villages.

Joint Coalition Council facilities where soldiers interfaced with indigenous civil leaders replicated those in-theater. The Army transformed cantonment areas into three FOB analogs with entry control points (ECPs), guard towers, and wire. FOBs and towns were named after existing locations in-country, and road signs, police cars, and markets were created based on recent photos from Iraq. To save time and conserve costs, 3d Brigade, 87th Division, soldiers performed most of the construction work to build these sites. For example, the 2d Company, 305th Battalion TSB, built most of the two FOBs for defense training and battalion ARTEPs and FCXs.

Within weeks of arrival at the mobilization station, and after soldier readiness processing and dental and medical examinations, units began operations as tactical formations. Unit leaders planned, prepared, battle-tracked, and controlled their organizations while acclimating to the battle rhythm typical of units fighting in-theater. They had to accomplish some classroom instruction, but training maximized time in the field. Soldiers averaged over 40 days operating from FOBs and camps while under constant threat of attack by a resourceful enemy.

Because time is limited at the mobilization station, immersing soldiers immediately into a replicated combat zone enables focused training 24 hours a day and retraining as needed. Instead of living in a normal garrison environment, soldiers were surrounded by concertina wire, ECPs, and guard towers to simulate the FOB environment. In a FOB, small-unit leaders trained theater-specific tasks, troop-leading procedures, and basic discipline.

To populate the simulated villages, the Army hired 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) including 80 Iraqi-Americans. Under control of the 3d Company of the 349th Logistics Support Battalion (LSB), the COBs, particularly the Iraqi-Americans, added a powerful dose of realism to each training event. Iraqi-Americans portrayed linguists, mayors, police chiefs, religious leaders, terrorists, news reporters, and Iraqi National Guard, Army, and Border Police. They spoke to soldiers only in their native tongue and wore clothing appropriate to their positions. These COBs were given simulated identities, rehearsed at COB academies, and routinely participated in training events. Soldiers encountering the COBs communicated through translators to negotiate, conduct bilateral meetings, gather intelligence, and react to civil disturbances.

A full-time opposing force (OPFOR) from the 3d Company of the 349th LSB, primarily mobilized reservists, rehearsed operations for weeks before the brigades arrived. Dressed and equipped like anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) and with OPFOR academy training and daily S2 updates on the latest threat TTP, the OPFOR designed and executed threat countertasks that immersed training leaders and warriors in the most realistic situations possible. IEDs such as booby traps, mines, projectiles, bombs, and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) were ubiquitous. Soldiers were constantly subjected to simulated sniper, rocket, and mortar attacks.

**Instilling the Warrior Ethos**

To achieve success against the AIF OPFOR, soldiers and leaders conducted detailed troop-leading procedures, issued doctrinally correct five-paragraph orders, conducted rehearsals, and performed rigorous precombat inspections and precombat checks. The Army treated every training event, including individual weapons qualification; military operations on urban terrain (MOUT); combat patrolling; and cordon and search, as a combat mission.

The Army organized training events in 19 modules, each focusing on 1 or more of 83 theater-specific CFLCC training tasks. These modules led to new theater-specific METLs for each formation and echelon. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, validated in writing that individuals and units had trained to proficiency, and the commander of First Army approved resulting training plans. The Army created a densely packed training matrix to ensure soldiers could accomplish all required training tasks to standard. Trainers tracked soldiers by name as they progressed through CFLCC-mandated individual tasks. To accomplish this, the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division was heavily reinforced by trainers from the 1st, 4th, and 5th Brigades of the 87th Division and elements of the 4th Brigade, 85th Division. At its peak, the effort employed some 750 First Army personnel to train the 7,000 soldiers of the 278th ACR and 155th BCT. The ratio of OC-Ts to soldiers was ap-
proximately 1 to 13. TSB commanders responsible for various modules prepared detailed training plans, rehearsing, terrain–walking, and validating training events in detail and preparing risk-management worksheets.

TSB commanders also put their training creativity to the test in multiecheloned training events to validate individual and collective tasks. Speed and trust in absorbing the latest lessons learned and flexible, adaptive, responsive trainers were the watchwords for developing training plans. Theater-specific tasks like FOB defense, ECPs, combat patrols and ground assault convoys, raids, or cordon and search garnered significant attention in training for combat in Iraq. But First Army trainers built many other tasks into the training program, including METL-specific, branch, and specialty training. Gathering and updating the latest TTP for each task and developing appropriate threat countertasks were critical, and this is a continuing process that lies at the heart of theater immersion.

As conditions changed in-theater, trainers rapidly changed conditions on the training battlefield. This approach placed a premium on agile, creative TSB commanders and aggressive, streamlined acquisition of the latest lessons from the war zone.

The trainers included key individual tasks that cross-walked to collective tasks in tough, realistic, hands-on conditions to create intuitive soldier responses. They embedded IED threats in-theater in every training event possible from land navigation to battalion ARTEPs and in every form conceivable, from projectiles slung behind guardrails to booby-trapped buildings and highway overpasses. Soldiers repeatedly trained on multiple tasks. For example, a single simulated rocket attack trains soldiers how to react to indirect fire, casualty evacuation procedures, 9-line medical evacuation requests, damage assessment, crater analysis, counterbattery fire, and many other procedures.

Individual and collective training places emphasis on first-line supervisors and junior-level leaders. AARs focused on key leader skills and the warrior ethos to develop initiative and aggressiveness in formations. At the heart of this approach were comprehensive noncommissioned officer AARs led by TSB and brigade CSMs. As units progressed through training, gaining greater confidence, the responsibility for conducting AARs passed to unit leaders.
The Army devised and executed a robust live-fire program throughout the training matrix to ensure soldiers participated in live-fire events throughout training. Soldiers and units progressed through rigorous premarksmanship instruction to individual- and crew-served-weapons qualification. Reflexive-fire and close combat assault courses included urban scenarios, IEDs, and moving-target arrays followed by live-fire FOB defense against a moving VBIED and squad and platoon live-fire assault courses.

After crew-served-weapons qualification, gunners and assistant gunners qualified on weapons from vehicles such as HMMWVs, heavy expanded mobile tactical trucks, 5-ton trucks or howitzers (day and night), and on moving platforms engaging stationary and moving targets. Crews formed into combat patrols and ground-assault convoys for collective live-fire events in day-and-night conditions, again from moving and stationary vehicles versus moving and stationary targets. Combat vehicle crews executed Bradley and Tank Tables through Table XII. Paladin crews and platoons fired through Field Artillery Table XV. Mortar platoons executed mortar training and evaluation programs. A battalion/brigade FCX combined fires from motorized companies, howitzer platoons, mortar platoons, close air support, and Army aviation. By the time they completed training at Camp Shelby, the 278th RCT and 155th BCT had expended over 2.3 million rounds of ammunition and more than 14,500 soldiers were qualified to use individual and crew-served weapons.

The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, and Camp Shelby also used training devices to enhance soldier weapons proficiency. While tank and Bradley crews employed traditional systems like the Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer, the Army fielded new systems as well, notably the Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer, which soldiers used to good effect to practice and sustain convoy skills. Additional devices the Army found useful in training squads and crew-served weapons teams were the Engagement Skills Trainer-2000 and the Virtual Battlefield Simulator-1. The Fire Arms, Laser Marksmanship, and Beamhits Training Systems were also superlative primary marksmanship instruction tools. As the 278th RCT and 155th BCT mobilizations drew to a close, the Army fielded mine simulators and training IEDs. These new devices will see plenty of action in future mobilizations.

**Draconian Maintenance**

Whether soldiers are breaking through Normandy hedgerows or operating from dispersed FOBs throughout Iraq, effective logistics, particularly maintenance, is a key determinant of a unit’s ability to effectively perform its mission and survive. The paradigm shift from “normal” operating procedures practiced at armories and drill centers to the full exploitation of the Standard Army Maintenance Information System is a challenge. Rapidly immersing leaders, operators, and units in the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS-G), with emphasis on “blasting” to the Standard Army Supply and Maintenance Systems rather than the antiquated “disc-drop” system, is imperative.

A 2-day structured “ULLS-G Gunnery,” with all operators and maintenance leaders in attendance and outside subject matter experts brought in for training, included the U.S. Army Forces Command G4 and a III Corps Command Maintenance Evaluation Team. ULLS-G Gunnery laid the foundation for effective maintenance management and Class IX flow throughout mobilization, into the MRX, and on to theater. Enforcing attendance, oversight, and accountability at brigade-level maintenance meetings was instrumental to unit success.

Trainers issued DA activity codes to units and enforced parts-ordering and tracking. Because time was of essence, trainers inspected and validated all unit equipment before deployment and training. Creating accountability and confidence in the maintenance and supply system was imperative. Training event OC-Ts habitually checked operators and equipment for proper licensing, dispatches, and preventive maintenance checks and services. Operators or equipment found wanting were frozen in place until unit commanders corrected the problem. All of this was reported in tactical AARs.

Command maintenance, evaluation, and training teams and internal trainers, such as the TSB S4 and logisticians with recent theater experience, focused on logistics management and unit administrative and logistical operation center (ALOC) procedures. They stressed recent ALOC TTPs and CSS situational awareness, provided one-on-one assistance, and distributed relevant logistics information, such as the “Mobilizing Unit Leader’s Maintenance Management Smart Book and Baseline SOP” and “ALOC Smartbooks” from recent Combined Arms Support Command publications. Because some units received relatively brief postmobilization training, immediately on a unit’s arrival trainers stressed a sense of logistical urgency and recent doctrine and TTPs. Establishing a baseline of logistic fundamentals greatly improved unit sustainment.
Battle Command

For ARNG leaders and staffs, steeped in legacy battle command techniques designed for high-intensity operations, counterinsurgency operations and SOF presented a significant paradigm shift. Commanders’ critical information requirements and the military decisionmaking process were no longer easy to apply to the operational environment. ARNG leaders and staffs had to learn a whole new lexicon with supporting tasks and TTPs and apply them to theater immersion so unit leaders could see first, understand first, and act first.

Pattern analysis and sanitation, water, energy, academics, trash-medical, and security charts replaced watchwords like doctrinal and situational templates. Effects-based targeting, information operations, and force-protection working groups moved to positions of prominence in unit planning. ARNG trainers embraced new digital equipment and employed it throughout the formations, and soldiers learned new battle rhythms similar to those encountered in theater.

A robust Battle Command Training Plan (BCTP) included the Leader Training Program at the NTC; cultural awareness training in Jordan; pre-deployment site surveys; staff and leader IED training; a BCTP command post exercise (CPX); a signal exercise; and company, battalion, and brigade CPXs. Both brigades participated in CPX-based MRXs with each of their go-to-war divisional headquarters.

The 1st (Simulations) Brigade, 87th Division, was the primary trainer for the capstone CPX conducted at Camp Shelby based on the Brigade/Battalion Simulation System. Equipped with a digital division tactical operations center, 1st Brigade, 87th Division, became a simulated higher headquarters and provided digital links for all key Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) devices across brigades. Battalion ARTEPs exercised battalion and brigade C2 with the brigades issuing orders and tracking each battalion.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, knowing the enemy is critical to battlefield success; in battling the AIF, this principle is amplified. Simply put, actionable intelligence drives operations. To build unit proficiency, the First Army developed a rigorous 11-day training plan, which incorporated knowledge of the enemy, to build intelligence products and analysis of the enemy to develop predictive analysis for future operations.

A 2-day knowledge-based training plan gave brigades necessary knowledge to understand the enemy and how he organizes. Soldiers studied insurgency operations, AIF organizations operating in Iraq, enemy weapons systems, IEDs, equipment, and tactics. Soldiers cannot absorb this knowledge in 2 days; the use of the classified computer network is critical to continued study of AIF tactics.

The second element in the training plan was analysis. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) defines success or failure for intelligence organizations. A 9-day training plan included the All-Source Analysis System (Light), urban IPB, link-pattern analysis, collection management, and targeting and analytical techniques. During the first 6 days, soldiers mixed classroom instruction with practical exercises. A 3-day intelligence exercise integrated all subjects taught during the first 6 days of training. The exercise and other brigade staff training, such as brigade and battalion CPXs and battalion ARTEPs, allowed brigades to develop intelligence battle rhythms and become familiar with useful intelligence products. Realistic, detailed threat scenarios reinforced the analytical procedures learned previously. Intelligence training was aggressive and mentally taxing.

Because of the Army’s dependence on Army Tactical Command and Control Systems, battle command requires competent signal units. Theater immersion means experiencing theater-like conditions in all collective signal-specific training events. Signal elements set up voice and data communication backbones in FOBs, base camps, and remote sites; moved them; then set them up again. Signal training posed several challenges. A TSB does not possess divisional or area signal asset trainers or tactical network engineers. A garrison support unit does not possess signal-asset maintainers. Contracting support for technical and maintenance expertise; tasking a signal battalion for tactical network support; and creating a signal specific OC-T team from across the 87th Division solved this problem.

Under the 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S6’s oversight, training began before units arrived at the mobilization station. Contractors arrived at unit home stations and provided initial operator proficiency assessments, operator training, and equipment assessment and maintenance. Contractors provided assessments to the TSB S6 and helped refine training plans. Once at Camp Shelby, the signal company participated in CPXs and polished unit-collective tasks. The signal company participated in all digital CPXs, and Camp Shelby provided additional digital C2 training during battalion ARTEPs.

Both brigades transformed from heavy, mechanized formations to agile, motorized organizations with HMMWVs and a mechanized infantry task force.
force. The Army fielded new equipment in these formations, such as ATCCS devices like Blue Force Tracker, Maneuver Control System-Light, and the All-Source Analysis and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, which many Active Component units have yet to receive. New tools of war such as M4 carbines (soldier favorites in the Rapid Fielding Initiative); the Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; and the PROPHET intelligence system facilitated unit training.

Transformation does not apply only to digital systems and new pieces of equipment. Soldiers transform as well. In the case of members of mobilizing brigades, many soldiers were cross-leveled to flesh out changing formations. Combat soldiers like tankers and scouts gained an additional military occupation specialty (MOS) as infantrymen; CS and CSS personnel attended a 20-day 91W course to meet the Army’s latest MOS standards. Phased mobilization allowed the Army to call up selected personnel in advance of unit mobilizations and assign them to MOS qualification-producing institutions. These soldiers arrived at the mobilization station at approximately the same time as their parent units.

The MRX was the culminating event in the First Army training program. The brigades debarked from planes and trains and flowed into Fort Irwin in simulated RSOL operations—as if they were moving through the aerial and sea ports of debarkation in Kuwait en route to Camps Arifjan and Buehring. As they would have to do in Kuwait, the brigades battle-tracked the build of combat power, force-protected, and planned and prepared for a long, contested move into the Mojave Desert. At the NTC, brigades conducted combat road marches into the AOR and occupied FOBs, faced myriad force-protection, SOSO, and combat tasks prevalent in-theater—all under constant attack from the AIF. Training included robust live-fire MOUT and live-fire and live-counterfire missions by Paladins from the FOBs. Because free elections in-theater are crucial in the strategy for victory in Iraq, election-support missions at the NTC were the units’ graduation exercise.

**Immersion: An Evolving Concept**

First Army did not rest with the success of the 278th RCT and 155th BCT’s missions. Trainers from across the First Army descended on Camp Shelby and lessons, techniques, and methods spread rapidly to mobilization stations across the eastern United States. Trainers improved theater-immersion initiatives at each mobilization station and tailored them for combat, CS, and CSS formations. Many trainers also brought their own innovative methods to Camp Shelby. Today, the Army is building FOBs at every major mobilization station, and many theater-immersion tools pioneered in the 278th RCT and 155th BCT mobilizations are omnipresent.

The most significant lesson learned in the 278th ACR and 155th BCT effort was the need for more sophisticated and rigorous training in battalion and brigade battle command; in particular, effects-based targeting and information operations. Here time is the enemy, as are the multitude of training and transformation requirements that compete for leader time and attention. To mitigate the problem, the Phased Mobilization Concept was expanded to provide more time for leaders, headquarters, and CSS elements to mobilize in advance of the main bodies, which would allow them to complete individual and some collective training requirements before their units mobilized and to better prepare them to guide their organizations. This approach created more time to focus on critical battle command training events, including multiple brigade-level command post exercises as well as a brigade FTX with multiple maneuver battalions in the field.

Finally, it was determined that an OC-T team, created along lines analogous to the NTC Bronco Team, was necessary to coach, teach, and mentor brigade and battalion leaders and staffs throughout postmobilization training. In the future, these initiatives will be put to the test with the mobilization of the 48th Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 2d Brigade, 28th Division, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, as well as other mobilizing units across the First Army AOR.
Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View

Major General Robert H. Scales, U.S. Army, Retired

THE AMERICAN DEFENSE establishment has grown up in a big-war culture where big threats were met with big-ticket programs. Yet, throughout the Cold War era in Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere real soldiers were compelled to fight unpleasantly real wars against enemies who watched the battles carefully. These enemies learned with each combat encounter that the surest way to gain advantage is to negate American big-war technologies by moving the fight into complex terrain such as jungles, mountains, and most recently, cities. The enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure American forces into terrain where Information-Age knowledge, speed, and precision give way to the more traditional warfighting advantages of mass, will, patience, and the willingness to die.

These enemies realize they will never effectively develop, integrate, and employ sophisticated weapons systems. A tradition of tribalism within Islamic militaries impedes their ability to create large, cohesive, well-bonded, structurally sound fighting organizations. They are willing to accept that they can best achieve success against the United States by fighting in small, relatively untrained groups using Industrial-Age weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and assault rifles.

In Somalia, Lebanon, and Iraq, the enemy also learned that America’s vulnerable center of gravity is dead American soldiers. Thus, killing Americans has gravitated from merely a means to an end to an end itself, and the most efficient killing ground is in cities, where urban clutter allows the enemy to hide. Familiar terrain, the presence of supporting populations, and a useful infrastructure gives the enemy the advantage of sanctuary in the midst of the occupying power, an advantage impossible to achieve in open terrain. He can literally hide in plain sight and become indistinguishable from the indigenous urban masses that shield, protect, and sustain him.

Recent experience also suggests urban warfare will challenge the American military for many decades to come. The complexity of the challenge will only grow as cities in developing countries (the Middle East in particular) continue to gather in the poor and disaffected. Removed from traditional cultural, religious, and social bonds that hold their aggression in check, restless young males will add more human kindling to the growing fires of urban, fundamentalist insurgencies.

A city is the greatest challenge to any tactical force. In cities the red zone—the space separating friendly from enemy forces—compresses. The zone is often thousands of meters in open battle, but only tens of meters in the urban maze of densely aggregated buildings, streets, and back alleys. The traditional advantages of fighting outside the red zone disappear as cities compel soldiers to fight the enemy close. The compartmented nature of the urban jungle fragments forces. Short lines of sight limit the effective ranges of organic weapons and allow the enemy to “hug” U.S. forces, obviating the effective use of precision-guided weapons launched from aerial platforms. Compartmented urban terrain lessens to a significant degree the advantages of superior situational awareness and electronic-communications dominance.

Soldiers and Marines fight and occasionally die in brutal, close, and intimate tactical combat in cities, and every tactical action has strategic consequences. Each time a soldier or Marine dies, the United States loses another bit of strategic initiative, and probabilities for success diminish. Each soldier’s death raises public clamor to bring U.S. soldiers and Marines home. Only a fool would conclude the enemy is unaware of these connections.

If dead soldiers are America’s most vulnerable center of gravity, putting aside for a moment the humanitarian aspects of the issue, it seems obvious the
Soldiers watch over a traffic control point near the Fallujah suburb of Al Kharma, Iraq.

The welfare of our soldiers should be the number-one priority for defense planners and policymakers. Perhaps it is a number-one priority, but nothing in today’s policies, budgets, priorities, and strategic doctrine suggests this is the case.

Let us be clear about who does the dying. Since the end of World War II, four out of five American dead have been infantrymen—not just soldiers and Marines—but infantrymen. Infantrymen constitute less than 5 percent of all servicemen, but they do virtually all the killing and dying. The United States has not suffered a single soldier death from enemy air action since Korea and none from enemy sea action since World War II. The last serious air-to-air combat action was Linebacker II in 1972. The last major ship-to-ship action was in Leyte Gulf in 1944. The last soldier to die in action died yesterday.

Remembering how small, undemanding, and underserved our population of infantrymen really is is important. America’s treasure-house of close-combat soldiers is only marginally larger than the New York City Police Department. Every Army and Marine infantryman, tanker, and Special Forces soldier gathered in one place would not fill FedEx Stadium. These men (and they are virtually all men) come predominantly from the white middle class with a disproportionately small representation of minorities. While motives to join the warrior ranks vary, the desire of each soldier to prove himself in hazardous circumstances is common. In sum, close-combat soldiers do not choose to join the services for the money or to get an education.

Russian dictator Vladimir Lenin reportedly said that in war “quantity has a quality all its own,” inferring that technology, training, and leadership can only do so much to overcome the inherent advantage that mass brings to battle. Close combat has always been manpower-intensive. Technology can make the job safer and more efficient, but the battle and the enemy set the standards for density on the battlefield. As a rule, the more complex the terrain, the greater the number of soldiers required to fight there. Cities are notorious for soaking up great quantities of soldiers.

The small number of close-combat soldiers and Marines in the Armed Forces today is all the more difficult to justify given the fact they have skills that cannot be bought off the street or contracted out. In virtually every conflict since the end of World War II, a shortage of first-rate, professional infantrymen has threatened the success of military campaigns. A protracted campaign drains the supply of “intimate killers,” prompting the inevitable response: quicken the training, hasten the building of units, and replace those killed or wounded in combat. The result of such haste and lack of foresight is a tragic increase in needless deaths and maimings.
Comparing the costs for equipping warriors in the services reveals a dichotomy. A first-rate pilot takes several years and at least $8 million to train, and he fights with a weapon that costs between $50 and $150 million. Many infantrymen go into close combat with about 4 month’s preparation, and the total cost for equipping them is considerably less than $100 thousand. Yet, infantrymen die every day, while fighter pilots are rarely seriously threatened. Today there are fewer Marine and Army infantry squads than first-line fighter aircraft in active service.

This state of affairs has been accepted because of a belief that distant fires and strategic intelligence so attrit an enemy that a close fight between opposing close-combat forces would be uneven and anticlimactic. However, recent experience conclusively proves this premise no longer holds. Science is not responsible for shaping the premise; the enemy is. He has adapted his style of war to draw us in close to the point on the battlefield where big science yields to small science. He has developed an operational fighting doctrine that greatly reduces his vulnerability to being killed from great distances. His effectiveness begins at the point of contact and diminishes quickly beyond the red zone.

To gain a fresh perspective on the Nation’s military needs, we must look at warfare from the bottom up (metaphorically at least) by walking point in Baghdad or Fallujah in the company of those soldiers and Marines who do most of the dying. By thinking about their tasks from the ground up we can better appreciate what they consider important. By watching close-combat soldiers in action, we can connect what they do at the tactical level to strategic essentials. What should we do to allow close-combat soldiers and Marines to succeed in today’s new, dangerous, and obscure era of warfare? How can we put American technology, intellect, and organizational abilities to work to ensure the safety and success of the young people who perform these difficult jobs?

Initiatives for Close Combat

Several initiatives are likely to help close-combat soldiers win and survive in direct tactical engagements. The key word is “direct.” Remember the statistics cited above and focus on who does the real fighting and killing. We begin at the intimate, visceral level where direct killing takes place and the science of war gives way to myth, anecdote, and supposition. Gradually, we will elevate our aim and evaluate less-direct factors. We must keep in mind that the farther we move from the firing line, the less relevant systems are to the warrior’s needs and the more expensive they become.

Knowledge of the enemy. In urban operations, the one commodity a close-combat soldier or Marine demands most is knowledge of the enemy waiting around the street corner in ambush. Strategic systems such as orbiting satellites, high-flying drones, and aircraft can sometimes pick up the presence of such an intimate, immediate threat but they have no means for getting information to the soldier in time for him to act on it. The close-combat soldier must find the enemy the old-fashioned way—by exposing himself to fire to flush out, spot, fix, and kill the enemy.

The close-combat soldier gets advance warning principally through reconnaissance by scouts who put “eyes on” the objective to verify the enemy’s presence. Occasionally, back-alley payoffs to snitches and spies augment reconnaissance. Crowded cities compound the difficulties in finding an enemy who
hides in plain sight by blending in with the population. Often, the enemy uses civilians as shields and, on occasion, sacrifices them to American firepower to gain a psychological advantage.

While technology can help the soldier find the enemy in the close fight, soldiers have long sought a device that displays in real time all threats in their proximate area—information from all sources, strategic to tactical, filtered so they receive only information pertaining to the immediate situation. In two-dimensional, urban warfare, the enemy has the information advantage because of his intimate knowledge of the terrain and the help he receives from civilians. Our soldiers will regain the information advantage only by making the fight three-dimensional. Looking down from a low air perch using aerial drones or hovering aircraft can even the odds by allowing the soldier or Marine to see behind street corners and into buildings. The enemy can hide inside urban structures, but aerial dominance robs him of the ability to move about freely and mass.

Astronomers learned the value of linking radio telescopes into a cohesive array to gain a greater resolution of objects than that achieved by individual telescopes. The technique applies to tactical warfare as well. Available technology can link soldiers so each is a sensor in a field of sensors that collectively becomes an expansive sensor array. Such a field’s detailed ground’s-eye view of the battlefield would yield a resolution and definition of the enemy unprecedented in modern warfare.

Maintaining contact. Colonels and generals rely on sophisticated command and control systems to help orchestrate the battle, but soldiers and Marines in close-combat units still require some system to help them maintain contact with each other and their superiors. The urban battlefield is lonely and intimidating. Enemies appear everywhere, often in unforeseen circumstances, and buddies within a squadron are often out of touch with each other. Rifle squads must rely on eye contact, hand-and-arm signals, and shouted commands. These soldiers should have a system of virtual touch to give them the confidence to fight effectively without having to gather in vulnerable groups.

Leaders at the squad level should also be able to see their soldiers virtually. Individual monitors attached to every soldier could keep a leader informed of each soldier’s position. Combat polygraphs relaying biofeedback information could provide information about a soldier’s physical and emotional condition and help squad leader decide which soldiers are best prepared emotionally to perform specific combat tasks. Collectively, data would tell higher commanders when a small unit reached its emotional, physical, and psychological point of exhaustion.
In a perfect world, soldiers or Marines walking point should be able to read their commander’s tactical intent. If we expect tactical leaders to make strategic decisions when alone, they should be given a window on their commanders’ decisionmaking processes. The essence of indirect leadership is the ability of subordinates to observe and become part of the decisionmaking process as plans develop and change. A device that allows soldiers to listen to and add to command and staff discussions would give them a window on their leaders’ thinking and help them understand the intent and logic behind orders.

Signature reduction. During the Persian Gulf War, close-combat soldiers succeeded in large measure because they “owned the night.” Light-intensification and infrared night-vision devices allowed soldiers to consistently engage the enemy without being seen. Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest the American advantage in fighting at night is eroding, particularly in urban combat. Middle Eastern cities are dense and cluttered. Streets and dwellings are often brightly lit, eliminating any advantage accrued from wearing night-vision devices. Light-intensification technologies are now available worldwide. Even the poorest insurgent can avail himself of these devices by buying or stealing them. In the future, we must own more than just the night. Small units should be able to hold the spectral advantage across a much broader span of the sensor spectrum from visible light to infrared, and they must own it absolutely—even when urban noise, light, and closeness degrade these advantages.

Close-in killing. The closer technology moves to the firing line, the less useful it becomes. The last mile of the battlefield has always been a place of mystery, folklore, and misunderstanding. Historically, our enemies have (proportionately at least) paid greater attention to their soldiers’ effectiveness when fighting close. American close-combat weapons, principally small arms and antitank guns and missiles, have sometimes been inferior to the enemy’s. The last original U.S. Government design for a small arm was the 1903 Springfield rifle, which was essentially a knock-off of the German Mauser designed 7 years earlier. All other American small arms were either designed by private citizens or purchased abroad. With the possible exception of night-vision devices, Global Positioning Systems, and shoulder-fired missiles, an American infantryman has no appreciable technological advantage in a close battle against even the poorest, most primitive enemy.

We must give our soldiers the same overwhelming dominance in killing the enemy inside the red zone that airmen, sailors, and Marines have. Weapons on tanks and other armored vehicles are effective from about 50 to 200 meters—the ranges most likely to be encountered in the urban fight. The challenge is to give that lethality to dismounted soldiers, who are the ones most likely to engage in firefights. The U.S. military needs new small arms that are highly lethal and easy to wield inside urban spaces. Soldiers and Marines need the ability to shoot first in surprise engagements using some form of reflective sighting. They need a system that can kill the enemy behind walls or around corners. A soldier-portable weapon that can detonate over the enemy’s heads would be helpful, as would a light, wall-buster weapon that kills an enemy inside urban structures.

Protection. Too many soldiers and Marines die needlessly because they enter tactical fights without adequate protection. What threatens them the most? Since the end of World War II, the greatest killers of American close-combat soldiers have been mortars and small arms. In the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the weapons most feared are RPGs and roadside bombs. The RPG is a simple, diabolical weapon the Germans developed during World War II and the Soviets adapted to give infantrymen a chance against enemy armor. As its name implies, the RPG is nothing more than a grenade detonated by a piezoelectric contact fuze and propelled from an iron tube by a small rocket. Our soldiers are most afraid of simple roadside mines because of their unpredictability and the horrific effect they have on the body.

Recent experience in Iraq reinforces the truism that in limited wars a mounted soldier’s chance of dying in the close fight is less by almost an order of magnitude than that of a soldier fighting on foot. Armored vehicles are particularly useful when fighting in cities. A layer of relatively impenetrable steel prevents all but the most powerful explosive devices from causing harm. Speed of movement and the ability to carry communications equipment and weapons gives mounted soldiers dominance in an encounter with back-alley thugs armed with RPGs, mortars, and automatic weapons.

The enemy and circumstances demand that some fighting be done dismounted. Exposed soldiers must be better protected, and the best protection is a shield of knowledge. If a soldier knows with relative certainty what or who is behind the next building, he needs little additional protection. But, in the GWOT, as in past wars, if he so chooses, the enemy will find ways to restore the fog of war. There are no guarantees of perfect situational awareness for even
the best-informed soldier walking point in the urban jungle. That soldier will need better personal armor to shield him from small-arms fire at close range. Once in contact, he will require additional means for limiting an enemy’s ability to maneuver around him. He should be able to engage the enemy without exposing himself to fire. Finally, when he opens fire, he must have some ability to discriminate between the enemy and innocent civilians.

**Tactical medicine.** The survival rate for soldiers wounded in combat today is unprecedented, and more must be done to keep them alive. Our most vulnerable center of gravity is dead Americans. Timely evacuation of the wounded is the greatest challenge in urban combat. We must get a wounded soldier away from the enemy’s close embrace and through (or above) narrow streets before he bleeds to death or dies from shock. The enemy’s embrace on occasion foils even the best evacuation efforts. Soldiers fighting in cities will often find themselves stranded much like the U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia. We must find better ways to stabilize a wounded soldier stranded on the firing line. Perhaps a portable protective wrap could be developed that would reduce a soldier’s heart rate and slow his metabolism for several hours without causing serious injury.

**Physical, intellectual, and psychological fitness.** As the battlefield becomes more uncertain and lethal, it also becomes lonelier and enormously frightening for those obliged to fight close. Most recent American campaigns have been fought in unfamiliar and horribly desolate terrain and weather. We must pay greater attention to selecting, bonding, and psychologically and physically preparing close-combat soldiers to perform well in this new era of war. Modern science offers promising solutions. Soldiers can be better tuned psychologically to endure the stresses of close combat. Written tests, assessments, role-playing exercises, and careful vetting reduces the percentage of soldiers who suffer from stress disorders after coming off the firing line.

The biological sciences offer promise that older, more mature soldiers will be able to endure the physical stresses of close combat for longer periods, which is important because experience supports that older men make better close-combat soldiers. They are more stable in crisis situations, less likely to be killed or wounded, and far more effective in performing the essential tasks that attend close-in killing.

War is a thinking man’s game. Senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded it is better to out-think than out-equip the enemy. They tell us that wars are won by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions—tasks that demand the ability to under-
stand the changing nature of war. Yet increasingly, military leaders subordinate this ability to the more pressing demands of routine day-to-day operations. Today’s military has become so overstretched it is too busy to learn at a time when the value of learning has never been greater.

We ask soldiers and Marines to make judgments and command decisions that in previous wars were reserved for senior officers. A corporal standing guard in Baghdad or Fallujah can make a decision that affects the strategic outcome of an entire campaign. In Afghanistan, sergeants decided where to deliver precision munitions. Their decisions had enormous consequences for the strategic mission, yet the intellectual preparation of these junior leaders is no more advanced today than during the Cold War. Thankfully, these soldiers’ innate creativity, innovativeness, and initiative belie their lack of formal intellectual preparation. Even so, it seems clear they could do even better if service institutions educated them earlier and with greater rigor.

Today’s close-combat soldiers or Marines need more time to develop to peak fighting efficiency than their predecessors did. Years, not months, are required to produce a close-combat soldier with the skills and attributes to perform the increasingly more difficult and dangerous tasks that wait in the future. At least a year is necessary for small units to develop the collective skills necessary to fight as teams.

**Cultural awareness.** The American soldier’s humanity occasionally gets him killed. Many past enemies have remarked on the naiveté of U.S. soldiers new to close combat. Thanks to the oceans that surround the United States, we are relatively well protected and have rarely faced massive invasions or traumatic intrusions into our homeland. That explains why many U.S. soldiers in a firefight at first do not believe someone unknown really wants to kill them. American soldiers like to befriend strangers and even enemies. German and Japanese veterans were astounded at how quickly American soldiers sought to bond with them and forgive their aggressions once the battle ended. Children in particular were often the objects of this innate propensity to make friends.

Unfortunately, the gulf between West and East has never been greater than that between American soldiers and Iraqis. A barrier of cultural differences between American and Islamic societies blocks the American soldier’s proclivity to connect with alien societies. Few soldiers speak Arabic or have spent any time in Arab countries or even in the presence of Middle Eastern peoples. Close-combat forces cannot again be sent into a tactical environment where they are forced to fight as complete strangers. In the war in Iraq, Iraq’s strategic center of gravity is the will of the Iraqi people. Our soldiers cannot hope to win such a war without better...
Special Forces supplemented U.S. Embassy security during an evacuation of foreign nationals from Liberia.

knowledge of how the enemy thinks and acts.

Every American soldier should receive cultural and language instruction, not to make him a linguist but to make him a diplomat in uniform who has the sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with indigenous citizens on the street. Soldier acculturation is too important to be relegated to last-minute briefings before deployment. The military should devise, monitor, and assess acculturation policy as a joint responsibility.

The military spends millions to create urban combat sites to train soldiers how to kill an enemy in cities. Urban sites optimized to teach small units how to coexist with and cultivate trust among indigenous peoples might be equally useful. Such centers could expose young soldiers to a simulated Middle Eastern urban crisis, perhaps near a mosque or busy marketplace. Expatriate role-players could incite local mobs to violence. The services and joint agencies, with State Department, CIA, or allied observers calling the shots during an exercise, would provide an interagency and international presence.

Training. The quality of performance among today's close-combat soldiers is high. Enemy soldiers run about shooting wildly while American soldiers move in tightly formed groups and carry their rifles with fingers outside the trigger wells. No one questions the value of rigorous training, and no one appreciates first-rate training more than close-combat soldiers. They know good training is better than pay and benefits because they, more than anyone, understand that first-rate preparation for war is the best life insurance they can buy.

Past performance in combat provides no guarantees for the future, however. The unforgiving nature of today's urban battlefield demands a new set of close-combat skills. Urban battles are isolated, compartmentalized affairs where small units must be self-contained, autonomous entities that perform complex tasks without external help. Soldiers and Marines will have to be proficient in the many tasks supporting units, such as intelligence, medicine, fire support, and communications units, once performed.

In Vietnam, two-thirds of all small-unit combat deaths occurred during the first 2 months in the field because the training system of that era mass-produced soldiers unprepared for the complex, difficult task of close-in killing. In the future, small units must undergo far more rigorous precombat conditioning. No unit should go into a shooting situation until leaders as well as followers have experienced bloodless battles first.

Soldiers and Marines will also have to transform themselves from close-combat specialists to providers of humanitarian assistance and social services. Often, they will have to shift between the two opposite roles several times during a deployment. Such soldiers and Marines cannot be mass-produced. Training regimens for tasks such as these might take years rather than months. Think of tomorrow's close-combat soldiers or Marines as moving from apprentice to skilled close-combat journeyman under the tutelage of master craftsman squad leaders. Taking a close look at its custom of keeping young Marines in the ranks only through a few deployments before mustering them out might be in the Marine Corps' best interest. The Corps might find it more productive to keep Marines in the force longer.

Small-unit effectiveness. U.S. soldiers are more effective than those from other cultures because they fight for their buddies rather than for fractured ideologies, twisted theologies, failed symbols of allegiance, or discredited leaders. No one disputes that fighting in cities today demands a great deal more training and collective bonding. The isolation inherent in urban fighting puts greater demands on small units and requires a degree of small-unit cohesion never before seen in the American military. A soldier's bond to his buddy often lasts long after the danger has passed, sometimes for a lifetime, but little is known about how to generate this bonding, and commanders are not terribly skillful at creating conditions for it to occur.

The one ingredient all agree is necessary for creating a closely bonded unit is time. The aging of a
good unit, like a good wine, cannot be hurried. Platoons need at least a year to develop full body and character. The Army’s effort to create individual soldier stability is admirable, but keeping a soldier stable is meaningless if he goes into combat a stranger within his unit. Perhaps we need to recast the definition of stability to embrace the centrality of small-unit stability, specifically in close-combat squads and platoons. The pipeline is long and the probability of death is great. Conventional logic demands that the Army and Marine Corps create many more close-combat units, of which we can never have too many.

The challenge for the future is to develop doctrine and technology to allow small units to regain the advantage in the close urban fight and defeat a diabolical enemy who owns the home-field advantage. To be successful, small units must be able to connect with each other inside urban canyons, overcome isolation, and mass and concentrate the force as much as possible. Small units must find ways to extend the red zone to regain the advantage of killing the enemy outside the range of his organic weapons. Only after achieving these objectives can American forces enter a city with confidence that they will defeat the enemy while incurring losses acceptable to the American people.

**Supply.** Paradoxically, as the American way of war has become more technologically complex, non-technological stressors on fighting units have grown. Infantry and special operations soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq carry far heavier loads on their backs than soldiers did during World War II. A soldier today is virtually a pack animal, carrying as much as 120 pounds of gear into the battle area. Even this load gives him less than 24 hours of sustainability. Batteries alone weigh more than 20 pounds. A close-combat soldier must become unburdened if he is to fight effectively. His needs must be met just when needed and in the right proportions.

Aerial vehicles on call can provide dismounted soldiers in cities with the essentials of close combat by dropping supplies directly to units in contact. Close-combat soldiers must have the discretion to expend whatever is necessary to win and that resupply will follow without enemy interference. Only then will soldiers and Marines chance unburdening themselves and focus on fighting rather than humping loads that inhibit their ability to fight effectively.

**External Support**

With the essentials provided, a close-combat soldier’s need for additional support diminishes in proportion to the cost and proximity of resources coming from outside his immediate control. The presence of outside help rarely contributes significantly to improving soldiers’ circumstances, and we should treat external sources of support with caution. Most close-combat soldiers would gladly trade all the bombers and fighters in the universe for the sure knowledge of who is around the next corner.

**Firepower.** The sources of external killing power soldiers favor are not the most expensive, sophisticated items in the service arsenals. First choice goes to systems the soldier or Marine commands personally, such as the low-tech and ubiquitous mortar, a weapon that is both simple and responsive. Next is close support artillery to respond to calls for fire from soldiers in contact. Outside sources of killing power that soldiers and Marines prefer are aerial systems. Most favored are older, slower, low-tech killing machines that can deliver intimate killing power, such as attack helicopters; the ubiquitous, trustworthy, low and slow-flying A10 attack aircraft; the Marine Harrier; and the deadly AC130 aerial gunship, derivative of a 1950s-era Air Force transport aircraft.

Whatever the source of killing power, close-combat soldiers judge its effectiveness on four crucial characteristics: precision, discrimination, proximity, and latency. The precision problem is virtually solved. One-meter accuracy is perfectly fine. The problems of discrimination and proximity arise from the difficulties in placing air-delivered fires on the right target, particularly a tactical, close-in target. Soldiers and Marines might prefer 2-ton bombs for collapsing bridges and buildings, but big bombs are of little use when the target is small, just around the
corner, and on the move. Smaller, rather than more precise, bombs are the necessary next step in weapons development if aerial killing power is to meet the demands of urban close combat.

The ground warrior’s greatest firepower need is a solution for the latency problem. Simply stated, the closer in the target, the greater the time needed to deliver firepower to kill it. Technology can help solve this problem, but the greatest impediment to responsive fires is bureaucracy. Too many eyes and hands are involved and too many decisions made before aircraft are cleared to deliver a weapon to friendly forces in contact.

Unresponsive firepower systems are taxed most severely when attacking targets on the move. Even the most advanced bombing system cannot kill any object, even a large one, on the move. Of course, the enemy is aware of this weakness and has learned the surest way to avoid destruction from American precision is to disperse and hide or keep constantly on the move. The enemy knows a safe period always follows being spotted because American commanders and soldiers use that time to choose the right weapon, gain permission to deliver the munition, and decide the proper method to deliver it. Unfortunately, these impediments lessen the ability of supporting fires to kill the most dangerous enemy systems. The task is left to the man inside the red zone using shoulder-fired missiles, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles.

Maneuver. The freedom to move about the battlefield is essential for success in the open battlespaces and closed urban battlespaces of a campaign. The more quickly a ground force defeats an enemy arrayed conventionally in the open, the less likely the enemy can retreat into the urban jungle to establish a cohesive defense there. Imagine the consequences if Army and Marine forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom would have had combined armored and aerial-delivered forces to pass through and over Iraqi forces and surround and enter urban areas. Had American forces possessed that operational speed, the enemy never would have been able to create today’s organized havoc inside Iraq’s cities, and the task of destroying both the fedayeen and Ba’athist infrastructures would have been far easier and considerably less costly in lives.

Sweeping, rapid maneuver in open warfare can best be accomplished by transporting close-combat soldiers and Marines in light, swift, armored vehicles. However, the maneuver challenge changes when relatively static urban warfare begins. In cities, the enemy can only move about in small groups without risking annihilation by fires from aircraft watching overhead. Mounted maneuver allows armored vehicles to establish a cordon around a city quickly without exposing ground soldiers to enemy ambush. The speed of vehicle movement permits small units to strike deep into the urban mass to take out critical targets and return unharmed. The soldier’s greatest concern when fighting mounted is the disorientation and isolation he feels once he leaves the vehicle.

**Getting the Proportions Right**

Big science and technology produced the world’s best aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles and are still essential to the Nation. To neglect these programs now would only encourage other potential enemies, such as China and perhaps Russia, to rekindle a needless, fiscally damaging conventional arms race.

One can also argue that certain aspects of big-war technologies devoted to winning wars at sea, in the stratosphere, and in space provide useful capabilities for prosecuting tactical battles in urban jungles. The argument is simple. If you believe events in Afghanistan and Iraq are anomalies that, once ended, are unlikely to be repeated, then today’s defense priorities are about right. If, however, you believe the military faces decades of intense conflict against active, adaptive, and fanatical enemies who consider killing soldiers a viable strategic end, then you must agree a rebalancing of defense priorities is of utmost importance. Current events appear to prove proportions are not right. We must adjust priorities immediately to improve the chances of keeping American ground forces alive in the close tactical fight. More resources for individual soldiers and Marines will mean fewer deaths and maimings. Paying more attention to those who do most of the fighting and dying will have strategic consequences. Limiting the cost of prosecuting wars increases the likelihood we can achieve victory at a cost the American people are willing to accept. MR

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Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, is an independent consultant for defense matters. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Duke University. He has served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Korea. With Williamson Murray, he is the co-author of The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
LATIN AMERICAN political leaders have had considerable success at subordinating their militaries to civilian rule, but they have done so without a fundamental knowledge of or interest in defense affairs. But, our own definitions of civilian control, which almost uniformly stipulate that civilians must be well versed on defense if they are to lead, preclude us from comprehending these positive trends. The definitions, which are normative and based largely on standards imported from North America and Western Europe, are exacting, and they erect hurdles that Latin America not only has not cleared but cannot clear.

Consequently, a great disjuncture exists between what we posit must happen to achieve civilian control and what actually happened. If we were to hypothesize that a central pillar of civilian control hinged on the ability of civilian politicians and their appointed officials to show they could lead informatively on defense, we would be left with a null set: no Latin American states would qualify because there has never been the kind of permanent security-threat environment that warrants investing the resources and talent necessary to create sophisticated war machines nor to equip civilian overseers with an understanding of how they work.

By and large, militaries of the region do not have to worry about the threat of invasion from foreign militaries, and thus, civilians do not have to worry about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training. Internal threats (narcotraffickers, terrorists, guerrillas) do not pose challenges that warrant great military preparedness.

Unlike the U.S., Latin American military spending does not generate great amounts of civilian employment, and thus, politicians cannot benefit from diverting defense resources to their districts. Consequently, they have no incentive to learn about defense. Still, the military must be managed. What Latin America needs are civilians who can manage the military in political-, not defense-, oriented terms. In this respect, Latin America is in better shape than we might think, but we would never know that within the confines of current intellectual constructs.

The Problem

An overwhelming consensus exists within the community of Latin American scholars that civilians inside and outside defense ministries and legislative committees suffer from an appreciable deficit in knowledge of defense affairs. Such knowledge is vital if political leaders are to command the respect among military officers necessary to fully achieve civilian control. It is significant that in the one country where some case arguably could be made for civilian competence (Argentina), a leading civil-military scholar insists that, as of 2 years ago, a significant absence of civilian defense knowledge, with few resources or institutions committed to training civilians in defense, still existed.

What is it that civilians do not know, and for how long have they not known it? Latin American civilians within defense ministries (and legislative commissions) seemed unprepared to lead on questions pertaining to national-defense objectives, priorities, threats, strategies, implementation, budgeting, doctrine, and education. They consistently duck questions on if and how defense forces are needed to achieve national security. What foreign and domestic policy objectives of the nation, if any, would entail the use of defense forces? Under what conditions? At what cost? And, are the militaries ready to defend? Then there is the question of prioritization of goals. What are the most critical security and defense objectives? Which ones are less critical? Assuming clear goals were laid out, how does the nation get from here to there? Civilian ministers and their staffs do not seem to be up to speed on national security and defense strategies.

Civilians within the defense community should be well versed in implementation problems, even if the
responsibility lies more with the military itself. How will the military be readied, organized, trained, and deployed to meet the challenges it faces? There are also budgetary matters. Are civilians helping to construct budgets correlated with strategic objectives? Are they allocating funds needed to fulfill missions that have been carefully conceived and assigned by civilian leaders? There is scant evidence they have.

Finally, there are questions about doctrine and education. How are militaries oriented to fight? How should their orientation change to fit national priorities? What are the military schools teaching? Are lessons consistent with democratic values? How do they relate to the overall objectives of the nation? Civilians have a hands-off policy when it comes to ideological and intellectual preparation of soldiers.

Another way of viewing the defense-knowledge deficit in Latin America is to note what kind of knowledge surplus exists within the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s 2003 “Annual Report to the President and the Congress” maps out new operational goals and specifies the budgetary request to fulfill each. Within the report, the section on operational risk asks four basic, essential questions Latin American civilian defense ministers and ministries seldom pose: Do we have the right forces available? Are our forces postured to succeed? Are our forces currently ready? Are our forces employed consistent with our strategic priorities? The report answers each question in detail: we are still waiting for answers from Latin American Defense Ministers.

**Historical Timing**

Historical timing is important. Certainly, if this were the period of democratic transition, or even the early post-transitional period, it would be presumptuous to raise such concerns. But now, some 20 to 25 years after the democratic wave washed ashore, enough water has passed under the bridge to allow us to take stock of Latin America’s condition. Indeed, comparisons with Spain permit such evaluation. Just 15 years after the fall of the Franquist regime, Felipe Agüero could declare that civilian supremacy had been fully attained. His definition of supremacy is quite demanding, insisting that civilians have an active presence in defense spheres, including their own defense project; a set of well-thought-out views on military organization; professional norms and education, and allocation of resources. If Spain had succeeded in meeting most of its goals after 15 years of democracy, certainly it is time to ask hard questions about Latin America’s lack of progress after 20 to 25 years.

Similarly, just a decade after the fall of communism, civil-military scholars of Eastern and Central Europe insisted countries there had already moved from first-generation issues of institutional restructuring to second-generation challenges of control of defense policy. Why, then, has Latin America not yet met second-generation challenges?

The first, most basic question to ask is, Are civilians in charge of the defense ministries in Latin America? If not, and if they are not in a position to exert authority or to hire other civilians into key ministerial positions, it matters little whether they have defense wisdom.

Not surprisingly, the military dominated the position of defense minister during the 1980s when the region was in the infancy of its democratic rebirth. By the early 1990s, that domination eased, but if we look at the figures over the last decade, there is no trend at all toward civilianizing defense cabinet positions. In 1994, 44 percent of all ministers were from the military. In 2004, the figure was 46 percent. It is also disturbing to note the military’s thorough monopolization of the defense portfolio in some of the region’s largest and most important countries: Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, and Mexico. Those countries have had military defense ministers between 90 to 100 percent of the time over the last 21 years. Based on these data, Latin America is not moving steadily in the direction of civilianized defense ministries.

What about civilians currently in charge? How much defense education and on-the-job experience do they have? Data were examined to see if ministers had taken courses or obtained degrees at military or civilian academic institutions in Latin America or elsewhere and if they had previously served in the defense ministry in any capacity or had occupied any relevant defense- or security-related post elsewhere in government. Of the eight civilian defense ministers (out of 15) currently in power, only two, possibly three, have some defense-relevant education, and only one has a defense career background. Thus, only 13 percent of all defense ministers are civilians with some defense expertise, and only 7 percent are civilian defense ministers with a defense background.

Naturally, these findings do not begin to get at the problem of the poorly trained civilian staff that mans subordinate posts within these ministries. The findings also do not touch on the subject of legislative defense commissions and whether congressmen, or staff assigned to them, have fundamental defense understandings. Unfortunately, I could not obtain information on those variables. But, if civilians are to lead on defense, leadership must begin at the top. Few civilian defense ministers in the region, let alone the presidents they answer to, can exert authority over the military based on expertise, irrespective of
whether they are in the formal chain of command or not (and most are).

Why should this dearth in defense knowledge matter? That the knowledge gap will be closed any time soon is not likely. Powerful historical, structural, and self-interest reasons exist as to why this is so. Latin America is not a region where politicians have ever had or will ever have the incentive to get up to speed on defense issues. However, that is not to say civilians cannot be effective handlers of armed forces. Presidents and their defense ministers have had (with a few obvious exceptions) relative success at subduing military rebellions, calming civil-military tensions, and building stable, generally respectful relations predicated on military subordination to civilian control. The balance of political power has unquestionably tilted in favor of civilians over the course of 15 to 20 years, but the balance of competence has not. Civilians still are at a decided disadvantage vis-à-vis their military counterparts when it comes to understanding the ins and outs of defense.

Yet, nearly every definition of civilian control assumes managing the military is part of managing defense—that they are inseparable. While Latin American politicians have every incentive to manage the military in a way that subordinates them to civilian authority, they have few incentives to develop expertise on defense issues. In suggesting, however, that the former cannot be accomplished without the latter, as almost all definitions do, we are left to contemplate the absurd proposition that according to our own criteria, there is little if any civilian control anywhere in Latin America.

If civil-military relations in the region are in such a precarious state, then given the importance of civilian control to the survival and consolidation of democracy, it follows that democratic governments are also in a precarious state. Neither is the case. The reasonable alternative is to adjust the definitions so they are relevant and in tune with Latin American realities. And, they must be adjusted primarily by separating civilian control of the military from civilian control of defense.

Civilian Control and Defense Wisdom

That it is hard to guide the military without knowing something about defense has long been argued. Obedience implies command, so the argument goes. Soldiers can only be expected to faithfully comply with orders if they have confidence their political overseers can lead on the issues that matter most to them. Absent that leadership, soldiers can lose respect for civilian handlers, the chain of command can weaken, and military insubordination can result.

Of course command authority can imply many things, but the literature on civil-military relations leaves little doubt command is strongly tied to defense wisdom, in which civilians (at least in Latin America) are lacking. The requisites of knowledge begin with Samuel Huntington, the author of *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
of Civil-Military Relations. Even within the notion of objective control, which relies heavily on the military’s professionalization, a strong need exists for civilian competence in defense affairs. The Secretary of Defense must be able to integrate fiscal and defense information into an overall policy design. To do this, he would have to rely on a military and civilian staff to help develop a comprehensive military program.

The National Security Council (NSC), composed mainly of civilians, is charged with advising on overall national security policy. Huntington found it inconceivable for such an agency to function if its civilian members were in the dark about defense. The failure of Latin American NSC members to become sufficiently informed about defense might be one reason presidents from the region so seldom convene their NSCs.

More recent scholarship has essentially heeded Huntington’s call. According to Agüero, civilian control involves the ability of civilians to define goals and the organization of defense, formulate conduct of defense policy, and monitor implementation of policy to avert military perceptions of civilian incompetence and to overcome military corporate resistance to democratic leadership. In commenting on the requisites for democratic civilian control, J. Samuel Fitch notes that civilians must be able to identify threats that would warrant military force; assign the military its defense- or security-related missions; devise a sensible budget; set defense policy; and exert oversight on military education and socialization. Absent these elements, military subordination to civilian rule could become conditional—no longer absolute.

According to Harold Trinkunas, in “Crafting Civilian Control in Argentina and Venezuela,” the key is for civilians to attempt to institutionalize their control via oversight of military activities and military professionalism. To accomplish this they would need to demonstrate substantial commitments of government resources and expertise. Trinkunas acknowledges there are lesser cost-control methods that hinge on strategies of appeasement and divide and rule, as well as those that rely much less on expertise and oversight. He warns, however, that these are risky and result, at best, in weakly institutionalized control.

In commenting on the need for defense reform, I argue that the “broad strokes of institutional reorganization must be painted by the president and his defense staff,” but this was not done in the case of Argentina. I also blame the armed forces because they have “grasped tenaciously to defense planning as if it were a subject only they could touch.” With defense perceived to be off limits, civilians have never been able to prove their worth. Instead, they have developed a kind of inferiority complex that just reinforces their dependency on the military.

Rut Diamint focuses on the issue of educating civilians in defense, noting there is an unwillingness of states to invest resources into creating institutional training grounds for civilians in those areas, as there is for the diplomatic corps or for economics. Juan Rial points out that civilian graduates of various institutes of higher studies in Latin America rarely head for the ministries of defense. Those who do are almost always uniformed personnel. Thus, there is no real career path laid out for aspiring defense administrators and managers. The results are predictable. Diamint has combed Latin America’s defense ministries for clues of civilian defense wisdom. In every case she has come up short.

Why have questions of defense—in Diamint’s words—“always been the private concerns of the armed forces and just a handful of civilians associated with them?” Why have civilians not “taken back defense” from the military? Why, after more than two decades of democratic rule, have so few resources been devoted to equipping civilians with the skills they need to conduct defense affairs within the ministries and legislative committees? And why has our criteria for civilian control been so seemingly out of sync with Latin American realities? The fact is, civilians have not and will not become sufficiently well versed on defense matters anytime
They will always have a significant knowledge deficit because there is no incentive for them to learn defense. For several important reasons, defense has not been and will not be a priority for Latin American governments.

**Historical Legacies and War Avoidance**

Latin American armies were neither created for nor called on to serve in ways commensurate with West European armies during the formative stages of state creation. With few exceptions, Latin American armies were never state builders. They never used offensive power to enlarge national territories at the expense of others. They were mainly involved in internal, internecine conflicts between caudillos—political party bosses and other power brokers—all within boundaries set by Spain and Portugal. Consequently, they did not have to grow to a size or achieve a readiness consonant with the huge tasks of state formation and, hence, did not inherit the critical legacies European armies inherited.

Strip away the myths armies have built about their indispensable roles in defense of “la Patria” and you will find these institutions, with one or two exceptions, never succeeded at expanding the reach of states, or even consolidating the territories they had. But, if they have seldom used offensive capabilities to project power and seize territory, neither have they readied themselves for defensive purposes. Latin American nations have fought few interstate wars. The region has been and remains one of the most pacific on earth, and militaries have never had to be effective deterrents to invasion.

In the absence of war or the threat of war, there has been less demand for strong fighting machines as well as less demand for defense expertise among civilians. In his exhaustive study of wars and nations in Latin America, Miguel Centeno finds that civilian elites, military officers, the masses, and the media alike largely reject interstate war as a feasible option to addressing political problems.

Politicians seldom voice the rhetoric of war and usually have more to fear from internal mass movements than from invasion by foreign countries. National leaders do not see a rational gain in war and do not include war as part of their behavioral repertoire. Society routinely rejects war or war preparation as an option. Two-thirds of those polled in 1998 opposed U.S. weapons sales to Latin America for fear doing so would generate an arms race. Centeno says, “Latin American states and their populations do not appear to have had the historically forged institutional or political appetite for the type of organizational insanity of modern war.”

Latin America is gun-shy of war, and it shows. In the last 100 years, only six wars have been fought and there have been only three since 1935. Latin America lags behind Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in terms of the number of wars fought during the 20th century. Only Africa had fewer. Border skirmishes have been plentiful, but according to Centeno, only 5 percent of these erupted into full-scale war, compared to 65 percent in Europe. David Mares refers to militarized interstate disputes (MID), where military violence is threatened, displayed, or used without producing wars, as being plentiful in Latin American history, numbering in the hundreds. Yet, of 237 MIDs in South and Central America over the course of a century, a mere 2.5 percent developed into full-scale combat.

The percentages reflect both an unwillingness and inability to wage external wars. Latin American militaries are not trained or equipped to fight sustained international battles. Thus, when they do engage the enemy, they look for quick exits rather than decisive victories.

In January 1995, sensing that a conflict was imminent between his country and Peru, Ecuadorian President Durán-Ballen Cordovez requested the attention of the guarantor states 3 days before hostilities began. Three weeks later, the guarantor states had secured a cease fire, and 11 days later, the brief war ended with the Declaration of Montevideo. Monica Herz and João Pontes Nogueira comment: “Fear of general escalation certainly contributed to limiting the scale of violence and to attempts to end the war quickly.”

Yes, there have been many protracted internal wars fought between armies and guerrillas and civil wars between political factions and their militias, but the resource and organizational and logistical demands of such conflicts cannot compete with those required for interstate conflicts. With the exception of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), most guerrilla units in South America have been defeated with relative ease, never testing the armed forces’ warfare capabilities. In Peru, dogged police-intelligence work, not decisive battlefield victories by the armed forces, finally vanquished the Sendero.

Centeno argues that Latin American militaries sought internal missions because they could handle them. In constructing its defensive Cold War architecture, the United States knew it would never rely on Latin American forces to contribute to the Hemisphere’s defense, because it justifiably believed Latin American militaries were unable to lend a hand in fighting major international wars. Thus, the United States relegated Latin American states to internal policing and oriented its military aid and sales programs toward inducing an inward look.
Avoiding War

When Latin American countries occasionally do engage in war, their capacities, not to mention their will to fight, are quickly depleted, as evidenced by Argentina’s defeat by Great Britain in the Malvinas War in 1982 and by the brevity of the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1995. The lessons learned from these brief, unsuccessful encounters are quite distinct from those learned in the Northern Hemisphere where civilian and defense experts endlessly review past performances, looking at how tactics, strategies, equipment, and men combined to either win or lose to better prepare for the next war.

In the South, governments and militaries usually devise means of avoiding the next war. Argentina quickly discovered how thoroughly ill-prepared it was for an armed engagement against a first-rate world power. The lesson learned was not to develop a larger, more sophisticated fighting machine but to, in a phrase, “downsize with diplomacy.”

Argentina’s military has been reduced to a shell of what it once was. There are fewer men under arms, fewer installations, less weaponry, and less training time. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have solved countless disputes with Britain and with Argentina’s neighbors—Brazil and Chile. Diplomacy has so reduced tensions between these states as to make armed conflict between them practically unthinkable, which in turn, made it unnecessary to equip the military in ways that would allow it to effectively fight an interstate war and lowered the need for civilians to preoccupy themselves with defense preparedness.25

Argentina is not alone in desiring to avoid prioritizing military war preparedness. As a region, Latin America spends less on the military than any other region on earth. Latin America’s average military expenditures as a percent of the gross domestic product trails behind Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America. Its military expenditure as a percent of central government expenditures is significantly less than any other regions. Few politicians devote the time, resources, and political capital necessary to build their armed forces into effective fighting units.

What politicians and armies have been doing with great relish is to forge cooperative security agreements that make the need or risk of armed engagement between neighbors more remote. It might seem like defense business as usual when we note the countless efforts on the part of Southern Cone states to forge regional security cooperation. An impressive array of defense-related activities, ranging from mutual visitations to joint training and simulations, has occurred. But the principal motive behind these efforts is not to construct better defenses against an unknown or undefined enemy, but to increase trust and transparency between them to avoid the temptation to go to
war and the need to worry about defense. And, this means civilian overseers can devote less attention to defense preparedness.

The more-relaxed security environment throughout most of South and Central America reduces the need to maintain force posture and readiness, let alone the need to build larger, stronger, more sophisticated militaries, especially in the context of huge economic and social problems, with cash-strapped governments struggling to cope with so many other pressing priorities. While there is no permanent security threat environment that warrants the investment of the resources, time, and talent necessary to create sophisticated militaries, there is a near-permanent economic and social threat environment, which includes the threats of widening poverty, unemployment, declining social welfare services, and so on, that begs for governmental attention. Defense can never compete for this kind of attention, and the truth is it never has.

**Disincentives to Learn Defense**

Defense is a public good, and it is rarely consumed. Not a week goes by when the average Latin American citizen does not rely on power, transportation, communication, sewage, and school systems, and medical facilities, many needed on a routine basis. But defense lies in waiting; it is almost never used, and it is seldom visible. If it is in a state of disrepair, as roads, phones, electrical grids, and trains invariably are, citizens do not mind. Defense does not directly affect their lives. Thus, it is difficult for politicians to promote defense spending as a political issue.

Were military-related threats to national security more common, visible, and imminent, and were the need to deploy military force more apparent, it would be less difficult. But this is not the case. To be sure, there are various threats to security (narcotraficking, terrorism, contraband, other criminal activity, and illegal migration), but they do not compel wholesale military responses. In this not-so-new security environment, police, internal security forces, immigration authorities, and intelligence units are at the front line. Militaries occupy rearguard positions, waiting for the occasional call to assist other forces. Even when they do engage, they do so in a limited way, whether for logistical support, aerial surveillance, or conducting anti-crime sweeps through a drug-ridden barrio. These are not the kind of missions that test the military’s mettle.

Of course, even in the absence of threat, defense could still be relevant were it to provide important private goods to its citizens. In the United States that good is employment. Millions of North Americans—often entire communities—depend on defense expenditures for their livelihoods. Military bases and munitions plants, which employ civilians, are spread throughout the nation and motivate legislators to care and know about defense, procurement, and the defense budget and its enlargement. Key congressmen and their highly trained staffs sit on the Armed Services Committees where they wield considerable clout.

By contrast, in Latin America, military installations and defense contractors provide few civilian jobs and are normally concentrated in select areas. Defense is not a huge pork-barrel opportunity. Thus, only a few lawmakers gain by diverting expenditures to defense. If there is little to gain in terms of extending patronage and resources to their districts, legislators, as members of their respective parties, might still have an incentive to deliberate on defense policy. But, political parties in Latin America rarely include defense issues in their platform statements, and they do not make defense an issue either in the campaigns or thereafter.

Within Latin American congresses, defense commissions (where they exist) are poorly equipped to wield authority and oversight. Only 10 Latin American countries have committees dedicated solely to defense. The others have committees with overlapping jurisdictions. In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay, defense shares the agenda with foreign affairs, public order, development, or general governmental operations, which means focused attention to defense and the military is attenuated.

Congressional members of these commissions seldom stay long and thus do not gain the necessary experience and expertise. The scope of military- and defense-related tasks assumed by these defense commissions is restricted.

A review of defense committee work for 13 countries in recent years shows they most often deal with granting permission for deployment of national troops abroad; for the entrance of foreign troops into national territory; promotion and retirement rules; pensions and social security benefits for officers and families; judicial matters, including military court jurisdictions; and decorative or symbolic acts, including conferring medals, honors, and so on. These functions correspond closely to what the national constitutions stipulate for the legislative branch in general. In other words, defense commissions have not carved out their own unique, more-detailed defense agendas.

Reflecting on what these commissions are not doing on a regular basis is instructive. They are not reviewing the defense portion of the budgets, and
for good reason: they have no access to them. Congressmen are not privy to the itemized details of the defense ledger.

In most Latin American societies, national security trumps the congressional right to review and analyze, let alone change, defense allocations. Neither the defense nor budget and finance commissions are empowered to reopen, examine, or rewrite the packaged defense budget. There is no item-by-item review, no markup, and thus, no real capacity to assign or reassign resources to defense accounts, which impedes the committee's ability to carry out another vital function: oversight.

Defense commissions are not exerting informed oversight on defense operations, other than to decide troop exits and entrances. They occasionally weigh in on defense production and procurement and military judicial matters. Without the necessary expenditure information, congress cannot take the military to task for misallocations, wasteful spending, or fraud. The commissions have no auditors to examine military accounts. At best, commissions can call the defense minister to testify. If there is any effort, however limited, to exert budgetary oversight, it appears to be controlled by the services themselves.

Aside from information, another central issue is expertise, which is also needed for oversight. Unlike the fields of medicine, education, or health, few Latin American countries have communities of experts who can inform the debate or help staff commissions. The venue for defense-related discussions is the military academy, not a think tank or civilian university. And, there are few ongoing institutionalized channels of communication or revolving doors to link committees with an external defense establishment to help make more informed decisions.

In sum, the public pays no heed to defense unless there is a clear external threat that warrants an organized, military response. Because such threats rarely materialize in Central and South America, legislative politicians cannot prioritize defense because doing so would serve no electoral purpose. Defense, as opposed to the dozens of other more pressing issues, will not deliver tangible benefits.

Political parties do not fashion major defense positions in their platforms for the same reasons, and those in the executive branch of government do not give precedence to defense. All of this leads to the predictable result that civilians in and out of government do not have the necessary expertise to lead on defense. Yet, civilians must exert political authority over the military and pay attention to civil-military affairs. How can they do so without a firm grip on defense? The fact is they have been doing so for many years.

Civilian Control

That civilian control in Latin America, by any reasonable measure, hinges on civilians gaining defense proficiency is unlikely. During the past two decades, while the balance of competence still tilts heavily in favor of the military, the balance of power has moved in favor of civilians. With some exceptions, civilians have gained the upper hand over the military despite considerable gaps in defense-related knowledge—gaps which have not closed appreciably. The balance of power has moved decisively in favor of democratic governments in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

To a lesser extent, but still visible, is a movement in favor of civilians in Chile and Guatemala. Even in Colombia, where a brutal civil war continues to rage, there is no talk of the civilian government losing control over its armed forces. Only in Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela have efforts to appreciably reduce military political power fallen short. Generally speaking, armies have less political influence in Latin American democratic systems than they once had. Coup avoidance is practiced regularly but so, too, is the threat of a coup or other provocative warnings that militaries typically issued to civilian overseers in the past. In a legal and practical sense, most militaries remain subordinate to civilian authorities. Presidents have legal command over their forces, and militaries honor that command.

Some of the successes throughout Latin America during the course of two decades include—

- Creating or re-creating defense ministries, most of which are in the chain of command.
- Significant military downsizing, in terms of size and budgets.
- Losing military prerogatives, including shrinking military court jurisdictions; loss of cabinet and other positions of vertical governmental authority; and loss of control over police and other internal security forces.
- Losing the military's clandestine civilian supporters (especially within right-wing and business circles) and, thus, its praetorian leverage outside the state.
- Greater civilian autonomy over the making of national policies and, concomitantly, fielding virtually no military interference (with the exception of Venezuela).
- Military noninterference in selecting and electing civilians to political posts (with Ecuador and Venezuela the exceptions).
- Presidentially authorized, wholesale purges of top commanders (in Argentina, Guatemala, and Honduras) and military acquiescence to those moves.
- Military missions (internal or external) under-
taken at the behest of civilian authorities, not autonomously.

Despite these improvements, the region seems light years away from institutionalized democratic civilian control, if that means extensive civilian understandings and supervision of defense affairs within well-oiled defense institutions. The disjunction between these expectations and the reality on the ground is sizeable. Take Central America for example. Central America is emblematic of so much of what has occurred in Latin America. Mark Ruhl accurately portrays the situation, noting how, contrary to every expectation, “democratically chosen leaders in [Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua] have largely subordinated the military to civilian control and curbed its political influence.”

Evidence of this trend is clear. The militaries have accepted “major reductions in their budgets and structures”; lost control of police forces; watched as their courts have lost jurisdiction over human rights cases; accepted, despite their displeasure, abrupt and sweeping personnel changes; and, in general, been obedient to executive orders and thus refrained from interference in governmental policymaking.

**Military Control**

The militaries operate within the bounds of the law, and the laws have been strengthened to clarify the prerogatives of the president and his defense ministries. Still, in every case, the militaries enjoy autonomy over institutional and defense matters civilians will not touch. Whether in a country like El Salvador, which arguably has made the greatest strides toward civilian control, or Guatemala, which has lagged behind, the pattern is the same: when it comes to defense planning, operations, budgeting, training, doctrine, or education, civilians are nowhere to be found.

El Salvador, where the military was once so dominant, “now accepts civilian control.” Yet, the defense ministry is totally overrun by military personnel from top to bottom. The armed forces completely control all facets of defense planning, budgeting, operations, and intelligence gathering. And, legislative defense commissions, lacking all expertise and interest in defense, fail to monitor the military’s use of resources. As soon as Salvadoran and other Central American presidents successfully reestablished civil-military order, they lost interest in further talk of military reforms presided over by themselves or their defense ministers.

In short, in Central America, there is a complete absence of civilian defense-related insight, influence, and expertise, yet military subordination to civilian rule has been largely achieved. That no discernible trend toward greater civilian expertise in defense affairs exists is important to note. Not even a hint is present that they have any interest in the subject. The result, at least for El Salvador (and Honduras), is greater institutional autonomy for the military within a framework Ruhl characterizes as being “close to democratic civilian control.”

So what is the rub? The common reaction to these trends is, yes, Central American governments, like most Latin American governments, have achieved a semblance of civilian control. But, to complete and institutionalize the task, they must clear the hurdle of defense wisdom, and they must fortify their ministries and legislative commissions by staffing them with knowledgeable civilian defense specialists. This is where one must part ways with conventional wisdom and say, What we see is about as good as it is going to get. We should dispense with the “musts” and the “oughts” and spend more time trying to construct definitions and analyses that conform to Latin American, not North American or European, realities.

The requirements for civilian control, in a security environment where the threat of war is remote; demands for great military prowess is low; and the material payoff to society of defense buildups is meager, should be different than requirements where the threats, demands, and payoffs are great. That
Political Civilian Control

Although civilians are reluctant to deal with defense issues, they must still manage the military. The armed forces form the coercive arm of the state as well as a self-interested corporation with needs that must be addressed. Civilian leaders have managed the military, largely through a form of political civilian control, which is a low-cost means of achieving a relative calm in civil-military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, legislative oversight, and large budgets. This has been the modus operandi for the majority of presidents and defense ministers in Latin America for some time.

Political civilian control is to be distinguished from classical notions of civilian control whether or not they are objective, subjective (penetration model), democratic, or more recent reinventions of these terms. The concept has several dimensions. For example, it is a means of avoiding undesirable military behavior, be it intense pressure, provocation, coup threats, or actual coups. Certainly coup avoidance on its own does not solidify a hierarchical relation between civilian leaders and their militaries, but in a region marked historically by coups, it is an important accomplishment in itself.

Also, political civilian control is personal. Unlike Huntington’s notion of subjective civilian control, civilian control does not mean the bulk of the military is socialized to a civilian or political party point of view. Unlike penetration models practiced in communist states, the civilian control model presumes no effort to indoctrinate officers and the rank and file to a political philosophy, nor does it presume soldiers will have fully absorbed and internalized the principal of democratic civilian control. Rather, the concept suggests a more modest effort to ensure conformity with policy, first and foremost, at higher echelons of the service. Selected key officers are predisposed to fall in line with the preferences of politicians in power. They are officials who best can sell political positions to subordinates or soothe qualms about those positions. Presidents promote officers with whom they are familiar, have known via political party or familial connections, or who they surmise will be loyal to them. At the least, they try to purge from the top ranks those they calculate might cause them trouble. In doing so, they might have to upset rules of seniority to find officers who demonstrate maximum compliance, forcing those above to retire.

Even in Argentina, the country presumed to be closer to institutionalized civilian control than any other, the personal dimension remains critical. Soon after assuming office, President Nestor Kirchner dramatically cashiered nearly half the military’s high command—officers Kirchner surmised had been too close to President Carlos Menem, had disreputable human-rights records, or who might have interfered with human-rights inquiries. First to go was General Ricardo Briztoni, who had voiced political views at odds with official policy. Kirchner reached down 20 places on the army’s seniority list and chose General Roberto Bendini, someone he knew and trusted, to replace Briztoni.36 The new retirees walked away without a fight.

Presidents appoint ministers adept at managing the military and who usually come to the job without defense experience or education. They are not knowledgeable about defense, but they are politically adroit. They know how to keep the military off the front pages of newspapers, smooth over rough edges, put out brush fires, calm jittery nerves, make pledges of support, reinterpret political messages in a positive light, and so on. This does not imply acquiescence to military preferences; rather, it implies a willingness to convey those preferences up the chain of command.

Skilled civilian managers of the military are those who are willing to represent military interests to the administration while conveying administration preferences and commands to the military in a diplomatic yet firm manner, which is especially important when the government’s policy priorities diverge from the military’s. Governments must be able to make decisions that are unpopular with the military, yet retain the military’s compliance. But governments are unlikely to gain the military’s cooperation by proving their defense credentials; rather they do so by reminding the military that they and their administration are the ones who make policy; it is the military’s firm constitutional obligation to fulfill policy in a subordinate manner. Thus, civilian authority and the military’s respect for that authority do not stem from civilian defense knowledge.

Presidents and their civilian defense ministers try to avert, hold the line against, or channel and routinize military protestations, ultimately prevailing in those
difficult circumstances. Failure to do so simply invites future protestations and runs the risk of weakening the government’s sphere of influence, which is not to say the military never registers its displeasure. When it does, it does so privately, within official channels.

The military avoids taking public issue with civilians and refrains from overt provocations and threats, observing the rules of the civil-military game. By honoring procedures, the military helps solidify political civilian control, but it does not forsake its right to exert influence, which might take the form of advice and advocacy.

In the realm of spheres of influence, political civilian control adheres to the maxim “live and let live.” Civilian leaders do not meddle in core military interests if the military observes similar rules about the government’s core interests. The military’s core pertains to administering its services but, more important, to planning, preparing, and programming defense, which separates the Latin American model from the North American one, where the secretary of defense and his largely civilian staff are in charge of defense policy and strategy.

In Latin America, questions concerning defense strategy and tactics as they relate to force training, structure, and deployment have been left completely to the military to decide. Meanwhile, the armed forces observe limits to their own influence, leaving civilians to make policies outside the realm of defense. The military also does not have a say about the choice of political leaders and cabinet appointees.

If this sounds like objective civilian control, well, not quite. Huntington certainly maintains there must be a strict division of labor between things military and things civilian, but he also argues that the military’s subordination hinges on its professionalism. This is not the case here. Levels of professionalism might vary considerably among forces that plainly adhere to political civilian control. Moreover, objective civilian control presumes, as a consequence of greater professionalism, the military will become apolitical. The heart of political civilian control is politics; the military and its civilian overseers are political actors.

The military is the coercive arm of the state and a politically minded corporate interest group seeking benefit for itself. Its civilian overseers are political because they influence military behavior in ways conducive to subordination and by getting the military to ascribe to behaviors they might otherwise not prefer. Simply occupying formal positions of authority is not enough; they must interface with military commanders on a weekly or daily basis, striking a balance between firmness and flexibility, but they must do so inside the corridors of power. Hence, civil-military relations are not political as in a polemical discharge of opposing views into the stream of public opinion. After all, it is vital for subordinate military actors to keep political opinions to themselves.

While civilians interface, they do not intervene. The government stays out of the military’s defense sphere of influence principally because of its lack of knowledge and staff. In virtually all Latin American governments, legislatures, and defense ministries, there exists an overwhelming sense that the armed forces have a near-monopoly on defense wisdom and that civilians’ own defense-knowledge deficit can never be adequately overcome. This deficit differentiates the Latin American situation from that of North America, where civilian defense secretaries, especially their staff members, are well versed in defense-related issues and routinely delve into military affairs.

According to recent scholarship, civilian “meddling” has not only been a historically common occurrence in developed countries, it has been useful—even essential—to the proper management of
defense and the conduct of war. Civilian immersion in the details of defense planning (intermingling with soldiers at every level and carefully monitoring their actions for evidence of shirking responsibilities) has, according to North American experts, improved defense functioning overall, but civilian meddling in core Latin American military affairs has usually proven counterproductive. Without first establishing their defense credentials and credibility, civilians who have intervened in this way have bred military antipathy rather than compliance.

**White Books and Whitewash**

Civilian control of the military, in the absence of defense wisdom, is certainly not an idyllic formula. In an ideal world, it would be vastly preferable to have executive and congressional officials who could inform and oversee military defense planning and strategizing, but Latin America is not an ideal world, and these improvements have not and will not come to pass any time soon. The region’s historical, contextual, and political landscape precludes such developments. Regions removed from international geopolitical flashpoints (such as the Middle East, Near East, North Asia, and South Asia) pose no threat to nations outside themselves; face virtually no risk of war within their areas; have actively avoided war and built cooperative relations via diplomatic means; cannot provide appreciable material benefits to society via military spending; and are not regions that have or will prioritize defense.

Why civilians see little payoff to earning credentials in defense-related affairs is easy to understand. Even when countries profess interest in defense, their interest is remarkably shallow, as can be seen in the defense White Books of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala that have been published over the last decade or so. These are exercises in what I call “transparent obfuscation.” Their purposes are ostensibly to make defense objectives, capabilities, and strategies of each nation visible to others in the region and beyond. But these amount to long treatises replete with generalizations that say little about any given state’s defense realities. The analogy would be a once boarded-up house now being refurbished with a newly installed window. When we peer in, we see a poorly lit room sparsely furnished. There is little there and what is there is of little interest.

The White Books advertise they are the product of wide consultation with an assortment of civilian and military groups. That they have brought many to the defense table is to their credit. They are not by any stretch purely military documents, although it is impossible to tell who has informed which components of the reports. Still, the documents’ superficiality is revealing, indicating just how little defense expertise there is. With all the consultation, collaboration, and discussion, the majority of the White Books still amount to little more than superficial reflections and sterile generalizations. Virtually nothing can be gleaned of the actual state of defense affairs in these countries. In fact, one can easily transpose from one country’s White Book to another and not fundamentally alter the intended meaning.

But the White Books reveal exactly what we might expect from nations in a region that does not prioritize defense. Thus, remarkably little is said about war or defense preparation, strategy, or scenarios. Some of the subjects we might have liked the White Books to address are national objectives, threats, and strategy.

**National objectives.** National objectives are tied to the use of military force. What foreign and domestic policy objectives of the nation would entail use of defense forces? Under what conditions?

**Threat.** What are the principal military-related threats facing the nation? How probable is it these threats will materialize in the short, medium, or long term?

**Strategy.** Once having identified threats and points of vulnerability, what are the specific strategies the nation has pursued or would pursue in response? How do military and other security forces figure in those strategies, or would they?

- Strategic priorities. What are strategic priorities, and how would defense relate to these? What is the overall defense strategy of the nation?
- Organization, deployment, and readiness. If organization, deployment, and readiness are to be used, how are the nation’s defense forces organized, equipped, and deployed to respond to specific threats? If they are not configured to be threat sensitive, then on what criteria are they configured?
- Training. How is training oriented toward equipping the military to confront a given threat? If there are deficiencies, what needs to change?
- Doctrine. What is the assessment of how the military is oriented to fight? How should this change to fit national priorities?
- Education. What are military schools teaching? How does this relate to the nation’s strategic priorities?

The White Book whitewash is symptomatic of an
ongoing problem; it is incumbent on scholars to catch up to that reality. Our definitions and analyses should be less normative and more analytical. Civilian control definitions, which impose unfair standards on a region not able to meet them, should be stripped of their most exacting requirements. If not, we have created a hypothesis with a null set: no state in the region can qualify to help us test the proposition— if there are these conditions (x), then there is civilian control (y).

We must come to grips with what Latin America has achieved as well as the limits to those achievements. To suggest countries of the region are at a significant deficit and, therefore, at risk because they do not have governments that can lead on defense begs essential questions. Why, with one or two exceptions, have democratic governments not succumbed to military intervention after two decades more of democracy without defense leadership? Why are civil-military relations almost universally recognized to be more stable and suitable to civilian control than they were in the past? Why do reputable scholars of specific countries insist military subordination has been achieved even as they admit in nearly the same breath that civilians have no clue how to analyze or oversee defense strategizing, planning, budgeting, or deployment?

Yes, international forces are at work (economic and diplomatic sanctions for military coups or other democratic interruptions, for example) that make the task of subordinating the military easier than in the past, but we should not discount the political skills of presidents and their defense ministers to manage military affairs. As long as the armed forces are adroitly managed politically, civilian control can survive without defense. MR

NOTES

3. Diamant, Democracy, 41.
8. Ibid., 441, 455.
9. Ibid., 434.
10. Agüero, 19-20, 33.
15. Juan Rial, “La Gestión Civil en el Sector Defensa en America Latina” (Civil administration in the defense sector in Latin America), paper presented at the 5th Conference on Research and Education in Security and Defense (REDES), Santiago, Chile, October 2003.
19. Ibid., 85.
20. Ibid., 100.
22. Ibid., 42-43.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 142.
35. Ibid., 149.
38. I have reviewed all of these White Books, cover to cover. My analysis is based on that review. See the following White Books:
39. By way of comparison, Canada’s 1994 White Book goes into considerable detail about the purpose, design, deployment, and operational conduct of its missions. For example, in a 10-page section on multilateral operations, Canada includes specifics on key principles in designing missions within which are specifications of what multilateral operations Canada would participate in: support and contributions to peacekeeping training for said missions; specifics on force deployments to NATO and the UN, including the number and kind of battle groups (infantry battalions, artillery, air squadrons, special task groups, tactical squadrons, and so on), weaponry (how many ships and of what kind), and so on, and personnel (aircrews to serve NATO’s Standing Naval Force). While Latin American White Books simply list components of their forces, Canada ties these components to specific missions and strategies.

David S. Pion-Berlin is professor of political science at the University of California, Riverside. He received a B.A. from Colgate University and an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Denver. His most recent publication is Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005 forthcoming).
Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment

Major Norman Emery, U.S. Army; Major Jason Werchan, U.S. Air Force; and Major Donald G. Mowles, Jr., U.S. Air Force

And let there be no doubt, in the years ahead it is likely that we will be surprised again by new adversaries who may also strike in unexpected ways.—Donald H. Rumsfeld

In Iskandariyah, Iraq, approximately 30 miles south of Baghdad, a bomb exploded at a police station, killing 50 Iraqis applying for the new police force. U.S. forces conducted operations to seek out and defeat those responsible. Often, U.S. forces are successful in finding, engaging, capturing, or killing insurgents who instigate terrorist attacks. However, this traditional attrition-based approach to counterinsurgency does not adequately address its strategy and secondary effects.

By attacking the police station, Iraqi insurgents hoped to achieve their strategic objectives of influencing Iraqi perceptions about security and safety; contributing to the delay or cancellation of free elections; de-legitimizing an interim Iraqi government; and degrading domestic support for U.S. policy in Iraq. This scenario demonstrates the limitation of U.S. joint information operations (IO) doctrine in addressing a new approach to warfare. Nonstate actors such as terrorists and insurgents will likely be the major threat to U.S. national security and its interests for years to come. Because these actors cannot directly confront the U.S. militarily, they must rely on an information advantage to marginalize U.S. capabilities.

Over the past decade, various high profile terrorist groups have demonstrated a sound knowledge and coordinated use of information operations. Their ability to successfully achieve objectives by shaping their battlespace in the information environment, coupled with willingness to conduct nontraditional warfare, make them a significant threat to the United States.

Although the initial Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, addresses a traditional IO approach against conventional forces such as China or North Korea, it does not sufficiently consider nonstate threats such as terrorists and insurgents. The joint staff is currently updating JP 3-13 by incorporating the October 2003 revised Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy, informally known as the secretary of defense’s (SECDEF’s) “IO Roadmap.” To succeed in the new security environment, JP 3-13 must provide an IO approach that better defines and shapes operations in the information environment (IE) to enable victories over nonstate actors in the physical environment (PE).

Current and Future Security Environments

The United States is facing a drastically different security environment than it faced before 11 September 2001. In the past, adversaries confronted the United States with conventional armed forces backed by the industrial capabilities of a nation-state. Today, a single nonstate actor or terrorist group can attack the Nation and create untold destruction.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) defines a new security environment that includes these terrorist organizations and the nation-states and organizations that harbor them: “[T]he United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.”

Terrorism took many forms after 11 September 2001, but the United States is primarily concerned with terrorists who possess a global strike capability and whose global reach makes them extremely elusive and difficult to define or engage. In response to this new security environment, SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld changed the military strategy in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) from a threat-based approach to a capabilities approach to better respond to the numerous threats the United States faces.
States faces. By adopting this approach, defense planners can concentrate on how a potential enemy might engage the United States rather than concerning themselves with who that enemy is or where he will attack.

**Joint IO Doctrine**

Numerous documents provide direction of overall joint IO strategy, including JP 3-13, *Joint Vision (JV) 2010, JV 2020*, and the recently published “IO Roadmap.”

**Joint IO Roadmap** provides doctrinal guidance for joint forces information operations. The 1996 *JV 2010* defines information operations as “[a]ctions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.” *Joint Vision 2010* sets forth “a vision for how the United States military will operate in the uncertain future” and achieves the ultimate goal of full-spectrum dominance.

Information superiority is a key element of full-spectrum dominance. *Joint Vision 2010*, which states that information superiority will mitigate the effect of the friction and fog of war, advocates ensuring an uninterrupted flow of information and nontraditional actions. *Joint Vision 2020* adds: “The combined development of proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations. These changes in the information environment make information superiority a key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control.”

The “IO Roadmap” provides strategic-level IO guidance for the current security environment defined in the latest *QDR* and *NSS*. The draft update of JP 3-13 incorporates the “IO Roadmap” and a new DOD IO definition: “The integrated employment of the specified core capabilities of Electronic Warfare [EW], Computer Network Operations (CNO), PSYOP [psychological operations], Military Deception, and Operations Security [OPSEC], in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, while protecting our own.”

The “IO Roadmap” groups IO elements in the following categories:

- **Core capabilities** (EW, CNO, OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP).
- **Support capabilities** (information assurance, physical security, counterintelligence, physical attack).
- **Related capabilities** (public affairs, civil-military operations).

Although current and draft IO doctrine encompasses many aspects of warfare, the ability to deal with the new security environment still needs scrutiny. The new definition focuses on offensive information operations against the adversarial decisionmaker, ignoring that there are many valuable targets in the information environment that are not critical decisionmakers. The 1998 definition of information operations was so broad that it was everything and yet nothing. The new draft definition limits itself in applying information operations to the listed core capabilities.

Joint Publication 3-13 poorly defines and applies the concept of information superiority as it would apply to a nonstate actor. Information superiority is an imbalance in one’s favor in the information domain with respect to an adversary. The power of superiority in the information domain mandates the United States achieve it as a first priority, even before hostilities begin. However, superior technology and equipment fuels hubris to have information superiority over inferior adversaries.

A nonstate actor can decisively possess information superiority and an information advantage because he can remain unseen in his own environment, yet see U.S. forces, and choose when to attack.
U.S. information superiority can be finite and fleeting; its forces must recognize this and take direct and indirect action to reduce the adversary’s information advantage and operational efficiency. Information superiority in the new security environment must include denying information helpful to a nonstate actor by reducing OPSEC violations and information the population can provide.

**Physical Environment v. Information Environment**

Nothing is more important when conceptualizing joint IO doctrine in the new security environment than understanding the relationship between the physical environment and the information environment and how the United States should approach information operations in these areas against a nonstate actor. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, defines the physical environment by the dimensions of land, sea, air, and space. Humans live, breathe, and walk in the physical environment, and they see, hear, and touch objects that are real. Leaders generally conceive and measure gains and losses in the physical environment by the metrics of terrain, equipment, forces, and engagements.

According to the draft JP 3-13, the information environment consists of information that resides in the mind, physical world, and electromagnetic spectrum. Boundaries are “not limited to the linear battleground that military commanders conceptualize, [and] activities in the information environment often shape a commander’s understanding of the battle and can profoundly affect his decisions in the physical environment.” For example, forces providing security to a population is an act in the physical environment, but the population’s perception of security is in the information environment. Military leaders and planners must understand that the PE and IE domains exist in simultaneous yet separate battlespaces. Nonstate actors operate mainly in the information environment to leverage their advantage, and states tend to operate in the physical environment to achieve their goals. The United States must adapt its approach to conflict to maximize its results while diminishing the adversary’s.

Another key IE and PE characteristic is that “wherever human activity occurs physically, such activity [also] takes place simultaneously in the information dimension.” This is important in recognizing those residual effects from actions taken in the physical environment that will shape the information environment. Draft JP 3-13 fails to address factors that shape the information environment in which military operations are planned and executed or recognize that success depends on U.S. forces gaining and maintaining information superiority. However, previous IO doctrine and U.S. operations have traditionally sought to achieve finite victory in the PE battlespace and ignore the concurrent residual effects in the IE battlespace.

Current and draft joint IO doctrine fails to adequately explain and emphasize the information environment and the art of its application against U.S. adversaries. The key to preparedness against current and potential security threats, such as nonstate actors, lies in the art of information operations, not just the science. The science of information operations can be the application of systems and capabilities to support the goal of affecting adversary decisionmaking at a specific moment in time and space, while the “art focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with synchronization of military effort” in the information environment.

Draft JP 3-13 says: “Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve a strategic goal through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.” To fight a nonstate actor whose operational actions are planned to achieve strategic goals, the United States must operate similarly. U.S. planners must apply all facets of operational art in the information environment and the physical environment. There is more to information operations than just affecting adversary decisionmaking as proposed in the draft definition; coordinated military actions must affect the information environment as a whole.

Although draft JP 3-13 establishes the IE’s conceptual context and military operations related to it, it does not address the need to shape that environment because of friendly or adversary actions in the physical environment. The United States enjoys a force advantage over most of its adversaries and, therefore, seeks objectives and victories in the physical environment using actions in the information environment as an enabler.

In contrast, terrorists and insurgents, who lack military parity, seek to achieve their ultimate objectives by being successful in the information environment. They cannot successfully engage a superior force in the physical environment, so they conduct selected acts in the physical environment (bombings and small-scale attacks, for example) to shape the information environment (that is, perceptions). These acts can help achieve objectives in the information environment and, ultimately, in the physical environment. Therefore, a nonstate actor might choose to...
avoid a decisive fight with U.S. forces, selecting instead a more advantageous time and location for engagements. Nonstate actors will avoid direct confrontation in a state’s PE battlespace, but a state actor can defeat them by reshaping their information environment.

**How to Pursue Victory**

Current doctrine directs U.S. forces to achieve a decisive victory in the physical environment while using the information environment to support “objectives and reduce costs of war.” Although U.S. information operations might often affect the adversary’s perception or will to fight, the United States normally relies on victory in the physical environment to win the battle, which is a typical strategy of a military with a force advantage over the majority of its adversaries.

Joint doctrine supports this by orienting on affecting adversary decisionmaking to influence decisions in the United States’s favor and to prevent the adversary from influencing U.S. forces. While this approach is adequate for a conventional adversary such as North Korea, it is inadequate for nonstate threats such as insurgents and terrorists. The United States might understand how to strategically shape the information environment, but at the operational level it often relies on its superior military might or its force advantage to achieve victory in the physical environment, neglecting the efficient, effective use of the information environment.

**How Terrorists and Insurgents Pursue Victory**

Terrorists and insurgents adopt a much different approach to achieving victory through the use of a complex IO strategy. They develop the IE battlespace because of the benefits gained from its residual effects. In *The Terrorist Approach to Information Operations*, Norman Emery and Rob Earl say: “Terrorists act in the physical environment not to make tactical gains in the physical environment, but to wage strategic battle in the information environment; therefore the physical environment enables many of the activities in the information environment to occur.”

Figure 1 shows the model nearly all terrorists follow to achieve objectives by indirectly influencing a decisionmaker. The process applies to select insurgencies. The model’s four steps and three orders of effects begin with a bombing or attack in the physical environment that the media or members of a population report. The interpretations can shape perceptions of a populace or government in the information environment. Perceptions once developed can endure for days, months, or decades and are difficult to change.

The model demonstrates that a specific act in the physical environment produces residual effects and
offers an approach for U.S. forces to interdict the adversary’s information environment to reduce or reverse the effectiveness of PE actions. Therefore, any operation to eliminate nonstate actors and their influence must also employ forces operationally to counter the potential strategic effect and results of previous nonstate operations. Having effective counteroperations to current and previous acts in the information environment, not just attrition warfare in the physical environment, is important. Shaping the information environment is not merely denying information to adversary decisionmakers; it is denying them results from their actions.

The big difference between what current U.S. doctrine is and should be is in its approach to conflict. As long as U.S. forces are denying a state foe his ability to make a decision, they are shaping his information environment. The United States might not be able to affect a nonstate foe’s ability to make a decision if he maintains an information advantage, but it can affect his results in the information environment, his chosen battlespace. As long as the United States conceptualizes all victories in the physical environment through decisive engagement rather than more lengthy action in the information environment, it might not succeed as quickly. If the United States adjusts its approach to nonstate conflict, it can beat insurgents and terrorists at their own game in their own battlespace, which requires a new approach to modern conflict.

The Art of Information Operations

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the U.S. military’s current approach to state and nonstate conflict, which works when engaging a similarly structured adversary such as North Korea or Iraq in linear conventional warfare. Figure 2 shows conventional-force actions in the information environment, such as PSYOP campaigns, EW, deception, and OPSEC measures supported by media messages and civil-military operations to achieve victory in the physical environment.

The problem with the approach in figure 2 is it does not work against such nonstate actors as insurgents or terrorists, who operate by design in a different battlespace. Figure 3 concerns the Iraqi police station bombing vignette and shows how state and nonstate forces can operate in different battlespaces with the nonstate force gaining the long-term advantage.

U.S. forces conduct operations in the physical environment to defeat or deter Iraqi insurgents responsible for a series of bombings; however, that is only a portion of the insurgent’s battlespace because they shaped the information environment with residual effects from previous attacks. The attacks on Iraqi supporters of U.S. programs perpetuate insecurity in the fearful population, a perception which does not dissipate with a few U.S. force victories against insurgents. The perception reaches audiences in the information environment, which ultimately supports insurgents’ strategic objective in the physical environment, such as
forcing the UN to cancel elections or the United States to withdraw prematurely.

To win, the United States must realize and employ the art as well as the science of information operations. The United States must also understand that when its forces react negatively and kick down doors in night raids, they are helping the enemy improve his own information environment. Their actions will annoy and alienate citizens who might no longer cooperate or who might begin actively supporting the insurgents. A silent population is de facto support to insurgents, who maintain or increase their information advantage in the information environment.

The effect insurgents have on the information environment is comparable to the ripples that dropping a large stone into a lake causes. Long after the stone has hit the bottom, the residual effects expand in all directions, are difficult to stop, and ultimately crash into the banks of the lake. Current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy focuses on the splash of the stone (the PE), and not enough on stopping the ripples (the IE) before they reach the bank—the enemy’s strategic PE objective.

Recommendations

Revisers of the next draft of JP 3-13 should consider the recommendations in the following paragraphs to improve the U.S. military’s ability to counter nonstate threats.

The doctrinal definition of IO needs to be modified to better reflect operations in the information environment. The proposed IO definition in the draft JP 3-13 limits what we can accomplish by limiting what capabilities we can use. Information operations are the effects sought, not just tools to get these effects. The new definition should emphasize using all available capabilities in full-spectrum operations to affect the information environment instead of focusing solely on the adversary’s decisionmaking capability in the physical environment. The IO definition we recommend is: “The timely employment of specified capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the adversarial information environment and decisionmaking while protecting our own.”

The next recommendation is to emphasize information operations to influence and obtain information superiority. The United States must break the mindset that information superiority is an inherent part of combat superiority. The most powerful force might not always have information superiority or the ability to directly influence adversarial decisionmakers to shape the information environment. To achieve information superiority, IO doctrine should address actions in the information environment to enhance U.S. objectives against nonstate actors who rely on the information environment as their primary battlespace.

We also recommend emphasizing the art of information operations as one of the core concepts of offensive information operations. The joint community has a prime opportunity to shape a new approach to warfare by addressing actions and effects in the information environment, not just in the physical environment, to enhance effects against nonstate actors who rely on the information environment as their primary battlespace.

Last, we recommend IO doctrine change its approach to nonstate threats by conducting find, fix, and finish actions in the physical environment while shaping residual effects from previous actions in the information environment. An adversary’s residual effects might persist from previous actions in the information environment following some act in the physical environment. To counter this, U.S. IO doctrine should adopt a simultaneous two-pronged approach against nonstate threats through physical attacks as well as through disrupting and minimizing their current and previous influence in the information environment (figure 4).

Draft JP 3-13 briefly addresses principles that would support the two-pronged approach but insufficiently emphasize it as a core concept and says the focus of offensive information operations is to directly affect information to indirectly affect decisionmakers “by taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions to add, modify, or remove information itself from the environment of various individuals or groups of decisionmakers.”

The simultaneous approach reduces nonstate actors’
operational effectiveness and support, causing them to either decrease operations or take greater risks in their activity, thereby increasing their exposure to defeat in the physical environment.

**Succeeding in the Security Environment**

Current published or draft joint IO doctrine insufficiently addresses nonstate conflicts the United States now faces. To succeed in the new security environment, the new JP 3-13 must better define IO- and IE-shaping operations to enable ultimate victories in the physical environment. Military leaders and planners must understand that while PE and IE domains coexist, they are separate battlespaces. Nonstate actors operate mainly in the information environment to leverage their advantages, while the United States often chooses to leverage its force advantage in the physical environment.

Fighting nonstate actors such as terrorists and insurgents requires an understanding of the residual effects of gains and losses in the information environment based on actions in the physical environment. The benefit of the residual effects in the information environment from actions in the physical environment are far greater than the physical result from the act (that is, deaths from a bombing). To combat these residual effects, the United States should seek to shape the information environment in its favor by conducting simultaneous operations to find, fix, and finish in the physical environment while shaping residual effects in the information environment from current and past adversary and friendly actions in the physical environment.

Shaping the information environment requires a new way of thinking and a new staff approach to warfare, with planners and leaders conceptualizing nonstate conflict differently than traditional conflict. The military should not continue to inadequately address an important dynamic in current and future warfare. Planners must not get caught up in seeking immediate effects while ignoring the value of gaining effects in the information environment, because the results there are slow in coming and difficult to quantify. Military operations do not always produce tangible, visible, or immediate effects. By shaping the information environment, military forces can affect the enemy decisionmaker by influencing his environment without changing his perception or decision.

This battle of ideas requires more bytes than bullets. The military can achieve this by using the science of information operations to focus on decisionmaking in the physical environment and using the art of information operations to shape the information environment; this synchronization achieves the victory in the physical environment and counters results in the information environment from current and previous actions in the physical environment. As long as U.S. information operations orient solely on the PE victory, the U.S. cannot successfully engage and defeat the wide range of threats in the ever-changing security environment. **MR**

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**NOTES**

8. JV 2020, 3.
10. "IO Roadmap.
15. Earl and Emery, 19.
17. Ibid., I-4, I-5.
18. Ibid., I-10.
19. Ibid.
20. Earl and Emery, 44.
22. Earl and Emery, 44.
23. Ibid., 11-12.

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Major Norman Emery, U.S. Army, is a Functional Area 30 information operations planner assigned to Multinational Forces-Iraq. He received a B.A. from Illinois State University, an M.S. from the Naval Postgraduate School, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Joint Forces Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the 3d Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, and Special Operations Command. His article “Information Operations in Iraq” appeared in the May-June 2004 issue of Military Review. He can be contacted at norman.emery@us.army.mil.

Major Jason Werchan, U.S. Air Force, is an instructor with the Air Force Element at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M, an M.A. from Oklahoma University, and is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College.

Major Donald G. Mowles, Jr., U.S. Air Force, is the Chief, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Strike Team, Combat Plans Division, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. He received a B.S. from Arkansas State University, an M.S. from Central Michigan University, and is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College.
Do We Need FA30?
Creating an Information Warfare Branch

Major George C.L. Brown, U.S. Army

Do not say, “Why were the old days better than these?” For it is not wise to ask such questions.
—Ecclesiastes 7:10

To build the correct blend of capabilities necessary to conduct the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) during the information age, the Army should create an information warfare (IW) branch. Current information operations (IO) training and force composition are inadequate to meet the GWOT challenge.

Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, General Richard A. Cody, recently released “The Army IO Intent” to provide guidance for the Army IO campaign plan and to amplify and supplement IO capabilities.2 Cody advocated creating “a proponency capable of integrating with joint and Army IO and resourced for ‘branch-like’ advocacy.”3 Cody’s use of the phrase “branch-like advocacy” reveals high-level Army leaders realize the need for an IO or IW branch. What qualities should fully trained IW branch officers have, and what knowledge and understanding should they possess?

During the Army 2003 World Wide PSYOP [psychological operations] Conference, senior leaders discussed the future combined education path and the need for merging IO-related functional areas (FAs). In a paper titled “Merging IO, PSYOP, and FAO [foreign area officer], Concept for the New Foreign Officer,” Major Fredric W. Rohm, Jr., proposed such a merger.4 The current FA30 (IO) program attracts officers from across the basic branches; however, most have little experience in core IO elements such as PSYOP, computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW), military deception, and operational security (OPSEC). The Department of Defense (DOD) “IO Roadmap” recommends developing “IO specialists who would be functional experts in one or more of the highly specialized core capabilities. . . .” The “IO Roadmap” also states: “IO specialists should possess specialized expertise on a certain IO core capability, but gain experience in [planning and executing] the broader construct of IO.”

Courses of Action

To achieve the joint “IO Roadmap’s” objectives, I propose two courses of action (COAs) for DOD and the Army. Currently, FA30 resides within the IO support career field, while key elements like FA39 (PSYOP) reside in the operations career field. Core pillars such as deception and CNO do not exist in an associated branch or functional area other than introductory training in the Army IO course. Currently, EW officers (EWOs) are in FA35G (Signal Intelligence [SIGINT]/EW) within the military intelligence (MI) branch, also in the operations career field. Few are available to serve as EWOs in division and corps IO cells because of their duties as SIGINT officers.

Delays in initiating the Army’s 4-week IO training program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and insufficient personnel available in the training pipeline compound the difficulties in producing trained IO officers. Many officers are thus forced into on-the-job (OJT) training. Can we really expect IO officers with only 4 weeks of IO training to fully understand the complexities of 12 IO elements and 2 related activities and successfully employ the 5 core IO pillars?

Recognizing this inability, commanders have often drafted officers from the most closely related specialties to carry the brunt of the IO burden. Public affairs (PA), PSYOP, or civil affairs (CA) officers often serve as IO officers, even when an untrained IO warrior is on station. Emphasizing this fact, Cody suggests the need for “specific marketing and international media skills to familiarize IO staff officers on how civilian entities plan, prepare, execute, and influence activities. Furthermore . . . , IO
officers should have cross-cultural communications and awareness.” These are the traits and characteristics that comprise the backgrounds of current PA, PSYOP, and CA officers, and FAOs.

The IO community loses credibility by not having trained IO warriors. Because of this deficiency, PAOs and PSYOP or CA officers often perform IO duties instead of their primary duties, resulting in mediocre performance in those areas as well because they must split their focus. I recommend two COAs to correct the problem:

1. Create a system that feeds related functional areas into FA30.
2. Create an IW branch.

**FA feeder system.** Using officers from IO-related FA specialties as IO officers is the norm. Commanders fill the void caused by the lack of trained IO planners with officers from related specialties. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior PSYOP officers were primary IO planners for the Central Command IO staff, the Third Army/Combined Force Land Component Command, the V Corps IO staff, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North. In all these commands, PSYOP officers served quite capably as IO planners during the first three phases of combat. Based on this, the Army should establish a formal system that identifies, tracks, and feeds FA30 with individuals from IO-related specialties to produce well-rounded IO officers.

Officers who want to enter the IO field would no longer do so directly from their basic combat arms, combat support, or combat service support branches. Instead, future IO officers would first be trained and serve as captains and majors in one of the IO-related functional areas, such as PSYOP (FA39B), PA (FA46), CA (FA39C), FAO (FA48), strategic intelligence (FA34), or information systems engineer (FA24). These IO-related functional areas would coexist with IO FA30, but only lieutenant colonels and colonels from these functional areas would become FA30 IO officers. This would ensure a level of understanding and expertise in one of the supporting IO-related fields. Even so, some might say this COA is only another form of OJT instead of a solution to the Army’s IO education and experience problem. (See figure 1.)

**Creating an IW branch.** A bolder COA would be to immediately create an IW branch by merging the IO (FA30) and PSYOP (FA39B) career fields, drawing personnel from the strategic intelligence (FA34), information systems engineer (FA24), and SIGINT/EW (35G) career fields. CNO, deception, and EW core IO subspecialties and training would be created within FA30 specialties.

A future structure could be comparable to the MI branch where several intelligence-related specialties exist under one umbrella, although the expertise within each subspecialty (such as human intelligence [HUMINT] or SIGINT) is drastically different. Or, a future IW branch might be compared to the Special Forces (SF) Branch, which contains various specialties, such as weapons, communications, medical, and engineer specialists, but only in the noncommissioned officer (NCO) realm under one branch. The officer composition of the IW branch would be similar to SF or MI branches, composed of IO (30A), PSYOP (30B), EW (30C), CNO (30D), deception (30E), and strategic intelligence (formerly FA34) as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FA39B</th>
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<td>FA39C</td>
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<td>FA48</td>
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<td>FA34</td>
<td>FA24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Info Sys Engineer</td>
<td>SIGINT/EW</td>
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**Figure 1.** Functional Area 30 feeder system of IO-related disciplines.
FA30F, with an officer and NCO corps composition for each IW subspecialty. Officers would only enter the IW branch after they completed captain basic-branch qualification.

All FA30-series branch officers would be 30B, 30C, 30D, 30E, or 30F before being designated as 30A information operations, the overall synchronizers and coordinators of information operations. Only lieutenant colonels and colonels would become 30A officers to ensure the officers would have had time to complete their joint professional military education and can fully comprehend the complexities of joint operations and interagency coordination. Officers could continue their careers in one of the various IO specialties or cross train in an additional core IO subspecialty within the IW branch. Many officers could then become 30As on promotion to lieutenant colonel.

Although not part of the IW branch, FAOs and CA and PA officers would be offered the chance to transfer to 30A and cross train in one of the IO subspecialties after becoming lieutenant colonels. (See figure 2.)

**Advantages of a Merger**

Creating an IW branch containing PSYOP, EW, CNO, and deception would increase the ability to conduct effects-based operations (EBO), which former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Meyers says is "a way of thinking about and solving military problems [that] incorporates effects-based thinking, processes, operations, and targeting." According to Meyers: “Improvement will require not only technological solutions, but also cultural change—a willingness to challenge standard practices, and question current organizational patterns and command practices.”

The new IW branch would break down barriers of communication by doing away with traditional bureaucratic FA stovepipes. The new, close association of key IO-related core components within one branch would increase understanding and enable innovative approaches to targeting enemy forces, decisionmakers, and key systems or networks.

Although many might oppose these ideas, DOD and the Army must determine what is best for national security, not what is best for maintaining individual branch or FA fiefdoms. The major source of opposition to these proposals will most likely come from within the special operations or PSYOP communities on the grounds the merger of functional areas would cause a dilution of the PSYOP message; that PSYOP units or task forces would no longer exist; or that PSYOP might be removed from the special operations community.

The opposite is more likely. Synchronization and coordination will improve when core IO pillars reside within the same branch. The merger would also improve PSYOP dissemination by providing direct access to CNO and EW means and planning expertise to ultimately facilitate precision-influence targeting of key decisionmakers. PSYOP units would not cease to exist, but could actually be structured to more fully support full-spectrum information operations. Joint PSYOP task forces and PSYOP units could be manned with PSYOP, IO, EW, CNO, and deception officers to enable a more holistic approach to PSYOP support to IO. Because the PSYOP community is already well established, the merger might also result in many officers, primarily with PSYOP backgrounds, assuming mantles of leadership within the new IW branch.

The merger would not affect strategic intelligence because it would have the same function as FA30F, drawing this intelligence field close to support IO needs. The information systems engineer functional area would continue to coexist separately, but many of its personnel would become FA30Ds to jumpstart a viable Army CNO capability. Officers currently in Army CNO billets...
should be permanently transferred to FA30D (CNO) regardless of their basic branch. The MI branch would benefit from the merger, with its officers focused solely on SIGINT, while officers with an EW focus would be part of the IW branch as FA30Cs to provide much needed EW planners.

Public affairs, CA, or FAO functional areas should not oppose the plan because these functional areas would continue to coexist as separate, distinct specialties. Such a separation would ensure PA, CA, and FAOs’ efforts were not tainted by the stigma an IW branch insignia might carry with foreign audiences. However, because of their close relationship to information operations, many PAOs and CA and FA officers should be offered transfers to the new IW branch as lieutenant colonels.

Professional Education

What type of knowledge and understanding should a fully trained IW branch officer possess? Producing a fully trained PSYOP or CA officer or an FAO requires 18 to 24 months. An IO officer must understand not just one, but five, core capabilities and two related activities and be able to apply these in a particular region.

The Army cannot conduct successful information operations without planners who are regionally oriented and culturally attuned. Regional focus and understanding is paramount. The “Army IO Intent” outlines the need for IO officers who understand “human factors and [possess] cultural awareness at the tactical level.” Within the PSYOP, CA, and FAO fields, officers are regionally oriented and trained with foreign-language training especially essential for FAOs and PSYOP and CA officers. To truly understand a region and its culture and to influence foreign audiences, proficiency in the target’s native language is essential. Understanding interagency processes is also essential. Information warfare officers must be able to think, plan, and communicate at the operational and strategic levels. Any future IO training path should include the opportunity for attaining advanced degrees in related disciplines.

Information operations are inherently joint and are planned, coordinated, and approved at the strategic level. The “Army’s IO Intent” states training and education for IO officers must ensure officers are “capable of integrating (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and executing to achieve desired effects [and understand] joint, interagency, and multinational interdependence.” The Army must train IW branch officers in joint planning and operations, EBO, and interagency roles and capabilities. To be truly effective contributors to the IO process, they must become joint-qualified.
The Army should carefully examine the current training path for FA30 IO officers. If it takes from 18 months to 2 years to produce a fully trained PSYOP officer or FAO, can we train an IO officer in 4 weeks? Information warfare branch training should include a 24-month program to create regionally oriented, culturally attuned IW officers who understand joint and interagency processes. Training should consist of the following:

- Information operations specialty training (PSYOP, EW, CNO, or deception), including from 1 to 3 months of training focused on one of the core IO elements. After initial qualification and utilization, each 30-series officer would be trained in depth in an additional core specialty.
- OPSEC training. All 30-series officers would receive one week of OPSEC planning, but it would not be a separate branch-specialty area.
- Regional orientation. Officers would receive from 4 to 5 months of focused regional orientation and cross-cultural training on a primary region and an overview of Europe, Africa, Asia, Middle East, or South and Central America.
- Interagency orientation. Officers would have a 1-month assignment in Washington, D.C., with a primary focus on agencies such as the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Global Operations and key departments and agencies like DOD, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA, with temporary duty as interns in these departments or agencies.
- Language training (mandatory for PSYOP officers). Officers should receive from 4 to 6 months training at the Defense Language Institute focused on a language from the officer’s target region.
- Joint IO planning. Officers should receive 1 month of training focused on planning, synchronizing, and coordinating IO core elements.
- Master of arts program. Officers should complete a 1-year to 18-month graduate study program focused on one IO-related program such as International Relations, International Studies (regional focus), National Security Studies, Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Systems Engineering, Security Management, International Marketing, or Business Administration.

Without warrant officers (WOs) and NCOs, coordination and execution of IO can be nearly impossible. NCOs with IO-related military occupational specialties (MOSs) are filling the void in various IO cells and staffs at various levels. The most common NCO specialties found on IO teams are PSYOP, Special Forces, MI, and SIGINT. These key MOS fields should feed future WO and NCO IO MOSs and ease of transfer should be the norm.

**The Future**

We are in a period of Army Transformation and development of IO as part of warfare not unlike that of the transition from the horse cavalry to armor. However, America’s enemies will not wait for us to ponder, train, reorganize, and act. The American people face a real psychological threat, as demonstrated by the al-Qaeda terrorist attack on 11 September 2001; the current carnage in the streets of Iraq; and the Web-based propaganda insurgents and terrorists employ. The enemy’s message is present daily on the Internet and other media. We have no choice but to produce a force trained in the art of influence, operating and serving from the tactical to strategic levels. Army IW officers must fully understand the pillars of information operations; be able to integrate them into joint planning processes; be regionally oriented and culturally attuned; and be able to interact and coordinate with government agencies.

In “The Way Ahead: Our Army at War—Relevant and Ready,” Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker says: “Transformation during a time of sustained campaigning will not be easy; but it is a practice that appears many times in the history of our great Army. We must examine, design, and develop new solutions for a new and dangerous world, as we have done so successfully in our past.” The Global War on Terrorism makes the creation of an Army IW branch an urgent necessity. **MR**

**NOTES**

3. Ibid.
6. Ibid.; Rohm.
7. “IO Intent.”
8. Rohm, personal experience.
10. Ibid., 26.
11. “IO Intent.”
12. Ibid.

Major George C.L. Brown, U.S. Army, currently assigned to the Joint Information Operations Center, received a B.S. from East Tennessee State University, an M.A. from Webster University, and is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College. He was awarded the Bronze Star serving as the V Corps IO and PSYOP plans officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Road to Abu Ghraib: U.S. Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience

Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army, Retired

The naked, stark images from Abu Ghraib prison fade from the news only to be displayed again as the next U.S. soldier is called forward to answer formal charges for what happened there. Meanwhile, the Army is ensuring it will not happen again—there, or anywhere else. Part of the repair process is determining the path that led to the situation at Abu Ghraib prison.

Geneva Conventions

In an effort to address shortcomings in the international law of land warfare exposed by the ravages of World War II, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) submitted four Geneva Conventions for delegates’ approval on 12 August 1949. These conventions are titled and abbreviated as follows:


The third convention, GPW, consists of 143 articles divided topically into six parts. Part I, “General Provisions,” contains 11 articles. Articles 3, 4, and 5, bear special mention. Article 3 establishes a basic standard of treatment rendered to persons no longer actively participating in hostilities because of sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause during armed conflict not of an international character. At the convention’s signing, article 3 was viewed as an attempt to offer a basic minimum standard of protection to those fighting in civil wars and insurrections.

Article 4 defines who is entitled to prisoner-of-war (POW) status under the convention and who, thereby, is afforded additional protections. Article 4 includes a four-part test that applies to members of militias and volunteer corps:

1. They must be commanded by a responsible person.
2. They must have a fixed sign visible at a distance.
3. They must carry arms openly.
4. They must conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Article 5 mandates that a tribunal determine the status of a detainee when a status question arises.

Part II, “General Protection of Prisoners of War,” consists of five articles (12 through 16) that list specific protections and rights accorded to qualifying persons who are POWs under article 4. Article 12 stipulates that a capturing power can transfer custody of POWs to another power only if the receiving power also observes the Geneva Conventions. Transfer of custody does not transfer responsibility.

Part III, “Captivity” (articles 17 through 108), regulates every aspect of the treatment of POWs during captivity. Soldiers often quote the portion of article 17 that requires them to give only name, rank, and serial number when questioned. Another portion of that same article prohibits the use of physical or mental torture or coercion against any detainee who refuses to give more than the required information.

Part IV, “Termination of Captivity” (articles 109 through 117), directs the repatriation of seriously wounded and sick prisoners during hostilities; the release and repatriation of prisoners at the conclusion of hostilities; and the disposition of remains of prisoners who die while in captivity.

Part V, “Information Bureau and Relief Societies for Prisoners of War” (articles 118 through 125),
helps the parties of a conflict establish offices and agencies for tracking POWs and authorizes the ICRC to set up an international clearing house to receive and pass such information.

Part VI, “Execution of the Convention” (articles 126 through 143), provides tools for implementing the convention and also for denouncing it if a party wishes to do so. Although the United States was one of 54 nations that had signed all four of the Geneva Conventions by December 1949, the U.S. Senate did not ratify them until 2 February 1956.

**Korean War, 1950-1953.** On 23 July 1950, a month after the North Korean Army invaded South Korea, U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur announced that the United Nations Command (UNC) had adopted and would observe the provisions of GPW. Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee made a similar commitment on behalf of his government. These were tough promises to keep. By mid-1951, the UNC had captured approximately 165,000 enemy prisoners of war (EPW), who were a mixed lot. Some were North Korean communists; some South Korean anti-communists conscripted by North Korea during its forward march down the peninsula; some Chinese communists; and some Chinese nationalist anti-communists forced into military service after their defeat in the recent civil war.

For a number of political and practical reasons, the UNC decided EPWs would remain in-theater and be contained in camps administered by the U.S. Army using Republic of Korea Army guard units. Camps, including a hospital camp in Pusan, were constructed on the mainland and on Koje-do, a large off-shore island. Prisoners were evacuated to this camp network from holding facilities using ground transportation. The ICRC regularly visited UNC EPW camps and reported its findings to the UNC and the ICRC headquarters in Geneva.

Life in the camps was difficult on both sides of the wire. Prisoners were kept in crowded tents and hastily constructed wooden barracks. The prisoner diet was “politically correct” in modern parlance—rice, fish, and other staples of Asian cuisine. Prisoners had access to a sophisticated medical treatment regime and were offered cultural and educational services. But political strife between the various factions of prisoners led to physical assaults, murder, and large-scale rioting. The North Korean Government infiltrated political agitators into the camp system to instigate and control prisoner unrest, to embarrass the UNC in the international political arena, and to tie down as many UNC troops as possible. North Korea was nearly successful in all aspects. Several times, the UNC had to commit infantry and armor units to camp duty to restore order.

The single prominent lesson in examining the Korean War experience is “no forced repatriation.” Thousands of prisoners did not desire repatriation to a homeland they did not claim as their own. These were primarily, but not exclusively, South Koreans forced into North Korean Army service and former nationalist Chinese soldiers who preferred to be repatriated to Taiwan rather than mainland China. On the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. President Harry S. Truman established “no forced repatriation” as a principle of the armistice on which there would be no negotiation, except how to implement it. North Korea’s refusal to submit to this principle extended the talks, and the war itself, by approximately 2 years. In the end, the other side caved, and the principle was established. About 85,000 EPWs were repatriated to North Korea at the end of hostilities in 1953, half of the total...
prisoner population. The remaining prisoners stayed in South Korea or were repatriated to Taiwan.

Another important lesson learned in Korea was that international shame or pressure did not compel North Korea to observe the provisions of GPW when handling UNC prisoners. Although nearly 13,000 UNC prisoners were released by the North Koreans at war’s end, thousands of others died in captivity because of malnourishment and mistreatment or are otherwise unaccounted for.

Vietnam War, 1965-1973. Because in many quarters the Vietnam War was viewed as an insurgency, early on the U.S. Government had to take a position on how and when to apply GPW. The South Vietnamese Government regarded captured Viet Cong as political prisoners, not EPWs, and imprisoned them in civil jails, sometimes without due process. South Vietnamese military units also did not observe GPW on the battlefield and often tortured or executed Viet Cong prisoners. Having made a policy decision at the highest levels of government to turn all detainees captured on the battlefield over to the custody of the South Vietnamese Government, and faced with the reality of more Americans becoming POWs as the level of troop commitment escalated, the United States announced in August 1965 it would apply the provisions of GPW in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Government followed suit. The execution in September of two U.S. advisers in retaliation for South Vietnam’s execution of Viet Cong prisoners further pressured the U.S. Government.6

In early 1966, after studying the issue, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Earle G. Wheeler, ordered that article 3 of the GPW would be the treatment floor for all battlefield-captured detainees. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), quickly drafted and issued implementing directives, including provisions for article 5 tribunals to determine detainee status.6 No detainee would be turned over to South Vietnamese custody before a status determination had been made.

With American materiel and advisory support, the South Vietnamese Government began constructing five camps—one in each corps tactical zone, the fifth in the Saigon area. U.S. Army Military Police (MP) advisory teams were assigned to these camps to ensure the South Vietnamese observed the provisions of GPW. By December 1971, the South Vietnamese held over 35,000 prisoners in six camps, almost a third of those captured by U.S. forces.

The United States and South Vietnam also combined their intelligence interrogation efforts, placing combined interrogation facilities in each U.S. separate brigade and division base camp and at a central location near Saigon.7 These facilities held sources for 1 to 7 days and up to 4 months in exceptional cases. By MACV directive, all interrogations were conducted according to GPW standards, particularly those prohibiting maltreatment. But, as in Korea, in Vietnam the United States could not obtain reciprocal treatment of its personnel held captive by North Vietnam or its proxies throughout the jungles of Southeast Asia.

Grenada, October 1983. In Operation Urgent Fury, a small contingent of U.S. Army Rangers and U.S. Marines landed on the island of Grenada to unseat a pro-Cuban government and protect several hundred American students at a medical training facility there. During several days of military operations U.S. forces took control of 1,500 detainees, half Cuban nationals, the remainder, members of the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA).

Initially, combat units guarded their own prisoners; soon though, a small Caribbean peacekeeping
force (CPF) of policemen from Barbados and Jamaica arrived, followed by XVIII Airborne Corps MP elements from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. First the CPF and then U.S. Army MPs became responsible for detainees. The JCS and State Department decided to treat all detainees as EPWs without granting them that formal status. The predominant descriptor for EPW operations on Grenada is “makeshift” (housing, feeding, clothing, medical treatment, classification). The soldiers and their leaders made the best of a difficult situation. If resources were limited, so were the number of prisoners and the operation’s duration. When hostilities ended just days later, the Cubans were repatriated to Cuba with the ICRC’s help. The PRA members were turned over to the new government of Grenada.

Panama, December 1989. XVIII Airborne Corps planners for Operation Just Cause took note of lessons learned in Grenada and included detention operations in their planning. They selected the Empire Range training complex as a detention facility and pre-positioned the necessary logistical supplies to build and operate a camp. Approximately 4,000 detainees cycled through this camp in late 1989 and early 1990 under the watchful eyes of U.S. Army MP units from Fort Bragg, bolstered by MPs from Fort Lee, Virginia, and the Missouri Army National Guard. A military intelligence (MI) interrogation facility, also operated by a Fort Bragg unit, was collocated at the camp. An informal article 5 tribunal consisting of the MP camp’s commanding officer, the ranking MI officer, and the assigned judge advocate, who ruled on detainee status.

GPW provisions were applied to all detainees early in the operation. They were afforded due medical treatment and permitted to notify and communicate with relatives, receive visitors, and in other ways exercise their rights under the Convention. As the new Panamanian Government took control, detainees were turned over to it for disposition. In January 1990, only a few remained in custody. Some were brought back to the United States for civil proceedings. The remainder stayed in custody in Panama.

Saudi Arabia, 1991. During Operation Desert Storm, the EPW detention mission was assigned to

### Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion, or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

   - Violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. [emphasis added]
   - Outrages on personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment
   - The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

   - An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Reprinted from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 3, Appendix E.
the 800th MP Brigade, whose U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) headquarters was in New York. The brigade and its supporting MP units were assigned to the 22d Support Command soon after arriving in Saudi Arabia. Using their own supplies as well as those purchased by the Saudi Arabian Government, the units constructed four large EPW camps along main supply routes in two zones, east and west, and two joint interrogation facilities collocated with two camps in each zone.

Early in the operation, MP advisory teams trained the Saudi Army to take over the EPW mission. The war lasted only 100 hours but produced 70,000 EPWs, many of whom were taken into custody after the cease-fire agreement was signed. The GPW was applied to all of these detainees. The 800th MP Brigade conducted informal article 5 tribunals for many detainees who claimed to be Iraqi civilians.

Saudi Arabia bore all the expenses of logistically supporting the EPW operation. All the prisoners and some of the camps were turned over to Saudi control. Other camps were disassembled and hauled away. After the war, approximately 13,000 Iraqis who refused repatriation to Iraq were reclassified as refugees with the Saudi Government’s cooperation and the ICRC’s assistance.

**Haiti, September 1994.** Military police from the XVIII Airborne Corps operated a joint detention facility (JDF) at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during Operation Uphold Democracy. Collocated with the JDF was a joint interrogation facility operated by an MI unit from Fort Bragg. The joint facility was constructed inside an empty warehouse and housed up to 200 detainees. GPW provisions applied when the operation began. ICRC representatives visited the facility early and often.

During the operation, several MPs complained to the MI unit’s judge advocate about certain interrogation tactics observed inside the warehouse. The judge advocate counseled both sides on their application of the articles of GPW. Analysis in an after-action report from the Judge Advocate Legal Center and School attributed the “dust-up” to a clash of cultures between MP and MI interrogators. The MP company commander, Captain Edward Armstrong, later observed: “It was an MP-run mission, despite the attempts of the MI to direct and provide orders to the MP guards.” Looking back now with new perspective because of the actions at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, the detention operation in Haiti might have been the “canary in the mine.”

**Common themes.** Several common themes emerge from an analysis of these case studies. First, GPW applied to every case, with the ICRC’s inspection and reporting assistance. Second, sensitive, critical decisions were always made at theater- and national command-authority levels. Every case study, except that of Panama, showed a lack of logistic preparation for EPW operations. All the case studies demonstrate the importance of Geneva Conventions training for those who administer or guard a detention facility. All EPW and detention operations, no matter how seemingly small or insignificant, have high international visibility. Finally, the Armed Forces’ strict adherence to GPW provisions never guaranteed reciprocal treatment of U.S. personnel in enemy captivity.

**Army Regulations**

Three Army regulations (ARs) on EPW and detainee operations were promulgated during the period studied: AR 633-50, *Prisoners of War Administration, Employment and Compensation*, in August 1963; AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War—Administration, Employment, and Compensation*, in June 1982; and AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees*, in November 1997. The 1963 regulation, which assigned staff responsibility to the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and Provost Marshal General, contained no statement of a general protection policy of the United States and gave responsibility for control and treatment of interned EPWs to the EPW camp commander. The entire regulation had a World War II look and feel, showing great foresight as to how EPWs might be employed in various domestic, industrial, and agricultural enterprises.

In 1982, the Army became the Department of Defense executive agent for EPW and detainee matters, with DCSPER retaining staff responsibility. The new regulation contained a general protection policy statement that applied to “all persons captured, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Army custody.”9 The statement was based on article 3 and other GPW articles, but the AR assigned no specific responsibility for “handling and treatment” of EPWs and detainees; it also recognized the ICRC as a protecting power.

The 1997 version of AR 190-8 is a multiservice regulation. The Department of the Army (DA) retains executive responsibility, with staff responsibility residing with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The AR states that combatant commanders, task force commanders, and joint task force commanders must “ensure compliance with the international law of war.”20 The general protection policy statement contains article-3 words and phases, along with text from other GPW articles. If there is conflict or discrepancy between the AR and the Geneva Conventions, the AR concedes precedence to the Geneva Conventions.

Doctrinal Publications


A careful examination of these five MP detention FMs and seven of the eight MI interrogation FMs reveals that, over time, the American soldier has been increasingly well-schooled in the general protection articles of GPW. Article 3 first appeared as an explicit treatment floor in early 1967 and remained so in all the studied manuals of both branches until 1992 for MI and 2001 for MP respectively.

Both FM series strongly link violations of the Geneva Conventions to the *Uniform Code of Military Justice.* 23

**MI doctrine regarding MP personnel.** MI interrogation field manuals consistently acknowledged the MP detention mission. MP guards have always played important roles as reporters on detainee behaviors, attitudes, knowledge, and contact with other detainees. The 1992 interrogation manual subtly expanded the MP guard role from that of a passive reporter to an active facilitator of detainee screening, stating: “Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings.”24 In his *Detainee Operations Inspection* report, the DA inspector general cited this passage in pointing out the disconnect between MP detention and MI interrogation doctrine.26

Particularly since 1978, MI interrogation FMs have placed MI interrogation prisoner-of-war (IPW) teams in MP battlespace, at EPW holding areas and at detention facilities. MI doctrine has consistently required IPW teams to coordinate with MP commanders in charge of these areas, listing specific
matters in which coordination will facilitate the interrogation mission. Based in part on experience gleaned from Operation Desert Storm, the 1992 interrogation manual suggests that MI unit commanders seek joint training opportunities with MP EPW units to work out coordination issues.

**MP doctrine regarding MI interrogators.** Before 1976, MP FMs posited “acquisition of maximum intelligence information” as the basic principle of EPW operations. In the 1976 manual, this principle was supplanted by “implementation of the Geneva Conventions.” The 1976 manual also contained a strong general protection statement, eliminated references to guards observing and reporting detainee behavior to IPW teams, and dropped a section describing support to external intelligence agencies. Since 1976, MP manuals have consistently acknowledged the MI interrogation mission, the passive role of MP guards with IPW teams, and admitted the presence of MI interrogators in MP battlespace at EPW holding areas and detention facilities. But MP detention manuals, even the 2001 version, do not address the details of or coordination MI activities require in MP battlespace. Interrogation activity is the “elephant in the room” that MPs do not want to talk about.

Current U.S. Army detention doctrine is not broken so much as disjointed. MP guards and MI interrogators, if they are trained according to current branch doctrinal manuals and competently led and supervised, will treat detainees and sources with due respect to the Geneva Conventions. An inherent conflict exists between guarding and protecting the rights of detainees (the MP mission) and extracting the maximum intelligence from a source under the law (the MI mission). Those who seek to repair the damage done by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal must seek to resolve this conflict.

Having acknowledged the problem, the next step is to develop a clear general treatment policy at the Army staff level based on the Geneva Conventions. Then the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) can ensure the GPW and GC content of MP detention and MI interrogation doctrinal publications is nested in approved DA policy. TRADOC must also take steps to deconflict the MP and MI EPW and detention mission and battlespace. Finally, new doctrinal publications should more clearly define command responsibility for GPW and GC compliance for all levels of MP and MI command. With the recent publication of the DA Detainee Operations Campaign Plan, this work has already begun and will continue until the problem is resolved.

**NOTES**

3. For a sensing of the International Committee of the Red Cross inspection regime, see William L. White, The Captives of Korea (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957), 25, 33.
11. The decision to use the Empire Range training site was made no earlier than a week before the operation began, and materials were pre-positioned and ready for use at D-3 (e-mail from LTC Kevin Gove to author, 19 July 2004). LTC (then Captain) Govem was the judge advocate for the 10th MP Brigade, the major unit responsible for this enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operation.
19. AR 190-6, 1 June 1982.
20. AR 190-6, 1 November 1997.
26. See FM 34-52 (1992), app. G.
27. See, for example, FM 19-40 (1967), para. 1-2.a.

Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army, Retired, is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Idaho and an M.A. from the University of Washington. He is the author of several articles and studies on Soviet Army tactics.
Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness Training Center

Brigadier General Mick Bednarek, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; and Stephen Florich

The 2004 Joint Readiness Training Center’s (JRTC’s) Operations Group vision statement reads: “Create an organization that shapes the future battlespace within realistic, demanding scenarios that capture the ‘fog and friction’ of the contemporary operational environment (COE) and the joint operational environment (JOE).” Our team will act as the engine of change to drive our future leaders—joint leaders—to think from the ‘tactical fight’ through the operational level of warfare. Our observer controllers [OCs] will possess a joint and expeditionary ‘mindset’ that reflects a greater level of flexibility, joint doctrinal understanding, and versatility with a vision that a joint solution to a tactical problem or mission will be better than a single service solution. Collectively, we will continue to coach, teach, and mentor future leaders to achieve an effects-based approach to synchronizing and integrating combat capabilities that includes systems visualization and connectivity with our joint partners as well as current and future coalition and multinational partners. We will achieve this by developing future joint training scenarios built around an adaptive, credible, and complex opposing force [OPFOR] that creates the chaotic, ambiguous, and demanding environments associated with today’s battlefield. Our cornerstone assessment tool—our after-action review [AAR] process—remains our bedrock.”

The JRTC promulgated this vision statement to guide combat training centers (CTCs) as they train U.S. soldiers for current and future conflicts. In addressing the Operations Group, we key on the joint leaders needed to protect the Nation.

Where We are Today

The statement, “The United States is a Nation at War,” is a primer for U.S. Armed Forces, a directive to all, and a challenge for future forces. People remain the centerpiece of successful joint operations, and leaders are the focus of successful training for those operations. Although capabilities associated with the tools of warfare will change, the dynamics of human interactions instilled through innovative leadership will remain the driving force in all the U.S. military does.

Fundamental to the full exploitation of improved capabilities is the capacity of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians to learn and adapt to new
missions and requirements. Tactical-through operational-level planners and ground force commanders must meet these demands, bear the hardships of combat, and work diligently to synchronize service and coalition efforts. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore this reality. The fog and friction of war randomly affect military operations and decisionmaking at all levels. Our Army’s combat training centers are first and foremost leadership-development centers; how operations groups shape the future battlespace within realistic, demanding scenarios to capture this fog and friction will be its legacy.

The strategic setting as expressed in the current U.S. National Military Strategy uses several tenets to provide a general azimuth in thinking differently toward broad-based scenario development in the context of future warfare and stability operations and support operations (SOSO) for joint forces.\(^2\)

The tenets are—

- Manage risks.
- Use a capabilities-based approach.
- Defend the United States and project U.S. military power.
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships.
- Maintain favorable regional balances.
- Develop a broad portfolio of military capabilities.

In short, military strategy applies a set of overarching principles—agility, decisiveness, and integration—to guide future commanders in achieving their supporting objectives. For the majority of battalion task force and brigade and regimental combat team commanders who rotate through Army CTCs, adhering to these principles is often an afterthought. As strategic parameters, they are certainly distant from tactical commanders’ collective consciousness. In the operational linkages between strategy and tactics, joint training promises—and must deliver—enhanced U.S. military power.

With the advent of the joint national training capability (JNTC), DOD will not fully implement its initiative to train forces jointly until Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. Joint training opportunities at tactical and operational levels offered between now and FY 2009 fall short in supporting the Nation’s needs.

The Nation is at war just as its military is transforming. How, then, can Army CTCs act as engines of change to help future leaders become joint leaders? The first step forward is to look inward. The AAR remains the CTCs’ cornerstone for leadership development through self-evaluation. If CTCs are to be engines of change driving the development of future joint leaders, they must be evaluated and transformed in JRTC AAR fashion. The strategic setting makes that transformation requirement clear. The JRTC is a premier joint training center for all types of military formations—brigade- and regimental-level equivalents. The ongoing structural transformation within the Army, as part of the expeditionary mindset, is critical to maintaining relevance within the joint force.

Current doctrinal constructs, which lay out the Operations Group’s COE, are based on the ability to “see first, understand, decide, and act” faster than an adversary in any situation. Decisions predicated on better understanding of the battlespace precede these actions, allowing commanders to act simultaneously or sequentially to achieve the desired end state at the least cost in lives. The tactical objective is to win the close fight while shaping operational battles for future strategic success. The Army is engaged in such operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans, thus validating this training model.

JRTC mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs) in support of all three areas of responsibility achieve unprecedented fidelity to the war environment in preparing units for deployment. These are “sustains” in AAR parlance, but what areas need improvement? In the past, the JRTC, like all service centers of excellence, has approached jointness as a matter of deconfliction rather than integration. The JRTC must build seamless jointiness into the CTC. The destination is clear. We must move forward.

The Road to Jointness

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provides some lessons for future joint training. Forces now participating in OIF come from around the world. Many did not take part in a joint or coalition training exercise tailored to their expected tasks before they deployed. Many individuals in theater are not even military; they belong to an array of government, nongovernment, private, international, and commercial organizations.

While some U.S. forces might have participated in joint training, most did not train as a joint force in support of a regional combatant commander. Recognizing this, DOD mandated the JRTC, which is a far-reaching, transformational, joint training program at the Joint Warfighting Center, a directorate within Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

The JRTC is a cooperative collection of interoperable training sites, nodes, and events that synthesizes combatant commander and service train-

A single facility is not conducive to diversity. To train all services at one center requires a land area large enough for maneuver; sufficient air space for joint close air support (CAS), attack aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicles; a littoral environment permitting live fire; and a blue-water area for naval resources. But even such a superb single range would not replicate the extremely dispersed global environment in which U.S. forces currently fight. That lack of fidelity would negatively affect training.

The road to JNTC’s full operating capability begins with deconflicting service capabilities, stitching together (vetting) those capabilities, allowing the services to integrate those capabilities, and producing full-spectrum, capabilities-based joint forces. We have already tested the road in Afghanistan where more integration increased capabilities exponentially rather than linearly. There, a fully integrated joint force enjoyed a tenfold increase in capabilities. As interagency integration proceeded, the force saw another significant increase in capabilities, and as combined elements were integrated, the increase was again measurable.

With such benefits already proven, does it make sense to wait another 5 years to fully implement and optimize joint capacities? Is it logical to continue service-centric training over a timeframe that does not now meet joint combatant commanders’ needs? The answer to both questions is a resounding “No.” Therein lies the impetus for the JNTC; it will bridge that gap in the interim. The JNTC, having already achieved its initial operating capability, will be at full operating capability by FY 2009.

Multiple ground and air “training centers of excellence” have already been linked and used in the emerging initiative of “joint context.” The JNTC’s western test range; the Army’s National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC’s) training facility at Twentynine Palms, California; and the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF’s) training facility at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, held a horizontal training exercise (HTX) in January 2004. A combined JTF exercise recently completed the first JNTC integration event, enhancing an existing joint exercise to address joint interoperability training in a joint context.

In an August 2004 HTX, the JRTC JNTC tested and validated prototype architectures (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
and modeling and simulation). In October 2004, a joint exercise control group refined selected accreditation and certification processes and set conditions for the JNTC’s initial operating capability. The JRTC JNTC HTX integrated a JRTC rotation at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and a USAF Air Warrior II integration at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. USMC and SOF participation occurred in virtual and live scenarios. JFCOM objectives for the exercise included joint tactical task training and analysis to improve the following collective joint capabilities:

- Integration of joint tactical fire support (including CAS), with emphasis on fires within an urban environment.
- Development and implementation of tactical information operations plans to support operational- and strategic-level information operations plans or guidance.
- Employment of joint tactical airlift load procedures with emphasis on assault zone preparations and combat control team control measures in a hostile environment.
- Coordination of joint ground maneuver between Army, USMC, and SOF organizations at the tactical level (brigade and below).

Is the above task list complete? Will accomplishing the tasks replicate a truly joint operation in OIF or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)? The loss of two friendly fighters because of fratricide during OIF reminds us there are clear challenges ahead. The JRTC and the Air Defense Artillery Center are pushing integration of air-defense assets (air missile defense teams) with ground maneuver forces in offensive operations for future rotational scenarios. Other joint training exercises (the joint Red Flag/Blue Flag series, Roving Sands, and so on) are also integrating these critical enablers.

The JNTC and JRTC’s purpose is to stitch together service capabilities in a joint training environment to achieve seamless operations when called to fight. Today, a commander’s common operational picture (COP) is three-dimensional. The joint fight must look the same in American service training exercises as it would in Karbala or Kabul.

Joint maneuver training centers reinforce these initiatives. In May 2004, the JRTC hosted the 2d Marine Division, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, in a rotation focused on situational training exercise lanes. Army OCs coached, taught, and mentored sister service brethren in emerging TTPs and lessons learned from OIF and OEF within a joint context. The results were gratifying. The 2d Reconnaissance Battalion took advantage of the JRTC’s expertise, fully exploiting the training materials the JRTC Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Cell offered, and demonstrating a truly professional approach in learning as it trained. Several other USMC units have voiced a desire to expand their strong service core capabilities within a more joint context at the JRTC.

The Future Joint Force

Who could have foreseen 5 years ago that Army or Marine company commanders would be charged with establishing the security and social conditions to allow a safe, secure, legitimate electoral process to begin in hundreds of villages and cities across Iraq? If we had thought that possible, would we have been willing to commit to the changes necessary to train those commanders for such a mission? DOD recognizes that the JNTC has a commitment to do better.

People remain the centerpiece of successful joint operations. To fully benefit from these increased efforts in joint training, the Army’s maneuver CTCs and other service training centers and facilities must continue to foster a joint and expeditionary mindset reflecting a greater level of flexibility, joint doctrinal understanding, and versatility. On the ground, soldiers and Marines must understand the core capabilities each service brings to the fight.

Core capabilities provide fundamental attributes the Nation’s future joint forces must possess. They must be fully integrated, network-centric, adaptable, expeditionary, lethal, and able to perform decentralized operations. We must acknowledge that a joint solution to a tactical or operational problem, mission, or task is better than a single service solution. The joint force must also be able to swiftly defeat an adversary, engage in sustained combat, and conduct simultaneous operations to reestablish order, stability, and local governance, if necessary.

The U.S. military must be fully capable of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations. Regardless of theater or conflict, the joint force commander must coordinate, integrate, and cooperate with other U.S. Government agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State, the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, or the FBI. Such complex operations must be conducted with great fidelity even though inter- or intraagency cooperation might not always be “cooperative.”

In equipping, training, and fielding joint forces, the military must inculcate the reality of coalition warfare. The United States has not engaged in a “pure” U.S. military operation since the Spanish-American
As the military integrates joint-force capabilities, it also ensures the collective processes needed to successfully maximize those capabilities to ensure they are taught to an acceptable standard, as can be seen in the area of information management. Focusing on information-management training in a JIIM environment would do much to improve rotational units’ warfighting effectiveness in all situations. JRTC is a premier warfighting training center that can significantly affect training and develop information management skills. As one of the Army’s “dirt” CTCs, the JRTC can do so with a fidelity and realism impossible to achieve elsewhere. Human factors, such as fatigue and confusion, coupled with the friction of a realistically arrayed battlefield accurately portraying the JIIM environment facing an equally realistic OPFOR, will continue to be the best way to prepare joint leaders for tomorrow’s fight.

Collectively, joint training opportunities have moved closer to the effects-based approach to synchronizing and integrating lethal and nonlethal combat power. In partnership with the CALL cell and leveraging input from Joint Warfighting Center lessons learned, the JRTC has captured the lessons of that journey in publications like the Effects-Based Operations Handbook, the Stability Operations and Support Operations (SOSO) Handbook, and the Cordon and Search Handbook. The CTCs will
continue to pursue future enhancement of leading, influencing, and at times, writing emerging doctrine as we prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Fully committed to the lessons-learned process and remaining proactive in ongoing OIF/OEF activities is a priority mission. The Army has taken lessons learned, coupled with JFCOM’s lessons learned, and reinforced collective team efforts in areas critical to maneuver commanders.

JRTC’s charter to train joint leaders stresses we must do more than simply assess what works and what does not. We must be willing to identify fixes to long-established problems and suggest initiatives to capitalize on new technologies and the exponential benefits of JIIM operations. We must continue that drive and expand its connections to the joint community, which includes selected joint experimentation and an Army Concept Technology Demonstrator applicable to regional combatant commanders. As we do, we will key on systems visualization, which develops a shared understanding of causal relationships and provides critical tools that help commanders at all levels and their staffs plan, execute, assess, and adapt. Recent JRTC rotations of Active Component and Reserve Component formations and enhanced brigade combat teams have highlighted this crucial need. An established classified local area network/Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, allowing commanders to collaborate and facilitate timely employment of appropriate joint capabilities, is essential to support the networked, adaptive planning and execution effort.

Collaborative planning and execution will include considerations for personnel tempo and coordination with other combat capabilities and future JIIM partners. By integrating joint capabilities at increasingly lower echelons and enhancing connectivity among elements, combat formations and future joint forces can better conduct distributed, decentralized operations. These factors enable commanders to match capabilities more precisely to specific tasks and purposes within an assigned battlespace or joint operational area.

The JRTC and service training centers must review their collective legacy equipment and systems (simulations, computer networks, staff processes, and so on) to ensure future expansion or life-cycle replacement will be compatible and “made joint” to the extent possible until replacement by “born joint” equipment and systems allows dispersed forces to more efficiently communicate, maneuver, share a COP, and achieve the desired end state. In the JRTC Operations Group, the key to increasing relevant capabilities is organizational, procedural, and mindset changes, versus additional manpower growth and infrastructure procurement.

We must think differently, work to achieve the good-enough solution, and be willing to experiment. An example is the future concept for joint command and control (C2). We must think through the capability that allows commanders and staffs to tailor C2 systems as needed, rapidly, and with appropriate C2 procedures of born-joint systems suited to each tactical or operational mission. We can no longer rely on a one-size-fits-all process.

A networked joint force can maintain a more accurate presentation of the battlespace built on the ability to integrate intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information, and total asset visibility. An increased degree of integration and synchronization will also be required among appropriate service forces to conduct joint tactical tasks and actions at appropriate levels. This is the essence of the JNTC. Joint training, more interoperable systems, and eliminating seams between JTF service components will enhance integration.

The Desired End State

The future will see each physical rotation as a mini-JNTC, with joint tasks linked to service training objectives that maximize each service’s core competencies, all within a joint context. Continued networking with joint, coalition, and multinational partners is vital for CTCs’ training transformation to reduce the challenges of dissimilar training, equipment, technology, doctrine, culture, and language associated with multinational operations. When scenarios and schedules allow, the military must integrate multinational partners into dynamic, COE rotations.

Joint training and rotational scenarios are essential to building a joint team with interagency and multinational partners. Tough, realistic training will be necessary to forge teams and foster a joint mindset in leaders and staffs the JRTC coaches, teaches, and mentors. The JRTC Operations Group’s future will include capabilities-based force packages of Army brigade combat teams conducting combat rotations and current MRX scenarios within live, virtual, constructive training environments in a joint context.

We must build future joint training scenarios around an adaptive, complex OPFOR, with dynamic
tactical-to-operational situations. The OPFOR should continue to portray adversaries who intermingle with noncombatants in a noncontiguous, COE battlespace. To achieve this, we must develop and expand a deployable, distributable, exportable capability to outlying sites or home stations that can replicate the COE/JOE battlefield.

Equally important is continued focus on reinforcing the basics of rifle squads, teams, crews, sections, platoons, and so on. We must integrate these fundamental strengths within CTCs to tie directly to future joint tactical tasks within the JNTC, similar to the familiar crosswalk of a unit mission essential task list (METL), and emerging service joint METLs or universal joint task lists.

Centralized joint planning and decentralized execution in an uncertain operating environment requires adaptive, innovative, decisive leaders. Leader development remains the foundation of military transformation and innovation. Leadership education and training must focus on developing skilled, knowledgeable leaders who can meet increasingly complex requirements in all environments—tactical, operational, strategic, and joint. We all must expand our understanding of individual, service, and joint core competencies, and education and leadership development must prepare leaders to succeed in chaotic, ambiguous, and demanding environments.

Final Thoughts

Full joint integration at the military’s collective CTCs has not been a high priority. Military institutions have waited too long to create joint leaders. Maneuver commanders struggling to coordinate operations with a coalition partner or the Iraqi National Guard or police demonstrates our tardiness. We must remember that some of the Nation’s greatest joint successes occurred at junior-leader levels in Afghanistan when SOF, conventional, and coalition forces coordinated, integrated, and synchronized a rapid campaign to un hinge and topple the Taliban.

We have long recognized the CTCs’ true function as leader development. We must embed jointness as a leadership trait from sergeant to colonel. CTCs are the key to reinforcing that goal. Over the years, the U.S. military has had limited success with schoolhouse exchange programs. Successes have been too limited and the need too pressing to wait until FY 2009 for a full joint operational capability. MR

NOTES


Brigadier General Mick Bednarek, U.S. Army, is the commander of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Operations Group, Fort Polk, Louisiana. He received a B.S. from Old Dominion University, an M.S. from Troy State University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the U.S. Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS) and Italy.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired, is a civilian military analyst with the JRTC Center for Army Lessons Learned Cell. He received a B.A. from Texas A&M, an M.A. from the Naval Postgraduate School, and an M.M.A.S. from CGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Africa, and the Middle East. His book, Journey to Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, is forthcoming.

Stephen Florich is a Future Operations Planner, Operations Group, JRTC. He received an M.S. from the Defense Intelligence College.
The Need to Validate Planning Assumptions

Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Woodmansee, U.S. Marine Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Faulkner, U.S. Army; and Major Wayne C. Blanchette, U.S. Air Force

JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines an assumption as “a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.”1 But, this definition of planning assumptions is incomplete. A key word—validation—is missing.

We need to rewrite the current joint definition and the planning doctrine on assumptions to stress the importance of continually validating assumptions. In addition, current doctrine needs to stress the importance of how to validate assumptions, and the joint community should address the following issues concerning planning assumptions.

First, planners must address assumptions concerning U.S. access to a foreign country. Diplomatic considerations are crucially important given the expeditionary focus of the U.S. Armed Forces and the need for access to basing or overflight.

Second, no formal mechanisms are in place early in the planning process for validating planning assumptions. We recommend using a validation matrix that provides a forcing function to visually focus planners’ intellectual energy to establishing assumptions and revisiting them.

Third, planners should establish validation points for every assumption to test the assumption’s validity. We define a validation point as an event that directly affects an assumption the commander must validate or invalidate. Changes in such events require a revalidation of the assumption, branch plan, or change in the plan.

Assumptions are Vulnerable

Assumptions are more vulnerable to events from the time the deliberate planning process begins to crisis action planning (CAP). The current treatment of planning assumptions, or the overreliance on assumptions, has turned the planning process into assumptive planning.

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the urgent need to amend the current planning process to address validating assumptions. According to the Naval Institute Proceedings article, “You Can’t Assume ‘Nothin’,” only 4 of 12 assumptions made before Operation Iraqi Freedom remained rock solid.2 Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the need to validate assumptions early and continuously; establish a validation matrix with validation points; and vigorously validate assumptions based on access. Assumptions based on access and U.S. diplomatic success carry more of a burden to validate than all other assumptions. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy of the United States, “[M]ilitary capabilities must ensure U.S. access to distant theaters.”3

The Armed Forces’ expeditionary focus puts a premium on access agreements to facilitate deployments, military operations, logistical support, and redeployment. When referring to the future asymmetric threat, U.S. “access to theaters is going to be increasingly difficult to come by.”4 Joint planners must identify access assumptions and, as events dictate, revisit them continually in the planning process. Planners can become committed to assumptions and never revisit them. To avoid this pitfall, planners must continually validate planning assumptions even after initial assumption development and into CAP.
To develop successful operation plans, military planners rely heavily on political planning assumptions, especially assumptions tied to access, by understanding the uncertain nature of the assumptions and the need to revalidate them. Most joint planners tend to develop apolitical assumptions. The difficulty arises when planning assumptions at the operational level are so dependent on strategic and diplomatic assurances. Without a change in the way we validate assumptions, fallacies in operational planning and inefficiencies in CAP and operations orders will continually plague us.

Successful planning requires continual validation of planning assumptions. Developing a validation matrix and using validation points helps planners justify the continued use of an assumption early in the planning process and throughout CAP. This matrix forces planners to focus their efforts to continuously validate or revisit assumptions.

Military planners seldom revisit planning assumptions after initial planning development. Current doctrine and guidance at the Joint Forces Staff College state: “Assumptions given by the higher headquarters must be treated as facts by the subordinate commanders.” Because of this definition, planners must further validate assumptions because “a poor assumption may partially or completely invalidate the entire plan.” The director of strategic studies at the Strategic Studies Institute notes: “Correcting faulty assumptions may require reworking the fundamental concept entirely.” If the plan is not reworked in its entirety, at a minimum, planners must develop a branch plan. Using validation points for assumptions forces planners to verify assumptions and possibly initiate branch planning. An invalid assumption can cause a requirement for a branch plan. Therefore, “continuous and relentless validation of assumptions throughout the deliberate planning process and at the start of CAP is a must.”

A gray zone exists between the start of the detailed deployment plan and the beginning of crisis action planning in which assumptions made during the deliberate planning process are carried over into crisis action planning without being validated. Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, states: “The detailed analysis and coordination accomplished in the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decisionmaking and execution during a crisis. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions.”

Assumptions in the gray zone pose the most risk to the plan: “U.S. defense planners explicitly identify assumptions made in the development of war plans. While the process for explicitly identifying planning assumptions is neither scientific nor foolproof, it is extremely valuable because it makes war planners and decisionmakers more cognizant of at least some of the plan’s inherent risks.” To mitigate risks, planners can identify some areas as generic validation points.

When identifying points that might validate an assumption, planners must carefully consider events that might influence an assumption. National and world events have tremendous influence on an assumption’s validity. The deliberate planning process “relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented.” At the operational level, many planners use political assumptions. Military planners should not shy away from political assumptions; they should be more aggressive in validating them.

Political and diplomatic affairs are usually tied to basing assumptions. To further develop validation points for these assumptions, interagency personnel should advise military planners on world and economic events that might influence assumptions. Not only will this broaden the planners’ view, it
will also ensure viable validation points are set for every assumption.

In accordance with the National Security Strategy, U.S. reliance on foreign basing is contingent on assurances from foreign governments. That said, it is not prudent to assume a sovereign country will allow U.S. forces to stage and base an attack from its soil unless its national interests are at stake.

**Turkey and the Northern Front**

The recent experience with Turkey leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates assumptions concerning longtime allies might not always hold true. The plan called for the use of a northern front in Turkey for air refueling operations, special operations forces, a logistical base, and 4th Infantry Division (ID) and joint personnel recovery operations.

Three dozen ships loaded with tanks and heavy equipment for the Army’s 4th ID waited off the coast of Turkey for permission to offload. The equipment and the 60,000 soldiers represented a significant portion of our combat capability that did not participate in the start of combat operations in Iraq. Many events in Turkey (changing political situations, diminishing public support, economic woes, and a newly elected government) should have been validation points even though U.S. Army Central Command was well into crisis action planning.

In July 2002, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman met in Ankara with Turkish Government officials seeking permission to base an attack from Turkey. Unfortunately, internal Turkish political events resulted in mass resignations of Turkish deputies. Wolfowitz returned with the message that the “Turks will not let us down” even though a vote of no confidence had passed and new elections were to be held in November 2002. The vote of no confidence in July should have been a clear indication that events had changed the status of one validation point (a supportive Turkish Government).

The new vote took place on 3 November 2002. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) defeated Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s party and installed a new anti-establishment government with roots in political Islam. The election of a new, untested government should have been a validation point for CAP planners. Turkey’s once powerful military and political elite would now have less of a voice in political and strategic decisions—a development for which U.S. decisionmakers were unprepared. The installation of the new government was an important change that could have invalidated the planning assumption.

Based on the state of affairs in Turkey, the Turkish Government had every reason to express its concern for a war with Iraq. Any of the following events should have triggered a status change of a validation point, possibly invalidating the assumption:

First, 96 percent of the Turkish people did not support a U.S.-led war with Iraq. Second, the 1991 Persian Gulf War emboldened Kurdish separatists who began using northern Iraq to attack Turkey. By the time a 1999 cease-fire ended the fighting, 30,000 people had died, perhaps as many as half of them Turkish soldiers. In 2003, the Turkish people did not want a repeat of the bloodshed of the 1990s.

Third, the United States failed to deliver on most of its promises of economic aid in return for Turkey’s support of the Persian Gulf War. Because Turkey was Iraq’s largest trading partner, the Persian Gulf War had weakened Turkey’s economy, which caused Turkey’s currency to collapse in 2000.

Fourth, in February 2003, Turkey refused the final U.S. economic aid package of $26 billion. Turkey sought twice that sum and let it be known that without it there would be no new vote in parliament to allow U.S. troops into Turkey. In
the end, a new vote was never taken, and the ships carrying the 4th ID turned south on 17 March 2003, 2 days before the decapitation attack on Saddam Hussein.

The initial course of events should have been an indication that Turkish cooperation was not assured: “In deliberate plans, there is a rule that no assumption about allies’ cooperation should be made unless the commitment is clear [in the form of agreements or alliances in place, for example].”20 The events should have been enough to cast doubt on whether Turkey would support a northern front.

In retrospect, it is clear the United States quickly reached several validation points that invalidated a basing assumption. Indeed, the political dialogue leading to the March 2003 vote to allow troops to base in Turkey seemed to put the assumption in jeopardy as early as July 2002, when Wolfowitz seemed convinced of Turkish support even though a vote of no confidence was pending.

In December 2002, Wolfowitz flew to Anakara for talks with the new Turkish leaders; he emerged saying, “Turkish support is assured.”21 Whether Washington received positive signals from the Turkish leaders or U.S. leaders refused to believe the Turks would put their own national interests ahead of U.S. desires is unclear. Leading up to the March vote in the Turkish Parliament, the events and validation points seemed clear.

On 1 March 2003, the Turkish parliament voted not to approve U.S. troops in Turkey. Still, the ships of the 4th ID stayed off Turkey’s coast for an additional 16 days after the vote. U.S. officials did not alter initial assumptions, although new dynamics required reevaluation by civilian and military planners and leaders.22

Turkey had loyally backed U.S. military actions since the Korean War.23 What was different now? Why did the 1 March 2003 vote in parliament authorizing 60,000 U.S. troops to use Turkey as a northern front fail?

Recommendations

Access to other countries will continue to prove critical to U.S. war plans. Emplacing the following recommendations will allow planners to continually validate planning assumptions:

First, the joint community must recast the current definition of assumptions to stress the importance of continually validating assumptions. U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni said: “I would always challenge assumptions very vigorously as the [commander in chief] CINC. We have too many assumptions. Many are pointless and some assume away problems.”24

Second, planners must validate assumptions as early as possible by using a validation matrix and establishing validation points.

Third, combatant commanders must incorporate the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Coalition Interagency Coordination Group (CIACG) into the planning process. Active participation by military and interagency planners must take place in developing assumptions and the validation process.

Our proposed definition of assumption is: “A supposition of current or future events that is continually validated during the planning process to enable the commander to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.” This definition, used with validation points and the validation-point matrix, would provide direction to planners throughout the planning process.

Before explaining where to insert the validation-point matrix into the planning process, it is necessary to review the five phases of the deliberate planning process: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans. The second phase, concept development, is where we can insert validation points. Concept development consists of six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, CINC’s strategic concept, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review.25

Planners identify valid assumptions during the planning guidance development step of the concept development phase (step 2 of phase 2). Initial staff briefings must include a validation matrix and validation points in the concept development phase. Possible

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</tbody>
</table>

N – No Support  Q – Questionable Support  S – Support
validation points for the matrix should include events such as national and international political events, public opinion, and economic conditions.

The validation point matrix includes events specific to Turkey leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. (See figure.) The letter codes applied to the validation points in the matrix provide planners a tool to assess the validity of current assumptions. If employed properly, the validation point matrix can be a visual tool to help military and interagency planners throughout the entire planning process.

Interagency coordination is conducted through groups such as the JIACG and CIACG. According to Joint Forces Command, the JIACG “seeks to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination with the government. Functions of the JIACG include participating in combatant command staff crisis planning and assessment; civilian agency campaign planning; and presenting unique civilian agency approaches, capabilities, and limitations to the military campaign planners.”

The JIACG’s value is in identifying validation points during the planning process and reporting the status of validation points. The CIACG “establishes operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the coalition.”

Coalition partners have tremendous insight into validation points within their country that could change the status of an assumption. Also, validation points might become less ambiguous in developing assumptions with expertise from coalition partners.

Developing good assumptions at the beginning of the planning process is crucial, but more important is the continuous validation of assumptions. We have redefined the definition of assumptions, established validation points, introduced the validation point matrix, and included the JIACG and CIACG in the combatant commander’s staff. Our definition of an assumption directs planners to continually validate assumptions throughout the planning process. Applying the validation point matrix to the assumption of using Turkey as a northern front demonstrates the matrix’s usefulness. Including the JIACG and CIACG on the combatant commander’s staff would help planners establish validation points and use the validation point matrix.

If planners had used the tools we have outlined, they might have invalidated the use of Turkey as a northern front. Planners must be cognizant of changing events throughout the planning process so as to continuously validate assumptions. 

NOTES
6. Ibid.
10. Echevarria, 10.
11. JP 5-0, III-6.
15. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Filkins and Miller.
20. GEN Anthony Zinni, E-mail to LTC Woodmansee, 11 February 2004.
22. Salmoni.
27. Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Woodmansee, U.S. Marine Corps, is the executive officer of Marine Air Group–14, Cherry Point, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, an M.S. from Auburn University, and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science from the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States (CONUS) and Israel.

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Faulkner, U.S. Army, is Division Chief, Capabilities Program Office, at the National Security Agency. He received a B.A. from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, an M.S. from Central Michigan University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Italy, and Germany.

Major Wayne C. Blanchette, U.S. Air Force, is a student at CGSC. He received a B.A. from Southwest Texas State University; an M.S. from Troy State University at Montgomery; and he is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College. He has served in various staff positions in CONUS and Germany.
Strength Maintenance
A Risk Management Approach

Major Teresa Z. Taylor, U.S. Army National Guard, Retired, Ph.D.

The U.S. Army must accomplish many evolving missions, encompassing everything from disaster relief to prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. An all-volunteer multi-component force performs these missions. As Operation Iraqi Freedom intensifies and deployments lengthen, Army organizations are experiencing recruitment problems, and concerns are being voiced about soldier retention.

Until recently, all Army components have been successful in achieving recruiting goals. In 2004, the Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) met their recruiting mission. However, the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) did not: it fell 5,000 short of its recruiting goal for the year. To help meet its 2005 recruiting objectives, the Army’s recruiting command has lowered some standards for recruits. Some have also raised the issue of reinstituting the draft. While that might be an option, most Americans still support an all-volunteer Army.

Strength-Maintenance Management Model

The Army’s strength-maintenance program is designed to recruit quality soldiers, retain military occupation specialty (MOS)-qualified soldiers, and reduce first-term soldier losses. The strength-maintenance management model offers a balanced approach to the development of initiatives aimed at recruiting quality soldiers. Its programs are designed to retain the maximum number of trained soldiers. Figure 1 shows the essential elements of the strength-maintenance program.

Equally important to strength maintenance are programs that would reduce attrition while enhancing retention of trained soldiers. Attrition rates vary between Army components. A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) analysis of Active Army attrition rates found a first-term attrition rate of 39 percent for enlistees entering the service in 1995. In fiscal year (FY) 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) met its Reserve Component (RC) attrition goals, in the aggregate, with an overall attrition rate of 18.4 percent—the lowest since 1991. This lower rate is attributed to the Reserve Component’s support of the Global War on Terrorism and the post-11 September 2001 implementation of stop-loss programs that minimize attrition in certain military positions. However, as the Army struggles to meet all the demands placed on it, concerns are being raised about the percentage of soldiers who might leave the military rather than face further deployments.
Operation Iraqi Freedom adds additional pressure to Army leaders who were already reexamining their terms of service to the Army. In 2001, the Army completed its Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) study that identified concerns about elevated attrition rates for commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant officers. The ATLDP study identified that Army downsizing, with the concurrent shift and increase in mission requirements, contributed to a zero-defects, micromanagement climate. Some specific findings of the study that have affected retention rates include—

- High operational tempo (OPTEMPO).
- The officer assignment process. The process focuses on personnel management rather than quality professional development.
- Attrition of captains. Because junior officers are rushed through developmental leadership positions to fill personnel shortages, their ability to master tactical and leadership skills is affected negatively.
- Junior officer job satisfaction. Junior officers are concerned about their duties and the imbalance between the Army’s needs and their family’s needs.

While each component participates in recruitment, Army leaders are responsible for implementing retention and attrition programs in their units. Because attrition management is essential to force readiness, retention and attrition programs must be focused, appropriate, and productive. I propose applying the Army’s risk-management process to a unit’s retention and attrition program to achieve a more measured and consistent approach to the process.

As Field Manual (FM) 100-14, Risk Management, outlines, the Army’s philosophy is to integrate the risk-management process into all activities. Risk management is the continuous process of identifying and controlling hazards to conserve combat power and resources. The six steps of risk management are—

1. Identify hazards.
2. Assess hazards to determine risks.
3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
4. Implement controls.
5. Supervise and evaluate.
6. Assess reduced hazards.

### Applying Risk-Assessment Strategies for Retention

The science of risk assessment and management was developed to reduce unnecessary risk to soldiers during training and operations. The Army’s policy of “training the way you will fight” is inherently dangerous. Identifying potential or actual hazards as well as steps leaders can take to minimize or eliminate the risk of those hazards produces manageable danger. Applying the same risk-assessment thinking to unit-retention programs means understanding the risks to retention associated with key factors that research has found most influences retention.

Controls are actions taken to eliminate hazards or reduce risk. The commander initially evaluates controls already in place to verify if they adequately address the risk. These controls take different forms, and each answers a question:

- Support provided. Is the type of support adequate to control the hazard?

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**Figure 2. Variables influencing retention.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Style</th>
<th>Group and Team Dynamics</th>
<th>Job Satisfaction and Training</th>
<th>Organized Unit Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive; experienced</td>
<td>Social atmosphere</td>
<td>Job satisfaction and variety</td>
<td>Family or job conflicts managed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses leadership principles</td>
<td>Pride in unit</td>
<td>Quality training conducted by competent instructors</td>
<td>Operational and personnel tempo managed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate discipline, fair treatment</td>
<td>Group cohesion</td>
<td>Shared responsibility for training</td>
<td>Equipment shortages addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People v. task orientation</td>
<td>Family involvement</td>
<td>Personnel used appropriately</td>
<td>Pay problems addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7. Ibid.
10. Martin and O’Laughlin.
15. Kirland, Raney, and Hicks.
Standards. Is the guidance or procedure adequately clear to control the hazard?

Training. Is training thorough and recent enough to control the hazard?

Leaders. Are leaders ready, willing, and able to enforce standards to control the hazard?

Unit self-discipline. Is unit performance and conduct sufficiently self-disciplined to control the hazard?

Commanders then determine how adequately existing controls reduce the risk the hazard poses. Following that determination, they might impose additional controls. To help identify hazards to retention, I summarize the relevant research that has been conducted in the last 20 years.

**Retention Research**

As figure 2 shows, research sponsored by many different agencies and individuals identified reasons soldiers choose to leave or stay in the Army. I group these into four categories:

1. Leader style, which relates to how positive a leader’s attitude is toward soldiers and how much experience the leader has. Retention is influenced by how closely the leader adheres to well-established leadership principles; how discipline is applied; and the balance a leader maintains between being people-focused and mission-focused.

2. Group and team dynamics, which encompass how satisfying unit social relationships are; how proud unit members feel to be a part of the organization; how cohesive unit members feel the organization is; and how successful unit programs are in making soldier families feel a part of the team.

3. Job satisfaction and training, which includes whether soldiers are in the occupations for which they were trained and how well initial and skill maintenance training is conducted.

4. Organized unit operations, which address the soldier’s perception of how efficiently and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Style Hazards</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● The organization’s culture emphasizes one type of leadership style over another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Senior leaders do not understand differences and the effect of different leadership styles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Leader training outside the institution is not considered necessary.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingent Reward</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Because behavioral and performance expectations are based on a negotiated contract involving rewards for successful performance, commitment to the organization might be limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Trust might be degraded if the performance contract is not honored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Leaders might become overly reliant on this leadership style.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management by Exception</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Under constant threat of punishment, subordinates’ stress will increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Individuals will experience increased job “burnout.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● This leadership style contributes to attrition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● This leadership style is associated with a higher intent to leave the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Leaders might be reluctant to try another leadership style if short-term results are required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformational</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Leaders might be unfamiliar with this leadership style and unsure how to employ it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Misapplication (when another leadership style would be more appropriate).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Knowledge-sharing about the appropriate application and employment of different leadership styles is made available and its use encouraged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standards</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● There is a published standard about the appropriate application of different leadership styles to which leaders are held accountable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Criteria by which to evaluate different leadership styles are developed and applied in units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Training, modeling, and mentoring are available to leaders for the express purpose of developing a wide range of leadership styles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Commanders at all levels of an organization form a primary team, acquire knowledge of all leadership styles, and develop an organizationwide philosophy about employing specific leadership styles within each unit in the organization.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Self-Discipline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Unit leaders develop an understanding of the implications of short- versus long-term thinking and its effect on leadership styles and organizational culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 3. The risk-management process and leadership style hazards and controls.
consistently the unit is run, problems are solved, and how OPTEMPO is managed.

Army leaders are acculturated to be decisive, aggressive, and to seize control. The Army has a bias for action. Army leaders who get things done quickly are valued for the results they can achieve. However, “going with the 80-percent solution” might not always be the best choice when crafting solutions to retention problems. Applying the deliberate, methodical risk-assessment approach to managing the variance within the factors I identified can help a leader manage this important problem.

**Leader style.** Different leader styles have different effects on short- and long-term goal accomplishment, the development of trust, how cohesive a unit might be, and the quality of unit performance. Research conducted in the last 25 years has begun to define specific leadership styles and the effects of those styles on followers. Although some defining characteristics are still being debated, leadership styles can be grouped into three broad categories:

1. The contingent reward, based on positive rewards for negotiated behavior.
3. Transformational management, which fosters commitment to leader and organizational goals, greater trust, innovativeness, and the ability to manage stress; higher performance levels in garrison and combat training centers; greater unit cohesion, this leadership style is related to subordinate satisfaction and a reduction in the intent to leave the organization.

Figure 3 identifies leadership style hazards as well as controls a leader might use to mitigate the risk of these hazards to retention.

**Group and team dynamics.** Research indicates military teams perform more successfully when team members have an equal understanding of what

### Group/Team Dynamics Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition is provided in a sincere, timely manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork is encouraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standards</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faultfinding and competition are discouraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust is established and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People-building is balanced with a concern for tangible results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate training on team and group dynamics is provided at all levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders plan and study before starting and expanding team activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders up and down the chain of command understand and support team efforts to build, maintain, and sustain the team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Self-Discipline</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People-building is balanced with a concern for tangible results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5. Bandow.
6. Ibid.
7. Nickol.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Nickol.
13-18. Ibid.
20. Adizes.

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**Figure 4.** The risk-management process and group/team dynamics hazards and controls.
the task is and how they should interact to perform successfully.\textsuperscript{14} How cohesive a team is contributes to the team’s effectiveness, its ability to withstand stress, and its ability to sustain itself in the face of change.\textsuperscript{15} Although some teams are able to self-organize and perform successfully, teams achieve effectiveness more rapidly when a leader provides team and group dynamics training.\textsuperscript{16}

Healthy teams are building blocks to effective units; they foster and are fostered by cohesion. The desire to be part of a cohesive organization is an element important to the retention of soldiers.\textsuperscript{17} Many external factors can influence Army team development: rank, branch, component, full- and part-time status, gender, race, family support, and so on. All can have an effect on how successful a team might be. Figure 4 identifies group and team dynamics hazards and controls a leader might employ to mitigate the risk of these hazards to retention.

**Job satisfaction and training.** A military unit’s readiness to perform a mission depends on its members’ individual and collective proficiencies and capabilities. A key factor cited in a number of retention studies was job satisfaction.\textsuperscript{18} How satisfied a soldier is in the job is related to how effectively the training he received prepared him to perform the job.\textsuperscript{19} A related retention factor is whether individuals are performing the role for which they were trained.\textsuperscript{20} Active Component (AC) and RC units must perform a variety of missions, and units in all components face challenges that can degrade a unit leader’s training program. Figure 5 identifies job satisfaction and training hazards and the controls a leader might use to mitigate the risk of these hazards to retention.

**Organized unit operations.** Unit leaders balance providing effective leadership for unit members with making effective, timely, appropriate management decisions to maintain unit operations. In AC units, leaders have more time to spend on unit-management issues. The necessary staff members are present and resources are close by. Reserve units face additional management challenges because full-time support staffs vary between units, units might be geographically dispersed, or resources might not be available. Figure 6 identifies organized unit operation hazards and controls a leader might employ to mitigate the risk of these hazards to retention.

### Job Satisfaction and Training Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Utilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training is not offered in a soldier’s military occupational speciality.\textsuperscript{1}</td>
<td>Soldiers do not perform the job for which they were trained.\textsuperscript{4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment or training areas are not available.\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>Plans are made, then not followed; there is an atmosphere of crisis management.\textsuperscript{5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers are poorly prepared.\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>Last-minute changes interrupt planned training.\textsuperscript{5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult-learning principles are not employed to develop training programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Hazard Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Standards</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Unit Self-Discipline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support plans for training are routinely developed and enforced.\textsuperscript{7}</td>
<td>Training is realistic in terms of what can be realistically learned in the time available as well as accomplished in realistic battlefield conditions.\textsuperscript{9}</td>
<td>Training is meaningful.\textsuperscript{10}</td>
<td>Unit leaders communicate training goals to senior leaders.\textsuperscript{13}</td>
<td>Unit trainers employ adult-learning principles when developing training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers feel like they are achieving competence.\textsuperscript{8}</td>
<td></td>
<td>Soldiers feel as if they make progress.\textsuperscript{11}</td>
<td>Training goals are mutually established and respected.\textsuperscript{14}</td>
<td>Appropriate planning is accomplished to schedule resources and coordinate training support.\textsuperscript{16}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Soldiers have a choice in what tasks they are trained in.\textsuperscript{12}</td>
<td>Unit leaders are provided the latitude to accomplish the goals.\textsuperscript{15}</td>
<td>Individuals are used appropriately in the occupations for which they trained.\textsuperscript{17}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2-8. Ibid.


10. Thomas and Barrios-Choplin.

11-15. Ibid.


17. Thomas and Barrios-Choplin.

**Figure 5.** The risk-management process (job satisfaction and training hazards).
Successful Strength Maintenance

A successful strength maintenance formula combines thoughtful analysis with the establishment of appropriate goals. Many factors affect a soldier’s decision to stay committed to the Army. While some factors might be beyond the control of individual commanders, a number of factors that influence retention and attrition are under the control of unit leaders. By applying the risk-management process to a unit’s retention program, leaders might identify more hazards to retention, and they might develop additional controls to mitigate risks to retention. In an Army of One, every soldier counts. **MR**

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**NOTES**

3. Ibid.
7. Schmitt.
9. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

Major Teresa Z. Taylor, U.S. Army National Guard, Retired, is a Research Psychologist at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Washington, D.C. She received a B.A. and an M.S. from Boise State University and a Ph.D. from the University of Idaho.
Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and John P. Sullivan

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S UICIDE BOMBING is the act of blowing oneself up while trying to kill (destroy) or injure (damage) a target. The target might be military or civilian or both. Typically, the killing or physical destruction of the target is less important than the terror generated by the act. Suicide bombing is a disruptive firepower capability (based on bond-relationship targeting) used by opposing forces (OPFORs) that lack traditional destructive firepower.

Suicide bombing is a criminal warfighting technique because it almost always falls within the not crime/not war overlap of nonstate OPFOR operations. When state forces, such as the Iraqi military, use the technique, they violate the rules of war by taking off their uniforms to appear as noncombatants (thus mimicking nonstate OPFORs) for stealth-masking purposes. The Japanese use of Kamikaze aircraft during World War II is considered a legitimate use of military force, but that early prototype form of suicide bombing has not been used for almost 60 years.

Persistent suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (in pre-, trans-, and postmajor combat operations) suggest this “criminal-warfighting” technique will be used with increasing frequency against U.S. Army and allied forces deployed for combat and humanitarian missions in and around Islamic lands. Therefore, U.S. Army, Marine, and constabulary personnel must develop appropriate intelligence, countermeasure, and force-protection capabilities to interdict, mitigate, and respond to what has become a threat against U.S. forces in the global war against radical Islamic terrorism and insurgency.

Suicide Operations and Military Traditions

Suicide operations (bombings and attacks) fall within three dominant philosophical military traditions: Western, Oriental, and Islamic, each of which holds varying views on this offensive technique at individual and unit levels of doctrinal employment.

Western tradition. At the individual level, the Western tradition does not advocate suicide operations. Soldiers or pilots might, on their own initiative and typically when mortally wounded, take as many opposing soldiers with them as possible. In this instance, the combatant has nothing to lose, as in the case of a dying U.S. torpedo-bomber pilot ramming his aircraft into a Japanese warship during World
War II. In rare instances, uninjured individuals heroically sacrifice their lives against hopeless odds in defense of their comrades, as did two Delta snipers in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, who chose to help a downed Black Hawk crew.3

At the unit level, desperation in war can result in suicidal or near-suicidal operations. The holding action of King Leonidas and his Spartan bodyguards at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. forms the basis of what might be considered a “heroic” activity. More than a millennium and a half later, the battles of Verdun and The Somme during World War I were clearly suicidal operations as opposing forces repeatedly attempted to break the trench stalemate with massed human-wave attacks. In the early days of the Korean War, Task Force Smith’s hasty blocking action was almost suicidal but required by dire circumstances.4

Even so, U.S. soldiers do not strap explosive vests to their bodies or purposefully ram cars or trucks laden with explosives into buildings.5 The suicide bombings taking place in Iraq are totally alien to a Western military tradition, which in no way views such action as heroic.

**Oriental tradition.** Suicide operations within the Oriental tradition have occurred sporadically across various cultures. In the 13th century, Mongol light cavalry “suicide troops” (mangudai) were used as bait. They charged the enemy then retreated, hoping the enemy would break ranks and pursue them into a well-coordinated trap.6 However, Mongol suicide or near-suicide operational concepts did not extend into the modern world. Those of the Japanese did, however.

The Japanese military drew on principles of Bushido—“the way (do) of the warrior (bushi).” These ideas were based on a fusion of Zen Buddhism and later Confucianism and were described in the *Hagakure* written in 1716 and Inazo Nitobe’s *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, translated into English in 1900.7 The Bushido warrior code contained the provision for ritual suicide (seppuku) and made death preferable to the dishonor of being taken prisoner. This tradition resulted in the prevalence of sui-
cide operations when Japan went on the defensive during World War II. Sword-wielding officers led suicide charges, and Kamikaze (divine wind) suicide bomber aircraft units, midget submarine units, and explosive motorboat units were born.8

Suicide bombings also occurred during the Vietnam War. The Viet Cong used sappers (demolition commandos) who would carry or wear satchel charges and purposefully blow themselves up to destroy U.S. and Republic of Vietnam equipment and fortifications.

Special commando “Black Tiger” units of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) also conduct suicide bombings in Sri Lanka and India. The Tamils are unique because they possess a hybrid Western and Oriental tradition that “advocate[s] a Tamil nationalism that is expressed by its leaders in religious terms referring to the cult of martyrs.”9 The group is innovative, having copied the Hezbollah suicide-bombing concept of operations in 1987 years before non-Shi’ia Palestinian terrorist groups used such methods. About 200 Tamil suicide bombings occurred from 1987 to late 2001, resulting in the group’s status as preeminent user of the technique. Currently, the Tamil Tigers are in a state of “strategic pause” with regard to suicide bombings but are capable of starting them again at any time.

Islamic tradition. Islamic suicide bombings are of interest because they provide the philosophical context in which such operations in Iraq are being conducted. Raphael Israeli’s article, “A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism,” is the best overview of suicide bombing’s Islamic philosophical origins.10 He notes that the conceptual basis for the Shi’ite cult of martyrdom is a tradition that originated with Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the prophet Muhammad. Hussein ibn Ali, sacrificed himself for Allah when he and his followers were annihilated by Caliph Yazid’s army at Karbalah in 680.

The idea of individual “selfless sacrifice” was used during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s when units of Iranian children, wearing the “keys to paradise” around their necks, cleared Iraqi minefields with their bodies. These Shi’ia sacrifices were immortalized with blood-red colored water in a fountain dedicated to martyrs in Tehran.

In 1982, the Iranian revolution under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was exported to Lebanon, where the Islamic Resistance, a precursor of Hezbollah (Party of God), launched suicide attacks against American, French, and Israeli targets. Thus, Hezbollah, created in 1982 as a counter to the Israeli invasion, was the impetus for modern suicide operations. Hezbollah exploited the images of the cult of Hussein ibn Ali to inculcate self-sacrifice and martyrdom as an ideal for its fighters. This Shi’ite group, which uses both terrorist and guerrilla techniques, conducted its first large suicide bombing in April 1983 against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. That bombing was directly influenced by the first documented vehicular suicide bombing (in December 1981) against the Iraqi Embassy in Lebanon. The Shi’ia Amal group, which had links with Hezbollah on the latter’s formation, conducted the 1981 bombing.

Suicide bombings remained solely a Shi’ia activity for a decade until Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), a Sunni terrorist group, conducted a suicide bombing within Israel in April 1993 against Israeli Defense Forces soldiers. This ideological transference from Shi’ia to Sunni came about through two circumstances. The first was Israel’s exiling of more than 400 Islamic activists, many of them Hamas members, to southern Lebanon in December 1992. Hezbollah befriended these activists based on the simple rationale that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” While in exile, Hamas members were influenced by Hezbollah’s suicide bombing techniques and took them back to the West Bank when they were repatriated.

The second event was the fatwas (religious edicts) created by fundamentalist Sunni scholars to rationalize how Shi’ia concepts of selfless sacrifice could fit into Sunni thinking about martyrdom and punishing one’s enemies. Suicide bombings spread to other fundamentalist Sunni terrorist groups then to secular, nationalistic terrorist organizations such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which emerged in 2000 as an offshoot of Yassar Arafat’s Fatah faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

The migration of suicide bombings from the religious to the secular set the stage for Saddam Hussein’s use of this technique against allied invasion forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and explains why any combination of former Iraqi Ba’ath party loyalists (to a limited extent) and fundamentalist Shi’ia and Sunni terrorists now operating in Iraq could conduct suicide bombings.11 Suicide bombers look forward to death because, as martyrs, they expect Allah to reward them in paradise, and they and their families will gain social status.

Economic benefits such as monetary payments might also come to family members as an additional bonus for completing a successful operation. During the Second Intifada, Saddam Hussein provided cash payments of $25,000 to the families of
Palestinian insurgents killed in suicide attacks against Israeli targets. Suicide operations range in organizational sophistication as well. A single suicide bomber might act individually against a target; two or three might coordinate the bombings; or a larger number of suicide bombers might participate as for example, the 19 al-Qaeda members who hijacked 4 U.S. airliners on 11 September 2001 and who coordinated their activities as part of a strike force against multiple targets.

Operational and Strategic Context

Suicide operations, which are more inclusive than suicide bombings, have historically occurred in all three dominant military traditions. However, only in the Islamic tradition are suicide bombings currently employed. The Tamil Tigers have not engaged in suicide bombings for the past few years.

Modern suicide bombings were first operationally employed during the early 1980s in southern Lebanon by the Amal and Hezbollah groups. The technique spread to the Tamil Tigers in 1987 and to Hamas in 1993. Over the ensuing decade, an increasing number of terrorist groups have engaged in suicide bombings: Palestine Islamic Jihad in 1994, Kurdistan Workers Party in 1996, al-Qaeda in 1998, Chechens in 2000, and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in 2002. With the exception of the Kurdistan Workers Party, this pattern has been part of a radical Islamic global insurgency against the United States and its allies since 1993.

We can analyze major groups engaging in suicide bombings by delivery modes (figure 1) and target sets (figure 2). The Tamil Tigers and al-Qaeda top the list in suicide-bombing sophistication, followed by the Chechens and Hezbollah. Less sophisticated groups are Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, although they have engaged in a greater number of suicide bombings than some of the other major groups. The Kurdistan Workers Party is at the bottom of the sophistication scale.

More sophisticated groups use larger, higher order explosive devices and engage in simultaneous (multiple suicide bombers or targets) or sequential
attacks (secondary and tertiary suicide bombers at the same target), often using other weapons. They can engage “hard,” rather than solely “soft,” targets, partially because they have larger bombs and better explosives, and they have access to more delivery methods. Triggering methods (fuzes, pull cords, cell phones) also increase with sophistication, and explosive devices are more difficult to detect by sensors (x-rays, metal detectors, dogs, soldiers).14

Operational advantages of suicide bombings over normal terrorist bombings include the following:

- The device is precisely delivered to the target. The suicide bomber functions as a precision weapon taking the explosive device right to the target, which is a standoff attack in the sense that the terrorist is “invisible” (stealth-masked) until the device is detonated, which helps overcome the Western advantage of standoff targeting based on physical distance.
- Harder targets can be attacked. Targets that cannot normally be attacked can now be reached. Normal terrorist bombings will not damage heavily fortified compounds that have proper standoff distances, but suicide bombers can crash through the front gate of a fortified compound and reach the desired target.
- The device has no window of vulnerability. The explosive device cannot be found and moved or rendered safe before detonation.
- No planned egress is required. A person simply has to deliver the explosive charge to the target. Escape routes and avoidance of capture afterward are not a consideration.
- No one is left alive to interrogate. Because suicide bombers are not typically captured, terrorist groups can better maintain operational security. The Tamil Tigers use poison capsules as a fail-safe method in this regard. Some Palestinian groups use a redundant, cell-phone-activated detonator that can be set off by calling the cell-phone number if the bomber attempts to back out of the mission.
- No burden of wounded comrades exists. Injured comrades create a logistical strain on a group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
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<th>Vehicular</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
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**Figure 1. Major groups by suicide-bomber delivery mode.**

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<th>Military/LE (Personnel)</th>
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<th>Transit</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
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**Figure 2. Major groups by suicide-bomber target set.**

- The horror factor increases the attack’s psychological effect. Suicide bombers wearing bomb vests are blown to pieces, and typically, their heads are separated from their bodies. Individuals look at one another with suspicion in areas where suicide bombings occur frequently, which creates higher levels of anxiety for U.S. troops: they must scan
everyone in a crowd for bulky clothing and unusual behavior.

- Blood-borne pathogens can be delivered. Suicide bombers infected with hepatitis and HIV can create a “hazmat” incident by spreading disease to targeted personnel. Bone fragments and blood-covered bolts and nails might directly transmit pathogens from the bomber to nearby victims.

Another strategic consideration is that suicide bombings create martyrs for the society from which the group recruits. As more suicide bombers kill themselves and gain prestige in the eyes of their society, the cycle of violence can escalate into a “religious movement.” Already, Palestinian society is taking on characteristics of a death cult with young children preferring to grow up to be suicide bombers rather than engineers and doctors. Recruitment of new suicide bombers is not difficult.

Radical Islamic networks, including al-Qaeda, are engaging in a global insurgency against the West. Martyrdom is one of the common bonds that hold the insurgency together, and it is increasing in strength as more terrorist groups engage in suicide bombings. The Roman Empire faced a similar strategic dilemma with Christian martyrs. The radical Islamic link to martyrdom, now more than 20 years old, must be broken before it becomes too entrenched.

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**OIF Statistical Findings**

Suicide operations have become emblematic of terrorism and war. Human-, vehicle-, and vessel-borne suicide bombers are a continuing concern to military, police, and security forces. This concern extends to Iraq and has been seen in all phases of operations in the Iraqi theater. The account of “major combat” operations in David Zucchino’s *Los Angeles Times Magazine* article “The Thunder Run” mentions suicide bombers during that phase of operations and covers the prelude to the fall of Baghdad from 4 to 8 April 2003.15

Zucchino, who was embedded with Task Force 4-64 of the 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), describes attempted suicide attacks against U.S. forces. While traversing Highway 8 toward Baghdad on 5 April 2003, a mechanized column encountered small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire. Intermingled with Iraqi military vehicles were civilian cars, taxis, buses, and motorcycles. Some Iraqi combatants wore military uniforms, some wore civilian clothes, and others wore the black attire of the Fedayeen Saddam. During this encounter, Task Force 1-64, a battalion known as “Rogue,” was taking heavy fire. Zucchino describes how two suicide vehicles packed with explosives sped down the offramp toward U.S. forces.16 The vehicles were destroyed before they could complete their attack. However, according to Zucchino, suicide vehicles loaded with explosives intermingled with Fedayeen, Arab volunteers, and Republican Guards. One particular vehicle, an orange-and-white taxi, attempted to ram a mechanized U.S. column.17 Such events have become increasingly familiar to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.

We attempt here to place suicide operations in context by describing them in the premajor combat buildup, during major combat operations (transmajor combat), and during the postmajor combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, we divide the postmajor combat phase into two segments: pre- and postcapture of Saddam Hussein. We also identify attacks occurring during Ramadan 2003, basing our analysis exclusively on open-source intelligence. We relied on media reporting from multiple sources, including wire services, news websites, and newspapers. We consulted several chronologies and databases and attempted to deconflict reports and casualty figures. Not all sources agreed on details, but the major trend is consistent.18 For example, on 19 March 2004, 1 day before the 1-year anniversary of the end of major combat, the Associated Press (AP) reported that at least 660 persons were killed in 24 suicide bombings that year. The AP report began its tally on 29 March 2003 and ended it on 18 March 2004 and counted 18 vehicle- and 6 human-borne bombings. The article also noted that this frequency was greater than the Israel-Palestinian toll over the previous 3-1/2 years.19

We recorded 49 entries for the same period (some were potential incidents, some were attempts, and others were multiple strikes). We identified a total of 54 entries, some of which were multiple attacks during a single coordinated assault. The 54 entries yielded total casualties of approximately 813 killed and 2,154 injured. The figures include suicide bombers in the totals. When we divided by phase we found two events during the premajor combat phase (5 killed in 1 vehicle- and 1 human-borne assault), 9 events during the transmajor combat phase, (17 killed, 33 injured in 5 vehicle- and 4 human-borne assaults); and 43 events during the postmajor combat phase (791 killed, 2,121 injured in 35 vehicle-, 8 human-borne, and 1 unknown-mode assaults).

When we subdivided the postmajor combat phase into the periods before and after Saddam Hussein’s capture, we documented 18 events before capture (totaling 274 killed and 749 injured in 16 vehicle- and
2 human-borne attacks) and 25 events postcapture (517 killed, 1,372 injured in 18 vehicle- and 6 human-borne attacks, and 1 unknown mode). We noted 5 events during the so-called “Ramadan Offensive” in 2003 (102 deaths and 354 injuries).

Our first entry occurred on 26 February 2003 during the buildup to the war. The combat phase began on 20 March 2003, and the first entry in this phase was recorded on 22 March 2003. We began the postmajor combat period on 2 May 2003, when major combat operations ended. Our last entry was on 18 March 2004 because analysis ended on 20 March 2004, 1 year from when major combat began.

Premajor combat. The premajor combat phase includes entries on 26 February 2003 and 13 March 2003 when Ansar al-Islam attacked Kurdish interests. Iranian hard-liners called for Palestinian suicide bombers to target U.S. forces in the region.20 And, by 11 February 2003, Iraqi officials were threatening suicide operations should the war begin, with Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan asserting that Iraq would deploy thousands of suicide attackers.21

On 11 February 2003, Osama bin-Laden joined the information campaign with an audiotape aired on Qatar’s Al-Jazeera television network in which he called on Iraqis to carry out suicide attacks against U.S. forces. His call was echoed on 23 February 2003 by Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who urged Iraqis and Muslims worldwide to carry out suicide attacks against the United States. By 12 March 2003, Saddam Hussein was calling for Arabs seeking martyrdom to join the struggle and conduct suicide bombings against the U.S. military. The British Navy expressed concerns about potential Iraqi suicide vessels, and reports of Iraqi suicide training camps began to surface.

Transmajor combat. The first attack in the transmajor combat phase occurred against a Kurdish military checkpoint at Khurmal, Kurdistan. In addition to the suicide bomber, at least three Kurds and an Australian news cameraman were killed. By 21 March, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad had joined the call to employ suicide bombings, urging Iraqis to prepare suicide belts and confront America with martyrdom operations. In response, U.S. forces were advised to strip enemy prisoners of war to counter potential suicide bombings.22 Iranian naval forces reportedly intercepted an explosive-laden Iraqi fast boat, and claimed to have spotted at least four additional suicide vessels.23

On 26 March 2003, an expatriate Ansar leader told Dutch television that Ansar suicide commandos would attack U.S. troops, a claim that had to be
taken seriously given the Ansar attacks in Kurdistan. Information began to surface that foreign fighters, including Hezbollah, were en route to join the war.24

The first successful attack against U.S. forces occurred on 29 March 2003 in Najaf. Four U.S. soldiers were killed in an Iraqi vehicular suicide attack. Iraqi leaders claimed this was the beginning of a “routine military policy,” and the attacker was posthumously awarded two medals by Saddam Hussein.25 In the aftermath of this attack, information operations supporting use of suicide operations increased. These propaganda actions were supported by an “affinity” attack inNetanya, Israel, on 30 March 2003, which injured 49 Israelis in what the Islamic Jihad called “Palestine’s gift to the heroic people of Iraq.”26 The Al-Quds Brigades deployed suicide operatives to Baghdad, and Islamic leaders, websites, and newspapers across the Middle East and elsewhere took up the call to join the jihad and encouraged suicide martyrs to defend Iraq.27

U.S. Marines found a cache of suicide vests in a Baghdad school on 13 April 2003. The vests, lined with C4 plastic explosive and containing ball bearings, were believed to have been secreted by paramilitary fighters associated with the Fedayeen Saddam. U.S. forces also found evidence of suicide training and recruitment efforts. Suicide attacks during the transmajor combat phase were limited in scope and sophistication. Most assaults were directed against U.S. military convoys, columns, or checkpoints. While suicide attacks during major combat had little military significance, they were an emerging force-protection concern and a precursor for suicide operations in the insurgency that followed.

**Postmajor combat.** Suicide operations gained momentum during the postmajor combat phase with more than 43 suicide events after major combat ended. The events have yielded many casualties and demonstrate an increased sophistication in targeting and coordination. The attacks continue to focus on U.S. military targets but include other targets of increasing strategic importance. New targets included the Italian Carabinieri, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Iraqi police, Shi’ite religious venues, political figures, and diplomatic sites such as the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies and UN facilities. The first attack in this phase was the 7 August 2003 truck bombing of the Jordanian Embassy. Coming after a lull in operations, the attack signaled the start of a concerted suicide bombing campaign in support of an Iraqi insurgency. An attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad followed on 19 August. Employing a suicide-initiated, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, the truck-borne assault targeted the front of the UN headquarters located in the former Canal Hotel and killed 25 and injured 100. Intended to erode public and international support for U.S. reconstruction of Iraq, the attack severely curtailed UN operations. In what appeared to be a reinforcing action aimed at eroding coalition stability efforts, a second attack against the UN occurred on 22 September.

An apparent resurgence of anti-coalition suicide attacks began when Ramadan began. The “Ramadan Offensive,” from 26 October to 24 November 2003, accounted for six suicide events, two of which were of major symbolic and strategic importance. On 27 October, suicide bombers attacked the Red Cross offices. The attack was coordinated with attacks on five Iraqi police stations where 40 people were killed and more than 200 injured. The 12 November attack against the Italian Carabinieri base in Nasiriya killed 31 and injured 80. The attacks caused the suspension of humanitarian operations by many nongovernmental relief organizations and provoked political discussion worldwide on the presence of coalition forces. Attacks on Shi’ite religious leaders, mosques, and shrines also occurred during this time, fueling lack of confidence in the coalition’s reconstruction plans.

Suicide bombings were increasingly used as a tool to stimulate insurgency during this phase. Their sophistication increased, and they began using larger bombs, fuel tankers, and—particularly pernicious—ambulances and police cars, in combination assaults. Suicide operations also augmented armed assaults. Foreign jihadi fighters apparently also played crucial roles.

Premajor combat information operations seem to have resonated. Some accounts suggest al-Qaeda links, including the infusion of Lashkar-e-Toiba, Chechen members of Bin Laden’s International Islamic Front, and Pakistanis, Saudis, and Jordanians.28
Aftermath of a car bomb that killed Ezzidin Salim, the head of the Iraqi Governing Council, 17 May 2004.

As noted in a 14 December 2003 Los Angeles Times account, insurgents demonstrated increasing sophistication in terms of tactics, strategy, and intelligence operations with suicide operations being central to this mix. The article says: “A menacing wild card in the war is the corps of suicide bombers, mostly believed to be foreign born jihadis, whom the insurgent forces appear to be able to call on for precision attacks, such as the bombings at the United Nations’ headquarters in Baghdad and a strike at Italian military police headquarters in the southern city of Nasiriyah.”

By 29 November 2003, media reports detailed al-Qaeda links to the Iraqi insurgency, noting that Iraq was central to its global insurgency efforts. European jihadis were being recruited for Iraq, and the importance of Abu Musab Zarqawi’s network, as well as a Zarqawi-Ansar alliance in staging suicide operations against military, diplomatic, and humanitarian targets in Iraq, emerged. In early February 2004 in Palestine and Iraq, Islamist leaders proclaimed martyrdom operations were a religious obligation.

By 29 February 2004, the jihadi suicide-bombing imperative had “taken root in the ravaged landscape of postwar Iraq.” This phase of operations is significant for the rising number of suicide attacks within an increasing insurgent operational tempo. The gains in sophistication demonstrated in the UN, Red Cross, and Carabinieri attacks before Saddam Hussein’s capture carried over into the postcapture period, with an increase in events, casualties, and sophistication. Suicide bombings had become firmly embedded in the Iraqi insurgent armamentarium.

The Future

Suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom began with a series of low-key, preconflict indicators. A couple of successful bombings occurred in Kurdistan followed by calls from Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime to use martyrdom operations to thwart U.S. intentions. Then Islamist leaders made Saddam Hussein’s call their own to stimulate their vision of an anti-U.S., anti-Western global jihad. During major combat operations, a relatively small number of tactically insignificant suicide attacks were directed against U.S. military forces. These attacks did not delay the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime or affect the outcome of combat operations.

These attacks—as with any attack employing suicide operations by irregular forces cloaked in civilian attire—were clear violations of international law. As such, they constituted perfidy or “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is accorded,
protection under the rules of international law.”\textsuperscript{33} The United States did not ratify the 1977 protocols, but customary prohibitions of such conduct still apply. In addition, targeting civilians is clearly terrorism and constitutes a war crime. International humanitarian law absolutely prohibits intentional targeting of civilians (including police forces).

While traditional Islamic law explicitly proscribes suicide and the targeting of innocent civilians, Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, the International Islamic Front, Palestinian insurgents, and “secular” groups, such as Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, sidestep these prohibitions by referring to suicide bombers as martyrs and interpreting their actions as a religious duty. The tactic of “extreme revenge” has been transported to Iraq and perhaps in the future will appear elsewhere.\textsuperscript{34}

The suicide bombings in Iraq, particularly against U.S. troops, then against the UN, Red Cross, police, and civilian targets, demonstrated a new chapter in global terrorism and insurgency. Martyrdom operations signal an escalation in the conflict because they seek maximum casualties and destruction. Suicide attacks are low-cost, precision means that yield a high symbolic return. At the tactical level, suicide operations allow precise targeting through manipulation of organic stealth: the bomber is masked until the operation occurs, barring accurate tactical intelligence derived from human sources within the combatant cell.

Because many suicide operations, particularly in Israel and Palestine, involve secondary or twin attacks, an awareness of secondary attack potentials must be ingrained in all military and constabulary forces involved in counterinsurgency, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and stability operations and support operations. Once the first bomb goes off, forces must always look for the potential secondary or tertiary attack. Tactical response should include separating suspicious persons from crowds and massed forces. Such police operations require increased training in constabulary operations and a higher number of constabulary forces being integrated into future military force structures.

Because checkpoints are frequently targeted, solid standoff distances at checkpoints and during intervention with suspicious persons are key. Countering suicide attacks demands enhanced intelligence; appropriate offensive military and constabulary operations; effective defensive and force-protection measures; and a force structure tailored to the counterinsurgency environment.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) suicide bombers employ evolve, and the best solution for dissecting evolving TTPs is through real-time intelligence collection, assessment, and dissemination. As soon as a suicide operation occurs or is interdicted, TTP should be documented and an advisory on the equipment used and the bomber’s previous behavior should be disseminated to friendly forces immediately. Quick, tactical assessments must not be delayed; the OPFOR will evolve its tactics for subsequent targets.

Suicide bombers in Iraq (or anywhere else, for that matter) will conduct operations based on local conditions and capabilities. For example, vehicle-borne attacks frequently rely on a high-speed approach to circumvent tactical security measures. Multiple attacks are designed to overwhelm operational-level coordination and force allocation. TTPs used in Palestine and by the LTTE in the Indian subcontinent provide good background information, as do the events we recount here. However, the current and future OPFOR will adapt TTPs to local context, capabilities, and countermeasures.

Strategically, suicide bombings erode the public’s confidence and that of the expeditionary force’s home audience. In Iraq, attacks stimulate the insurgency and undermine attempts to build a secure civil society. International organizations, such as the UN and Red Cross, and humanitarian entities are now reluctant to operate in the contested theater, which hinders attempts to restore stability. Perhaps most important, the experience of suicide bombings and their role in nurturing and sustaining an insurgency provides key strategic lessons. Like much of the Arab world, Iraq has little historical tolerance for occupation (especially by non-Muslims). This, combined with the contemporary appeal of radical jihad, creates an incendiary political mixture that provides Iraqi insurgents motivation, legitimacy, and a global support network.

The infusion of foreign jihadi fighters and the influence of transnational organized crime also make paramount the need for intelligence and law-enforcement components in the military counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{35} The jihadi-criminal-insurgent mix challenges civil governance and the rule of law. Military forces alone cannot reconstruct a civil society. The Iraqi experience demonstrates the need for expanded constabulary forces and the integration of military units, intelligence, police forces, and operations in concert with (or supporting the formation of) civil authorities.

As the United States seeks stability in Iraq and, potentially, in other states targeted by radical Islam-
ists, such interaction is essential. Suicide bombings continue in Iraq and elsewhere with regularity, fueling insurgency and stimulating jihadi support. U.S. soldiers and Marines continue to find indicators of future suicide potentials, including new caches of bomb belts and jihadi propaganda promoting suicide tactics. We hope to capture these lessons learned as the United States continues its struggle against extremists who use the suicide of their warriors as the ultimate sign of their resolve and as a rejection of a global civil society built on the rule of law. MR

NOTES


2. Suicide bombings are known by different terms depending on the group in question. Jihadi and other radical Islamic groups call these bombings “martyrdom operations,” and those who blow themselves up are “martyrs.” Many officers in U.S. law enforcement commonly use the imprecise term “homicide bombers.” Some academics, such as Raphael Israeli, refer to suicide bombers as “Islamicizers.” For simplicity, we use suicide bombings and “suicide bombers.”

3. SFC Randy Shughart and MSG Gary Gordon were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. For more on their heroic actions, see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

4. GEN Douglas MacArthur viewed Task Force Smith as an “arrogant display of strength.” Initially, it was thought this ad hoc, 540-man force might fool the North Koreans into thinking a larger force was present or even make them retreat when they found out they were engaging U.S. soldiers. Neither event occurred. After two valiant tactical engagements at the Battle of Tsanfan on 5 July 1945 what was left of the 5th task force withdrew in the face of advancing Korean People’s Army units. See Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History, 2: 1902–1999 (Constabahore, NY: Combined Books, 1996), 207.

5. Despite the tradition that soldiers do not conduct suicide attacks, isolated events have occurred. Some late 19th- and early 20th-century anarchists (the terrorists of their day) conducted suicide attacks. For example, in 1932 Russian anarchist Alexander Berkman tried to ignite an explosive capsule in his teeth while being subdued by police during the botched assassination attempt of industrialist Henry Clay Frick. See Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror (New York: Random House, 2002). 148. So, even in a Western tradition terrorists have the potential to engage in suicide attacks. Early Christianity considered suicide for God as lawful: “He who knows it is unlawful to kill himself may never the less do so if he is ordered by God,” wrote Bishop Augustine in the 4th Century.

6. Berkman tried to ignite an explosive capsule in his teeth while being subdued by police during the botched assassination attempt of industrialist Henry Clay Frick. See Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror (New York: Random House, 2002). 148. So, even in a Western tradition terrorists have the potential to engage in suicide attacks. Early Christianity considered suicide for God as lawful: “He who knows it is unlawful to kill himself may never the less do so if he is ordered by God,” wrote Bishop Augustine in the 4th Century.


11. For specific information on tactics and techniques are outside this article’s scope and venue. The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, contains some helpful OSINT documents. See also the following documents: Anti-Defamation League of B’nai, “Countering Suicide Terrorism,” 2002; Human Rights Watch, “Embers in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,” New York, 2002; on-line at <www.hrw.org/2002/november/21/israel/iraq Pulitzer/>; and “Gandamak strikes war with suicide bomber cash,” Sydney Morning Herald, 26 March 2002.

12. The dates for the initial suicide bombing incidents are derived from open-source information (OSINT).


16. While Zucchin’s account chronicles several attempted suicide attacks against U.S. forces on 5 and 7 April 2003 during the battle for Baghdad, the chronology contains several errors. Needless to say, media reporting of the situation in Iraq is clouded by the fog of war. Undoubtedly, accounts of these attacks vary, some not reported, and details are often sketchy. Therefore, all these events should be viewed as representative rather than definitive.

17. Media reports surveyed include the wire services Reuters, Agence France Press, Associated Press, and United Press International. Websites include BBC, CNN, Fox News, Reuters Alertnet, “The Agonist,” and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Iraq Information Portal. Print media sources (including on-line versions) include the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, Times of London, Asia Times, Times of India, Sydney Morning Herald, and Manchester Guardian. The Terrorism Research Center’s premium Content Terrorist Attacker database and Counter-OPFOR Program, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC)-West, Suicide Bomber Web-base were also reviewed. We sought to use the most recent, correct reports when available, yet ambiguity remains.


22. Oliver Poole, “POWs to be stripped in suicide bomb fears,” The Telegraph, 22 March 2003.


27. Numerous reports detail the extent of Islamist extremist support and recruitment to engage in jihadist activity in Iraq. A representative account is found in Philip Smucker and Dan Murphy, “A broad call for ‘martyrs’ for Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 April 2003.


U.S. Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Peter J. Schoomaker, has released an extensive reading list to help military professionals further develop confidence, military knowledge, habits of reflection, and intellectual growth, whether they are officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The following synopses are adapted from those found in the CSA’s Field-Grade Officers, CW4-CW5, Senior NCOs, and Senior Leaders above Brigade professional reading lists available on-line at <www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/CSAList/list1.htm>, accessed 13 December 2004.

**Field-Grade Officers, CW4-CW5, Senior NCOs**


*Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Rohan Gunaratna, Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 2003, 304 pages, $14.00. Based on over 5 years of research, *Inside al Qaeda* is the definitive story behind the rise of this small, mysterious group to become the notorious organization making headlines today. The book is essential reading for senior officers and NCOs in the Global War on Terrorism.

*Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, James M. McPherson, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, 944 pages, $18.95. *Battle Cry of Freedom* is James M. McPherson’s brilliant account of the war that made the country what it is today—the American Civil War. In clear, incisive detail, he discusses the causes of the war, military operations, soldiers, and leaders, as well as the political, economic, and social aspects of life in the Union and the Confederacy before and during the war. Numerous historians have pronounced *Battle Cry of Freedom* the best one-volume book on the Civil War ever written. The book is essential reading for senior officers and NCOs wanting to understand this important conflict.

*Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, Martin Van Creveld, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, 295 pages, $29.99. In his survey of four centuries of military history, noted historian Martin Van Creveld points out clearly the reasons “amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics.” Most battlefield results would not have been possible without the careful organization and allocation of logistical resources. Field-grade officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs who fail to consider logistics in their plans and operations do so at their peril.


cials, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor provide a behind-the-scenes look at the highest levels of military decisionmaking that determined the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. *The General's War* is an excellent primer for all senior leaders about the importance of personality in politics and war.

*On Becoming a Leader*, Warren Bennis, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, Revised edition, 2003, 256 pages, $17.50. Management expert Warren Bennis shows how individuals develop leadership traits and how organizations encourage or stifle potential leaders. He profiles dynamic figures from diverse business arenas to demonstrate how all leaders share distinctive characteristics. This provocative examination will encourage all aspiring leaders to take risks, embrace change, and transform their visions into reality.

*The Art of War*, Sun Tzu, Samuel Griffith, trans., Oxford University Press, New York, New edition 2003, 222 pages, $9.95. Written in China over 2,000 years ago, Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* provides the first-known attempt to formulate a rational basis for planning and conducting military operations. These wise, aphoristic essays contain timeless principles acted on by such 20th-century Chinese generals as Mao Tse-tung.

*On War*, Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., Princeton University Press, NJ, 1976, 711 pages, $14.95. This edition of *On War*, the third English version published, is easily the best. In this indexed edition, editors Michael Howard and Peter Paret provide an accurate translation from the original 1832 version. *On War* represents one of the greatest works on military thought and strategy ever written and contains ideas and concepts that apply at either the operational or the national level. Carl von Clausewitz remains essential reading for all senior leaders.

*Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, Michael I. Handel, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 2001, 425 pages, $34.95. *Masters of War* is a comparative analysis of the classical works on war and strategic thought by Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Atonine Henri Jomini, and Niccolo Machiavelli. The book illuminates the many similarities between the works of these authors and highlights the continuity in the logic of war through the ages. As such, it is a valuable compendium of military thought all senior officers and NCOs should read.

*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Samuel Huntington, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, 560 pages, $24.95. Blending the disciplines of history, sociology, and political science, Samuel Huntington’s study should be required reading for Army officers. Huntington develops a theoretical framework with which to analyze civil-military relations. Particularly noteworthy is the preliminary discussion, “Officership as a Profession.” The arguments Huntington sets forth in this section have colored the military’s self-perception for an entire generation.

*The Future of the Army Profession*, Don Snider and Gayle Watkins, Project Directors, McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, Highstown, NJ, 2002, 576 pages, $28.75. Who are the future members of the Army profession, and how is their competence to be certified to their client, the American people? *The Future of the Army Profession* is a contemporary analysis of the Army profession and its knowledge and expertise, with conclusions and policy recommendations. This book is important reading for all senior officers and NCOs who care about their Army.

For Senior Leaders above Brigade

*Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Free Press, New York, 1988, 329 pages, $18.95. History is a valuable tool for decisionmakers, but if used without careful consideration, it can blind the unwary with false analogies. This classic book offers senior leaders suggestions on how to use and avoid misusing the valuable experience history provides.

*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1998, 368 pages, $15.00. In this incisive book, the renowned political scientist, Samuel Huntington, explains how “civilizations” have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force behind global politics. While not everyone would agree with Huntington’s main thesis, one cannot afford to ignore this important, persuasive book.
The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Thomas Friedman, Anchor, New York, 2000, 512 pages, $15.95. Thomas Friedman, the well-traveled New York Times foreign-affairs columnist, peppers The Lexus and the Olive Tree with engaging stories illustrative of his central theme—that globalization (the Lexus) is the central organizing principle of the post-Cold War world, although many individuals and nations resist by holding on to what has traditionally mattered to them (the olive tree). This book is an important primer for the modern world for all leaders.

War in European History, Michael Howard, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, 176 pages, $17.95. In this slim but important book, one of England’s most distinguished historians brilliantly summarizes the evolution of warfare in Europe from the Roman Empire to the nuclear age. For U.S. senior leaders, Howard’s book offers an excellent, thought-provoking introduction to the broader history of the profession of arms and the role war has played in the evolution of Western civilization.


The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Berstein, eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, New edition, 1996, 704 pages, $27.99. Some of the most respected scholars in the field of strategic studies examine the formulation of strategy in all its complexity in The Making of Strategy. Senior leaders will find useful insight into the cultural, social, political, and organizational dimensions of strategic decisions in cases ranging from the Peloponnesian Wars to the formulation of 20th-century U.S. nuclear policy. The 17 cases display continuities in the principles of strategic thinking and breaks the 700-page book into convenient individual readings.

The Peloponnesian War, Donald Kagan, Viking Books, New York, 2003, 511 pages, $29.95. Senior leaders will want to read this valuable account of coalition warfare on land and sea in Ancient Greece. The book focuses on Athens’ and Sparta’s strategic planning, of their shifting alliances, and the effect individual leadership and civil-military relations had on implementing those plans. After 24 centuries, the lessons of this great war between two powerful city-states are still valid: economic strength does not guarantee victory, nor does military might ensure the ability to make peace.

Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, H.R. McMaster, Perennial, New York, Reprint edition, 1998, 480 pages, $16.00. In this important book, H.R. McMaster argues persuasively that President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war on poverty, not the war in Vietnam. But, Johnson made decisions he believed would allow him to do both, which was a recipe for disaster. The Joint Chiefs of Staff exacerbated this by failing to provide Johnson with their best advice. Dereliction of Duty is a cautionary tale about how the military and its civilian leadership failed at the highest levels.

Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon, James R. Locher III, Texas A&AM University Press, College Station, 2002, 524 pages, $34.95. Victory on the Potomac is a fascinating story of how Congress forced the Pentagon to undergo major reform during the mid-1980s. James R. Locher III, who was a major participant in the process, tells the inside story of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reforms that set the stage for increased jointness in the services. The book is an excellent primer on the creation of public policy and the interface between the Pentagon and Congress.

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, 208 pages, $30.00. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray provide a conceptual framework and historical context for understanding the patterns of change, innovation, and adaptation that have marked war in the Western world since the 14th century. Case studies and a conceptual overview offer senior leaders an indispensable introduction to military change.
Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: The al-Qaeda Manifesto

Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

To understand al-Qaeda, one must read the books of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s principal ideologue and chief strategic thinker. After Osama bin-Laden, Al-Zawahiri is the most-wanted Middle Eastern terrorist. The FBI has a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture or arrest.

In 2001, Al-Zawahiri published Knights under the Prophet’s Banner (Fursan Taht Rayah Al-Nabi) even as the empire he built with Bin-Laden, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar crumbled under the weight of U.S. air, special operations forces, as well as the Northern Alliance assaults.1 Initially serialized in the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper in 12 installments beginning in early December 2001, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner can now be found in the back alleys of any major Arab city.2 The word “knights” in the title refers to the members of the jihadist movement while evoking the image of the knights of the crusades.

The book begins with Al-Zawahiri saying: “I have written this book . . . to fulfill the duty entrusted to me towards our generation and future generations. Perhaps I will be unable to write afterwards in the midst of these circumstances and changing conditions.” According to Al-Zawahiri, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were just an opening salvo against the Christian and Jewish “infidels.”

Al-Zawahiri sees the United States, Israel, and Israel’s Western and Arab allies as the “first force” and Islamic militant movements that depend on God alone the “second force.” He believes the United States is removing Islam from power through rigged elections, brutality, and force. He views treaties, peace negotiations, and bans on weapons as steps in the direct occupation of Muslim land by U.S. forces. To Al-Zawahiri, jihad is an ideological struggle for survival—a war with no truce. He believes the Islamic jihadist movement should strike Islam’s enemies, using the Luxor incident of 1997 as the means and as an example.3 He supports the growth of jihad among youths and numbers his success in the tens of thousands of young men in Arab prisons around the Middle East.

Al-Zawahiri says the jihad has not stopped, and the movement is either attacking or preparing an attack. He asserts Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s replacement of six interior ministers is proof of jihadist success. He also says acts of violence, beginning with the Egyptian Islamic jihad attack on the Military Technical College in 1974 and the agitation in Southern Egypt of the early 1980s, were poorly planned, emphasizing that deriving lessons from mistakes and improving the potency of jihadic operations should be hallmarks of Islamic militant movements.

From a U.S. military force-protection perspective, Part Seven of Al-Zawahiri’s book reveals that the 1999 joint U.S.-Arab military exercise, Bright Star, was designed to keep fundamentalists from seizing political power, equating the exercise to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798.4 He claims the timing of Bright star was not an accident; it was timed to observe the 200th anniversary of the French occupation of Egypt. To
him, U.S. troop commitments are evidence of a victory for jihad forces. He combines his interpretation of Islam, Egyptian history, and news reports on U.S.-Egyptian military exercises to weave his own conspiratorial web to encourage youth to embrace his political objectives through violence and terror.

Al-Zawahiri dreams of a future jihad in the southern Russian Republics, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan to unite a nuclear Pakistan and the gas-rich Caspian region to serve jihad. Al-Zawahiri identifies the following targets for al-Qaeda and its affiliates:

- The United Nations.
- Arab rulers.
- Multinational corporations.
- The Internet.
- International news and satellite media.
- International relief organizations, which he believes are covers for spying, proselytizing, attempted coups, and weapons transfers.

Al-Zawahiri urges Islamic militants to take matters into their own hands: “Tracking down Americans and Jews is not impossible. Killing them with a single bullet, stab, or a device made up of an explosive mix or hitting them with an iron rod is not impossible. [S]mall groups could [prove to] be a horror against Americans and Jews.” These words bring to mind the actions of Beltway Snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Malvo, who killed 10 people in the Washington, D.C., area in a 2002 shooting spree. Mir Amal Kansi was another famous lone-jihadist, who killed two CIA agents in 1993. Kansi was caught in 1997 by the FBI in Pakistan and extradited to the United States.

Al-Zawahiri urges his followers to inflict maximum casualties in the West, advocates a cost-benefit assessment of martyrdom operations, urges attacks on the enemy’s power structure, and advocates patience, planning, and maximum damage to cause mass disruption. Although he is not specific about targets, one can deduce he means banks, transportation links, and energy refineries.


Egyptian Islamic Jihad became so unpopular in Egypt in the late 1990s that Al-Zawahiri developed the strategy of striking the enemy (the United States) afar instead of near (Arab governments). Refuting Al-Zawahiri’s theories and selective use of Islamic history is critical to the ideological fight against al-Qaeda.

For further study of Al-Zawahiri, I recommend *The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right Hand Man* by Islamist lawyer and former radical Montassser el-Zayat, who spent time in prison with Al-Zawahiri and is now highly critical of Al-Zawahiri’s actions. This book, which is the best English translation of a critical analysis of Al-Zawahiri’s theories, takes readers inside the mind of a geostrategic Islamic militant. The book is from El-Zayyat’s original, *Al-Zawahiri Kama Araftuh* (Al-Zawahiri as I knew him).

These books represent the new frontier in military studies. Books by Islamic militants contain valuable tips for those involved in force protection, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency tactics.

**NOTES**

2. I prepared this review essay by collecting the 11 installments of the Al-Sha‘r al-Awarib in Arabic that first appeared in December 2001. The translation represents my understanding of the material. Any errors or omissions are my own.
Hyman G. Rickover: Excellence, Greatness, Heroism
Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army

Excellence is being good at something. Greatness is when you are the best at something. And, heroism comes as a result of a struggle that requires courage and personal sacrifice. So, was U.S. Navy Admiral Hyman G. Rickover a hero?

Born in Russian-occupied Poland, Rickover immigrated to the United States at an early age with his mother and older sister, who fled anti-Semitic pogroms of annihilation to join Rickover’s father, a tailor and deserter from the Russian army, who had previously immigrated to America. The family fled to Belgium, where they boarded the Finland to cross the Atlantic to the United States. Once in America, the family moved to Chicago, and at age 9 Rickover began working to help support the family. Rickover characterized his childhood as one of “hard work, discipline, and a decided lack of good times.”

During the 1916 Republican National Convention, Rickover skipped school, where he was not doing well academically, to deliver messages for politicians, stationing himself next to the speaker’s platform to get as many deliveries as possible. One delivery was to a U.S. Congressman who later nominated him to the U.S. Naval Academy. Rickover barely met the height and weight requirements at the Academy but passed the tough entrance examination. His poor academic background and the prevailing anti-Semitism of the time were his major obstacles at the Academy. He overcame the first with determined study, the second by not drawing attention to himself. He made few friends, was considered a loner and a “grind,” and graduated 106th out of a class of 539.

Rickover spent the next 6 years at sea. His supervisors described him as forceful, industrious, reliable, and extremely able. He was seen as an effective leader, despite being taciturn and uncongenial. One supervisor even wrote that he had “no outward signs of qualities of leadership.”

In May 1929, Rickover graduated from Columbia University (where he also met his future wife, Ruth Masters) with a master’s degree with distinction in electrical engineering. He then attended submarine school in New London, Connecticut, where he graduated fourth in his class in June 1930.

Assigned to engineering duty on a submarine, the S-48, Rickover did well and qualified for command. Because no submarines were available, however, his next assignment was in the Office of the Inspector of Naval Material in Philadelphia. He was later assigned to engineering duty on the battleship New Mexico.

In July 1937, Rickover was promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander and became the commander of the minesweeper, Finch, an old ship well past its prime. Three months later he became an engineering duty officer (EDO), a technical specialty that barred him from commanding ships or submarines. Rickover’s first EDO assignment was to the Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippines. In August 1939, the Navy assigned him to its Bureau of Ships (BuShips) in Washington, D.C.

Rickover, who developed a reputation as a talented troubleshooter and effective problem-solver, ensured education and training were priorities and achieved impressive results. Working days, nights, and weekends and expecting his staff to do the same, he refused to compromise when it came to standards and quality. He expected sacrifice from those who worked for him—and from their families. He became commander in January 1942 and captain in June 1943.

When World War II ended, the Navy sent Rickover to the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Manhattan Engineer District to study the feasibility of using nuclear power to propel submarines. Battery-powered electric motors limited underwater time in submarines because diesel-powered generators charged the batteries, and the diesel engines used up the air in submarines. Nuclear generators greatly extended the time a submarine could stay submerged.

In August 1946, President Harry S. Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act, creating the Atomic Energy Commission to develop nuclear energy for military and peaceful uses. In July 1948, Vice Admiral Earle W. Mills chose Rickover to lead a group of engineers in developing nuclear-propelled submarines.

The group answered to the Navy, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a congressional committee with responsibility for all legislation dealing with atomic energy. Rickover’s group, the Nuclear Power Branch, known as “Naval Reactors,” made technical decisions, set technical standards, and supervised the program. Rickover was ruthless, “threatening, cajoling, and insulting those who stood in his way.”

In 1951 and 1952, Rickover was passed over for promotion to rear admiral. The Navy selection board for EDO admirals was composed of nine officers: six line and three engineer officers. The six line officers usually deferred to the three engineer officers in EDO selections, but the engineers on the board did not like Rickover.

With over 30 years in service, Rickover faced mandatory retirement unless he was promoted to rear admiral. Rickover’s workers at Oak Ridge lobbied the Senate on his behalf, and Clair Blair, Jr., a submariner during World War II, wrote articles in Time and Life describing Rickover as an officer who “had declared war on naval indifference.” As a result, the Armed Services Committee held up the Navy board’s selections for rear admiral and investigated the Navy’s promotion system. The Navy convened another promotion board and promoted Rickover to the rank of...
admiral. Breaking with tradition, the six line officers outvoted the three engineer officers on the board.

On 25 June 1953, in the Idaho desert, Rickover brought the Mark I—the first nuclear-powered reactor designed for a submarine to full power. Over his fellow engineers’ objections, he kept the reactor at full power for 96 hours, the length of time it would take to propel a submarine across the Atlantic Ocean.

On 17 January 1955, the first nuclear-powered submarine, the Nautilus, embarked on its first sea trial. Rickover was onboard when “underway on nuclear power” became a part of naval history. The next day the Nautilus made its first dive, setting numerous high-speed records while submerged, and later, crossed under the polar ice cap. Another nuclear submarine, the Triton, circumnavigated the world in 84 days while submerged, a record that still stands. The lethality of nuclear submarines would ultimately be awesome.

Rickover was promoted to vice admiral in 1958 and admiral in 1973. Congressional action once again prompted these promotions. A superb public relations man, Rickover arranged for congressmen to ride on nuclear submarines and saw to it that submarines were named for congressmen who supported him. He also wrote letters to congressmen from submarines during sea trials, giving them updates they could pass along to the press; he answered telephone inquiries, made himself available for interviews, and made sure the press was on hand when he gave submarine rides to congressmen. Lloyd Norman, a Pentagon reporter, said: “Every service academy and war college should include a course in public and Congressional relations with lectures and textbooks by [Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger and Admiral Rickover, both of whom are outstanding experts in those fields.”

Because of Rickover, a “nuclear” Navy grew within the “real” Navy. Officers on nuclear-powered ships had two chains of command: the usual chain to the Chief of Naval Operations, the second to Rickover. Rickover made it clear he wanted to be called first. With representatives in the field at civilian construction facilities and naval facilities who reported problems directly to him, and as the safety czar for the Atomic Energy Commission, he relieved officers or shut down entire projects if he felt safety was being jeopardized.

Eventually Rickover’s support in Congress waned, and problems with contractors were blamed on him. In 1977, the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and the Department of Energy absorbed its functions. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was also abolished, its functions split between several other committees.

Bitterness grew between Rickover and the industries that built the ships because of his high standards and their cost overruns. Rickover was far too rigid to compromise with industry—or anyone for that matter. His career survived until 1982 when President Ronald Reagan forced him to resign.

Leadership
In a speech in 1973, Rickover said: “Organization doesn’t really accomplish anything. Plans don’t accomplish anything, either. Theories of management don’t much matter. Endeavors succeed or fail because of the people involved. Only by attracting the best people will you accomplish great deeds.”

Rickover envisioned himself a savior and martyr: “Most of the work in the world today is done by those who work too hard; they comprise a nucleus of martyrs.” He was also complex and unpredictable. Reportedly he sent an officer whose wife was sick on a trip then appeared at the man’s home and cooked food for the family. Compassionate when tragedies struck those who worked for him, he sent personal handwritten letters of condolence to widows and parents when submariners were lost at sea.

In 1911, mechanical engineer and systems analysis advocate Frederick Taylor proposed the use of scientific measurements to determine the most economical and accurate way of getting work done. Taylor believed managers and workers should share the work, and it was a manager’s responsibility to look for the best scientifically-proven methodology. Rickover, although probably influenced by “Taylorism,” did not share Taylor’s obsession with efficiency; Rickover was obsessed with perfection and safety.

Mary Parker Follett, a Radcliffe-educated social worker, wrote about management in the early 20th century. Considered a “prophet of management” and a keen student of group behavior, Follett understood that relationships within a group mattered because they affected the group’s accomplishments. Emphasizing mutual problem-solving, she advocated sharing power with workers instead of exercising power over them and originated the concept of “horizontal management.”

Rickover shared Follett’s belief in the need for lifelong learning and the importance of education, but he did not believe in Follett’s horizontal-management theory.

In the book, Good to Great, Jim Collins says the CEOs of 11 companies that consistently outperformed the stock market over a 15-year period had only two consistent traits: “compelling personal modesty” and “intense professional will.” The CEOs also invariably gave the people they worked with credit for their company’s success. Charismatic leadership was not required for greatness. Great leaders did not stand out; what they accomplished stood out. I am reminded here of Rickover’s efficiency reports. He got results despite of having “no outward signs of qualities of leadership.” Certainly Rickover was highly motivated to succeed and had incredible will, but it was a stretch to say he was modest.

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations from 1971 to 1974, said: “Rickover is paranoid. . . . He [has turned] the world into an asylum. . . . The enemies of the U.S. Navy are the Soviet Union, the U.S. Air Force, and Rickover. His Division of Nuclear Propulsion [is] a totalitarian mini-state.”

The highly stressful interviews to which Rickover subjected candidates for the nuclear propulsion program were controversial. Rickover covered a broad range of subjects including “professional background, professional interests, family background, extracurricular affairs, and outside reading.” Although candidate Zumwalt described his interview as “thorough, searching, and friendly,” his brief initial interview with Rickover was insulting. Rickover told Zumwalt he had no imagination or initiative and berated him for trying to conduct the interview himself.
then dismissed Zumwalt to wait in another room until Rickover thought he was "ready to be interviewed properly."20 Zumwalt waited about 30 minutes in what he described as a "barren room." During Zumwalt's next interview, Rickover asked Zumwalt questions and digressed to a discussion of Clarence Darrow. When Zumwalt disagreed with Rickover on the subject, Rickover directed Zumwalt to leave, referring to him as an "aide that tries to pretend he knows everything."21

During the third session, Rickover discussed the Naval Academy and asked Zumwalt what he would do with the curriculum if he were the superintendent. Again the two men disagreed and again Rickover insulted Zumwalt. Rickover asked Zumwalt questions about philosophy and Plato. More disagreement and more insulting comments followed and back Zumwalt went to the "barren room."

During the final session, Rickover asked questions about high school mathematics, nuclear power, leadership, Zumwalt's father, his marriage, and his children. When the interview was over, Zumwalt says Rickover referred to him as "stupid," "a jerk," and "greasy." Zumwalt describes Rickover as "sneering" and "shouting."22

In Good to Great and Built to Last, Collins notes Rickover placed great importance on the right people for the job—"only those that fit extremely well. . . ."23 Rickover biographers Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen suggest Rickover used such tactics to weed out those who took the "victim" role.24

**Sacrifice**

Rickover’s limited ability to compromise gave him a strong need to sacrifice one thing for another. When he left Poland, he saw the need for sacrifice, sacrificing family time with his first job, sacrificing people to get the job done, sacrificing the Navy when he stopped wearing the uniform, and sacrificing his religion when he got married. Rickover did not appreciate the vast expanse of gray that exists between extremes. Rickover was ultimately driven out of the Navy because of a faulty vision. His vision to build a nuclear-powered submarine was great; his vision to build an all-nuclear-powered Navy was not. Although Rickover is considered the father of the atomic submarine, he might be remembered more for being the man who should have quit when he was ahead.

Rickover was not a Navy organization man, but he was most certainly a "Rickover" organization man, and planning and organization were essential to him, but they had to be his plans and his organization. He recognized the importance of having not only the best people, but the best people in the right job. The Navy sent him the best; he selected those who would fit into his organization and would accept his philosophy and style.

Rickover certainly achieved greatness, but was he a hero? We expect real-life heroes to engage in some behavior that places them at personal risk or to make personal sacrifices primarily for the benefit of others. Did Rickover’s sacrifices for nuclear propulsion qualify him to be a hero? Did he make those sacrifices for the benefit of the American people? Did he make them because he was internally driven? And, did he make America a safer place for democracy? Some would say yes; some would say no.

**NOTES**


2. Polmar and Allen, Rickover.

3. Rickover, 25, Rickover Papers, Fitness Reports, 1 October 1925-31 March 1926, 1 April 1925-11 June 1926.

4. Polmar and Allen; Rickover.

5. Ibid.


9. Polmar and Allen; Rickover.


11. Powell.


15. Collins, Good to Great.

16. Ibid.

17. Polmar and Allen.

18. Zumwalt, Jr., 85; Polmar and Allen, 102.

19. Zumwalt, Jr., 86.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


24. Polmar and Allen, 639.

**Colonel Gerald D. Evans, U.S. Army,** is currently assigned to a unit in Iraq. He received a B.S. from the University of South Dakota; an M.D. from the University of Nebraska Medical School, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various positions in the continental United States, Korea, Germany, and Iraq.
When an NGA support team deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it took with it a reachback capability to NGA's extensive staff and production elements in the United States. According to "America at War: Technology Lessons Learned," a March 2004 report by the National Technology Alliance, NGA's "use of direct support teams provides a large success in Afghanistan and Iraq." The report states: "The teams were not simply an NGA liaison; rather NGA fielded many of its skilled analysts and technicians together with fully geographic information systems, imagery processing computers, workstations, and field equipment . . . ."

One successful example was NST's ability to download high-resolution imagery less than a week old, which allowed U.S. Army Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander, to "walk through" his invasion route before entering Iraq. Wallace "came away from that session confident that the route would present no problems," the report states.

NGA is moving from a hardcopy "product" orientation to a data-centric digital environment. Customers will have ready access to GEOINT databases through an open architecture of interoperable, commercial systems, and a robust communications infrastructure. NGA's geospatial-intelligence feature database is the foundation for the Theater Geospatial Database in support of U.S. Army Europe and Pacific.

The NGA Support Team-Army, based in Reston, Virginia, provides direct support to all Army activities and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). A staff officer is stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to support the Combined Arms Command, Command and General Staff College, and other major TRADOC offices.

Integrating knowledge of the adversary and the environment provides a better understanding of the security situation and represents GEOINT's unique contribution to the Nation's overall intelligence picture. GEOINT efforts draw from all sources of intelligence and information to meet the needs of the Nation's civilian and military decisionmakers by reducing uncertainty. NGA's mandate is to provide timely, relevant, accurate GEOINT in support of joint and expeditionary warfighters who must remain relevant and ready.

Ralph M. Erwin is the NGA Staff Officer to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He received a B.A. from Cameron University and an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College. The public Website for NGA is at <www.nga.mil>.


After every war the U.S. military has to realign itself by taking stock of and reorienting to society's peace-time needs. The realignment that should have occurred at the end of the Cold War has not yet happened. Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America Since 1783 tracks previous realignments and discusses the implications of the failure to complete the one currently overdue.

Contrary to popular belief, the U.S. military has not yet put Vietnam behind it, says author Thomas S. Langston, professor of political science at Tulane University. For that matter, neither the military nor the civilian population have adjusted to the end of the Cold War. While the military and the populace look into their rearview mirrors, civilian defense leaders push forward, using the military as a social laboratory for changes too radical for society at large or jumping vigorously into nationbuilding and foreign adventures while stretching the military over the globe. Because there is neither consensus nor cooperation, current U.S. military policy is unbalanced, if not dysfunctional.

Postwar realignments have two components: service and reform. Service is the reestablishment of connection to the peacetime role of helping the populace rather than fighting wars. Reform is the introspective component, the studying of the failures and success of just-finished wars and making appropriate adjustments in capabilities—training and retooling. For civilian and military components to be successful, both must agree on the desired end product. This happened fully only twice: after the War of 1812 and after the Spanish-American War. In other postwar eras, one side or the other was dominant, and the results were mediocre to awful. Fortunately, none was disastrous.

The current era might see the first disaster. Civil-military relations are dismal; the military is more contemptuous of a civilian society from which it is increasingly isolated. At the policy level, there is no clear consensus on what the military posture should be or what roles it should serve. Not only is there a civil-military split, there is disunity within the military as well. Because there is no consensus, the post–Cold War realignment is stalled.

Langston identifies the problem, and as a good political scientist, has at least the beginnings of a solution—to get on with reform; reestablish civil-military communication and consensus; make the military capable of fighting old-style and new-style wars while also building nations at home or abroad—the way the Coast Guard handles war and peace missions simultaneously. More important, the military should stop hiding from Vietnam-style wars and learn to win them instead.

These recommendations are not bombshells; they are mostly common sense. But the consequences of letting this reform period drift can be dire—armed isolationism, if civilians dominate; perhaps unchecked militarism, if the military prevails. Langston is not totally optimistic the drift will be checked in time.

Book Reviews


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Although brief, the book is a sensible mix of description, analysis, and prescription. At a minimum it serves as a quick reading and extended contemplation.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Tinker AFB, Oklahoma**


Show me where someone stood on the nuclear-freeze movement in 1985, and 9 times out of 10, I will show you where they stand on the bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. Robert P. Newman, professor emeritus of political communication, is a noted exception. He was an outspoken critic of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and a fierce critic of the fierce critics of President Harry S. Truman's War and a fierce critic of the fierce critique of Truman from its origins in 1995, a book that devastated the fallacious thesis many now hold.

Whether Nitze’s conclusions stood on fact or what Newman calls “fraud,” it had the imprimatur of an official report. It hence became argumentative gold for people who normally would dismiss any government publication as a coverup, prima facia. In the 1960s and 1970s, New Left history cites the USSBS as definitive proof, another case where contemporary “peace movement” politics slanted views on events regarding Hiroshima. The USSBS was to have made up much of the story line in captions for the *Enola Gay* at the National Air and Space Museum. Because the Smithsonian Institution is semi-government, conservatives in Congress aborted the exhibit. One of Truman’s critics wrote, “It was a humiliating spectacle, scholars being forced to recant the truth.” Newman replies (although he was no political fan of the conservative bloc): “Scholars who confuse the fraudulent Nitze narrative with truth deserve humiliation.”

Newman and company might have won the battle of the Smithsonian, but time does not seem on their side. According to the Gallup Poll, 10 percent of Americans disapproved of Truman’s decision in 1945, 35 percent in 1995; young adults were divided 46 percent in favor, 49 percent opposed. One can only hope the citizenry reads Newman to discover the origins and the development of the fallacious thesis many now hold.

**Michael Pearlman, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


There have been several excellent military histories written about Afghanistan, including A.E. Snesarev’s Afghanistan: A History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, published in Russian in 1921; Percy Sykes’ two-volume *A History of Afghanistan*, published in English in 1940; Ali Ahmad Jalili’s three-volume *Military History of Afghanistan*, published in Dari in 1976; and Yu V. Gankovskiy’s *A History of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan*, published in Russian in 1985. Unfortunately, all are difficult to find today and only one is published in English. Stephen Tanner has done well producing a quick English-language history about an obscure area of the world that suddenly is vitally important.

Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of empires and has long been a battleground. The Greeks, Indians, Persians, Mongolians, British, and Russians have tried to hold Afghanistan. Internal strife has been constant, and Afghan forces have always been better prepared to fight an internal threat than an external invasion. Afghanistan’s warring mountain tribes have always proven the invaders’ ultimate test. Today, as the United States and other coalition forces are sitting in Afghan cities and airfields, there is a pressing need for a book that provides the history and background of this land-locked mountainous country.

Tanner has produced a history of a remote and little-understood region in record time. Unfortunately, as with any rapid effort, there are a few problems. Tanner perpetuates mistaken information the West put out early in the Soviet-Afghan War: misidentification of the divisions used in the invasion, inflation of the number of tanks involved, and misidentification of weapons systems. He also perpetuates the myth of the poor quality of the Central Asian reservists and the myth that the Stinger knocked hundreds of aircraft from the sky. (The Soviets changed their aviation tactics quickly to avoid this very scenario.) From a historian’s perspective, the book’s biggest problem is a lack of footnotes or endnotes,
making it almost impossible to substantiate Tanner’s claims. Is this book useful to the professional soldier or statesman inbound for Afghanistan? Yes. The book provides a rapid introduction to a historically complex region in an easy-to-read style. This book will not be the textbook on Afghanistan’s military history 100 years from now, but who cares? It fills an immediate need and provides background information for the professional to consider while maneuvering through Afghan politics and an incipient guerrilla war. LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


David M. Glantz has been called by some the foremost authority on Russia’s “Great Patriotic War.” His previous works, including (The Battle of Kursk, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars) [University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1999] and When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler [University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1998] were acclaimed as among the finest books written about the Eastern Front. Glantz’s latest effort, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944, continues the tradition.

Of the many books written about the fight for Leningrad, most focus on the tactical fights and civilian situations inside the city and are from purely Russian or German points of view. Glantz uses many recently released documents (particularly from Russia) to provide details rarely seen elsewhere and correct some misconceptions concerning the battle. Such detail separates The Battle for Leningrad from other books on the subject.

Glantz blends personal accounts, field orders, and excerpts from the Leningrad War Diary to tell the story. For each battle and campaign, he describes key decisions and orders of battle, and provides a wealth of statistics, giving the reader a total perspective on the Battle of Leningrad and its significance.

Glantz’s superb analysis is the strongest aspect of the book. Using his vast military experience to analyze events and decisions on both sides, he focuses on the operational level of war but also gives his thoughts on actions taken at the tactical level. Glantz has the rare ability to discuss what happened and, more important, why it happened.

This book is not for everyone; it is written for those with experience on the subject who desire to take that experience to a higher level. The reader must be ready to stay focused and devote energy to its pages. One of my friends said, “Glantz can make your head hurt!” But, what is a little pain when you can read a definitive history on the struggle for Leningrad.

LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945 could have been an exercise in academic absurdity and cruelty, but instead enlightens and educates. In seven chronologically organized chapters, Roger Buckley outlines U.S. policy in East and Southeast Asia since 1945 when Japan surrendered.

In 1945, Asia was defined by colonial powers trying to reassert dominance over their colonies with nationalist movements in armed struggle with them, and a prostrate Japan—the object of Soviet and U.S. interest. The United States was the paramount power, but initial U.S. actions were hesitant. This apparent irresolution was caused by the resolve to support anticomunist forces in Europe and Asia while also trying to keep the Cold War from spreading to the region. Although there were differences between European and Asian policies, they were matters of degree, not substance.

The Korean War chapter emphasizes Soviet and U.S. confusion over Korea and the complexity of its internal politics and rivalries. The effects of the war included a peace treaty with Japan, increased Japanese economic growth, a clarification of U.S. interests in China and Taiwan, and a new alliance, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).

In the postwar period (1953-1960), the gravity of international rivalry shifted to Southeast Asia. Buckley briefly outlines the events leading up to the 1954 Geneva Conference and its results for Indochina: British interests in Malaya; the Taiwan Straits Crises; and the ways they affected U.S. policy. The chapter on the Vietnam War is a straightforward summary of events, dealing with the major interpretive issues surrounding U.S. commitments, the conduct of the war, and eventual U.S. withdrawal. He concludes that “the result of the Vietnam disaster . . . was a harvest of rancor.”

Buckley follows with a description of the consequences of the Vietnam War, events that occurred during the last part of the Cold War, and the rise and relative decline of Southeast Asia as an economic power. He relates how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became an organization that stresses economic cooperation and mutual benefit.

The chapter on the region since the end of the Cold War emphasizes U.S. policy continuity, and although the Soviet Union collapsed, none of Asia’s Communist states show signs of disappearing. In fact, China has become a regional economic power. Buckley outlines alternatives for future U.S. policy, including power and influence, to encourage a greater sense of cooperation among allies. He believes Japan remains an American dependency because of its own problematic relationships with the region as well as its public disinterest in foreign affairs. He points out that the era that began with the surrender in Tokyo Bay is far from over; the events since 1945 show a U.S. determination to remain committed in the region. Buckley’s conclusion reflects his optimism about the U.S. presence in Asia. U.S. influence is the result of its open society rather than merely being a factor of economic and military power.

Asians might think some of Buckley’s judgments of U.S. policies are too complimentary, while many Americans might find his evaluations overly critical, but that is one of the work’s benefits; it is written by an outsider. I recommend this book to all who wish to quickly gain a basic understanding of how U.S. policies affect the Asia-Pacific region.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Huntsville, Alabama
CANNÆ: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, Gregory Daly, Routledge, New York, 2002, 253 pages, $35.00.

With Cannæ: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War, Gregory Daly forges one of the most comprehensive analytical studies of the battle ever attempted. Drawing on ancient and modern source material, Daly crafts an account of the battle that explores in detail the field armies arrayed against one another at Cannæ.

Daly, in his description of the detailed composition of forces and the intricacies of operational planning, spares no effort in producing a scholarly account without parallel. The result is a thoroughly engaging, captivating battle study—supremely analytical, yet at times reminiscent of Basil Liddell-Hart or General George C. Marshall in his treatment of the human dimension of conflict. Although the book is heavily laden with references, Daly unhesitatingly draws his own conclusions while evolving a uniquely personal perspective on the classic battle.

Daley presents a refreshingly comprehensive analysis and brings facts and references into a single volume worthy of any bookshelf dedicated to warfare in the classical world. Military professionals will appreciate the scholarly effort required to catalog the myriad details of the battle. Students of history will welcome a single-source reference for this monumental battle that shaped events of our own time.

MAJ Steven Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Arguably, there is nothing as satisfying to read as a biography with an easy-to-follow story and focused material. Stretched even further, you might say there is nothing as satisfying to read as a biography about an obscure historical character. John Moncure Daniel, onetime fiery editor of the polemic Richmond Examiner, is just such a character. Daniel, who has been treated tangentially in other historical works, is given fresh life with this new work.

Peter Bridges seeks to present Daniel in three ways: Daniel the man—a consistent treatment throughout the book that seeks to reveal “who” Daniel was; Daniel the editor—a role that applies only to those times when Daniel was the editorial editor for which he is purportedly well known; Daniel the diplomat—and herein lies the treasure of the book. While Daniel might be attributed a certain importance for his role as an editor and producer of Civil War-era polemics, it is his role as a diplomat that allows for new historical relationships and new conceptualizations.

In the late 1840s, Europe was a hotbed of “almost” revolutions. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, nationalism was a force to be reckoned with and one that would, not far down the road, see its day in the sun. The unification movements taking place in Italy and Germany in the late 1840s, up until their successful resolution in the 1870s, are a source of interest even today. Count Camillo Cavour, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, was the spearhead of the Italian unification movement. Based on his position, his role was central until his dismissal by Vittorio Emmanuel II—a relationship worth exploring.

Daniel was appointed minister resident to the Kingdom of Sardinia at the capital of Turin in 1853. After a few minor setbacks, he established himself successfully and remained at the post until 1861. His dealings with the Sardinian Government are most interesting, and much is made of the roles of Cavour, Giuseppe Mazzini, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. Of significance is the relationship between Daniel and these three men who shared a completely different orbit than that of a pro-slavery editor.

The only criticism with the book is that occasionally Bridges tries to create drama where none exists. One example is Daniel’s various attacks on Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Bridges concludes with a passage that leads the reader to believe Davis might have been angry about Daniel’s attack. While this might be valuable in fostering a sense of drama or furthering the story, as a tool of history it has no value.

Pen of Fire is definitely worth reading. It is valuable for those interested in Civil War history, diplomatic history, European history, and of course, as a biographical work. Overall, it is well written and well researched.

David Schepp, Fort Benning, Georgia


Almost 15 years ago Mark R. Peattie and the late David C. Evans were asked to collaborate on a study of Japanese Naval Strategy during World War II. As their work progressed, their topic expanded and changed into a technical, strategic, and institutional history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from its beginnings to the outbreak of war with the United States in 1941. The result was the publication in 1997 of the definitive English-language work on the IJN: Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1997) includes four chapters on naval aviation that, for reasons of length and size, were removed for publication as a separate work at a later date. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Aviation 1909-1941 is the continuation of Kaigun.

Author Mark R. Peattie makes it clear that, for issues of institutional and even strategic context, reference to Kaigun is required. With this requirement understood, one finds Sunburst an extremely informative, insightful book. If the book has a thesis, it is that Japanese naval air power was among the most fearsome tools ever fashioned and that in great measure the success of the Pacific blitzkrieg in the first 6 months of the Pacific war is directly attributable to this elite body of warriors. Peattie is a wonderful scholar and has made outstanding use of the archival Japanese War History Series he has so successfully mined in the past.

As with Kaigun, Sunburst’s major drawback is it ends too soon. The wonderful institutional insight offered after the outbreak of war with the United States need not have overly lengthened the book, especially since almost half of its 400 pages consist of appendices. Instead, Peattie summarizes this period
in an all-too-brief final chapter. Having an institutional history that comprehensively covers the entire period of the Japanese naval aviation to 1945 would have been nice, especially in terms of understanding the problem of Japanese-pilot replenishment after the air battles over the Coral Sea, Midway, and especially, Guadalcanal.

On the other hand, Peattie includes a number of valuable and lavishly illustrated appendices that range from biographical sketches to air group composition to tactics. These make this book not only good to read but also a handy and easy-to-use resource. John Marshall again contributes his wonderful graphics work in illustrating the various platforms. Overall, Sunburst is a wonderful contribution to the literature about the Imperial Japanese Navy and a valuable resource for scholars and history buffs alike.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Jon Latimer’s Alamein is an excellent companion to Rick Atkinson’s *An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943* (Henry Holt & Co., New York, 2002). Latimer does not focus on the battle per se, instead he places the battle in the overall strategic and operational context. In a fair and judicious manner, he discusses Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery’s role and analyzes Montgomery’s preparation for battle and the decisions he made during the battle.

Latimer also extensively discusses the British fight in North Africa that led up to Alamein and includes background material on doctrine, organization, training, and material. He also discusses the complementary air and naval interdiction campaigns in the Mediterranean, the role of intelligence, the contributions of Commonwealth allies, the constraints political leaders imposed, and the British Army’s command problems.

The book illustrates the following important theoretical constructs, such as when—

- British Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck experienced an operational pause after Rommel reached Alamein.
- Air and maritime campaigns were needed to complement a ground campaign to achieve overall strategic goals.
- Fog and friction were endemic on the battlefield.
- Deception activities had to be integrated with the operational plan.
- Coalition warfare took time and patience.

I appreciate Latimer’s comments about British Army command problems, such as the placement of British officers in command of more senior Commonwealth officers; the mistrust between services; key leaders who were incommunicado at critical times; the faulty planning that led to fratricide or tactical failure; and the use of brevity codes subordinates did not understand.

I believe this book would be easier to follow if there were more maps and if they were better integrated within the text. At times, I was unsure where the battle was in relation to the maps, or I found the appropriate map either too small or lacking needed detail. Aside from this shortcoming, overall, this was a great book.

**LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA, Charlottesville, Virginia**

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*Re-Examining the Cold War* is a collection of essays resulting from a partnership between the China Foreign Affairs College and the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. Editors Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin examine the ways national interests, security concerns, economic interests, and domestic politics affected Cold War Sino-American relations and have fashioned a mosaic that brings still-relevant patterns of confrontation, communication, and negotiation into sharp relief.

The chronologically arranged book begins with William C. Kirby’s succinct description of the origins of Sino-American conflict. He limns the events in post-World War II Asia and concludes that the opposing alliances were the basis for Sino-American relations in the 1950s. Zhang Bajia reviews the Chinese-American confrontation in Asia and concludes that mutual fear governed bilateral relations during the period.

In the next three chapters, Ronald W. Preussen, Robert Accinelli, and Gong Li discuss the relatively unknown Taiwan Straits crises during the 1950s. All concentrate on crisis management and diplomatic maneuvering, their conclusions dovetailing with each other. Gong writes that Mao Tse-tung’s goal was to “puncture the arrogance of the KMT [Kuomintang] army” while avoiding a war with the United States. Preussen and Accinelli show that U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles retained tactical flexibility by avoiding extreme measures that would result in a war.

Authors Zhang Bajia, Jia Qingguo, and Steven M. Goldstein focus on the ambassadorial-level talks between China and the United States—a neglected topic because no significant agreements were reached. However, the authors believe the meetings were noteworthy because they offered the two powers a communication channel that helped moderate disagreements and indirectly laid the groundwork for U.S. President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to China. Essayist Robert D. Schulzinger reassesses China’s policy during U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration. He states that a different view of China, in which it was not a relentlessly expansionist power, undermined one of the premises for American involvement in Vietnam.

Rosemary Foot and Li Jie analyze the role domestic politics played in forming foreign policy in both countries. Foot asserts the reexamination of American life and society that occurred in the 1960s forced a review of China policy. Li recounts a similar process taking place in China. The border conflicts with the Soviet Union, along with the chaos engendered by the Cultural Revolution, forced Mao to revise his views on domestic radicalism and relations with the United States. Preus­sen and Accinelli show that U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles retained tactical flexibility by avoiding extreme measures that would result in a war.

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contradiction and the fear of a war with the Soviet Union led to an opening to the United States. Finally, Michael Schaller shows how détente in the early 1970s had unforeseen consequences for all three parties.

The essays present mirror images of Chinese and American policy. One sees that each power was frustrated by its inability to shape the other’s foreign policies and international behavior. Hostility reached a high point during the Taiwan Straits crises where both sides glared at each other but purposely avoided an armed confrontation. While Eisenhower and Dulles worked to restrain Chinese General Chiang Kai-shek, the Communist goal was to demonstrate to him the impossibility of reconquering the mainland. In addition, Eisenhower’s administration worked to continue President Harry S. Truman’s administrative policy of preventing Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia by driving a wedge between Russia and China to destroy their alliance.

The essays illustrate that rationality in foreign policy is relative, and rationality and irrationality exist on a continuum with no sharp breaks. Above all, they show that foreign policies are encounters between cultures and a confrontation among values. Both China and the United States had foreign policies driven by “soft” culture-bound factors (beliefs, moral values, and historical consciousness) as well as so-called “hard realities” (economic and military power).

There is one caveat. While the papers of Chinese scholars are intriguing and provide needed and necessary insight into the ways foreign policy was formed, scholars have raised questions about the sources they used. Their essays are based on recently released material compiled and published by the Documents Research Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Documents that would show previous leaders in an unfavourable light have been excluded, and the Central Party Archives are closed to Chinese researchers. Until scholars working in China have the same access to material that scholars working in the United States have, a complete, balanced history of the period cannot be written. Despite its shortcoming, this book opens new research panoramas and vantage points for the interested reader.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Huntsville, Alabama

Redefining the Foreign Area Officer’s Role: A Response

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Friedenberg, U.S. Army, Ashburn, Virginia—In the May-June 2004 Military Review, Major General Michael A. Vane and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Fagundes’s article, “Redefining the Foreign Area Officer’s Role,” analyzed the current state of the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program (FA48). The FAO community and the U.S. Army benefit from colleagues taking an interest in how FOAs fit within the framework of the Army and also in the conduct of national security policy. The U.S. Army is in transition, and the FAO functional area will likely undergo changes to reflect emerging requirements.

Vane and Fagundes made several suggestions for improving how FOAs function; however, some of their statements need to be corrected. They say foreign-language ability is an “enabler” for FOAs. For them to identify language ability merely as an enabler mischaracterizes and devalues what is arguably one of the most critical assets FOAs bring to their commanders. Vane and Fagundes also say the FAO assignment system suffers from a “Cold War mentality,” even now, more than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. I want to stress here the importance of the FAO foreign-language ability and discuss Vane and Fagundes criticisms regarding the FAO assignment process.

What exactly does “enabler” mean? Merriam-Webster’s on-line dictionary defines enables as “one [who] enables another to achieve an end.” Never specifically defined in Vane and Fagundes’s article, the word in this context seems to mean language ability is a skill that helps FOAs do their job. This definition would be difficult to dispute. However, Vane and Fagundes say foreign-language ability is over-emphasized as a critical FAO skill, and as an “enabler,” it should occupy a lower priority than skills such as knowledge of strategic issues.

Why is language ability important to a FAO? While serving overseas tours, FOAs (whether as attachés or security assistance officers) most often meet English-speaking host-country officials. However, in many host countries, members of the military do not speak English or do not speak it well enough to function entirely in English. In such instances, it is critical for the FAO to speak the foreign language competently.

A FAO’s ability to get the message across in a foreign language could affect mission success, whether in an operational environment or in support of a training exercise. In many Latin American countries, FOAs function as much in Spanish or Portuguese as they do in English. A FAO’s competence in speaking a foreign language opens doors and builds relationships that might not be possible if the officer spoke only English or saw the study of foreign language merely as an “enabler.” Host-country officials appreciate when foreigners, especially Americans, take time to study the host country’s language. Improved rapport is the inevitable result.

Vane and Fagundes say within some regions there are too many languages for the FOA to master for FOAs to communicate effectively in every country. They believe the current FAO construct views the world from a language-centric view rather than a geopolitical perspective. Perhaps there are too many languages for the FAO to fully master in Western Europe.
and Northern Asia. No one can become a regional expert overnight; it takes years of studying a region and its language to attain expertise. However, having competence in even one language within a region where there are many different languages can have huge payoffs in understanding the region.

Languages such as Chinese, Russian, and Arabic are difficult to master, and students must invest significant time and effort to attain even a moderate level of ability. To become remotely competent, FAOs might spend a year or more at the Defense Language Institute, continue studying on their own and take refresher courses simply to maintain language proficiency.

Although FAOs do not need to be as proficient as translators or interpreters, they do need to focus enough effort on language study to be able to communicate effectively with host-nation military representatives. When FAOs view language capabilities as of secondary importance they relegate the study of foreign language to a lower priority and, inevitably, invest less time and effort to it than to other professional-development objectives.

During the approximate year-long in-country training phase, some FAO trainees attend host-country military schools equivalent to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or the Captain’s Career Course. Attending host-nation military courses allows FAO trainees to train and work closely with host-nation officers in their own environments and to communicate with them in their own languages. Trainees learn about the host country’s military culture and how its army fights, which is a critical asset when FAOs are advising policymakers or commanders. These training benefits would not be possible without extensive language training.

In my experience as a Middle East FAO (48G), language has been more than an enabler, it has been a critical tool in understanding the complicated Arab culture. Simply reading analyses of history and political science books in English, reading English news sources, or depending on English translations of Arabic texts does not allow us to understand what Arabs are saying or thinking. An over-dependence on English-translated sources risks a generalization about such a diverse culture. Reading or listening to foreign media in its original language lends a perspective to it than to other professional-development objectives.

U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1 October 1998) says FAOs should “develop skills required for conducting and analyzing military activities that have economic, social, cultural, psychological, or political impact.” Languages people speak shape how they think and how they view their world. FAOs cannot hope to understand foreign cultures or provide useful analyses without devoting time and effort to language study.

Vane and Fagundes have three primary criticisms of FAO assignments: assignments are skewed toward the attaché system; assignments reflect a Eurocentric Cold War mentality; and the FAO development model is outmoded. The first point is a criticism that also exists within the FAO world; repetitive attaché assignments can take FAOs out of the mainstream of the Army. It is incumbent on the FAO community to show attachés doing work critical to U.S. foreign policy, not simply “riding the cocktail circuit.”

By interacting with militaries in the Middle East, the Far East, and South Asia, attachés are making critical contributions to fighting the Global War on Terrorism. And, far from being out of the mainstream, FAOs serving in embassies in security-assistance assignments are working directly for respective regional unified commanders.

Vane and Fagundes’ statement that attaché assignments equate to battalion command in importance is not substantiated in any written Army policy. FAO branch analyses consistently show that promotion boards do not favor attaché assignments more than other types of FAO assignments.

The Human Resources Command (HRC) FAO Website says FAOs should rotate between overseas assignments as attachés and security-assistance officers with assignments in Washington, D.C., and major commands such as U.S. Central Command or U.S. European Command (EUCOM). FAOs should have a variety of assignments to develop their regional expertise. Repetitive attaché assignments are officially discouraged.

When Vane and Fagundes criticize FAO assignments as Eurocentric, they seem to be suffering from the same Cold War mentality they themselves decry. For them to say FAO positions are “over billeted within plush assignments in European Capital cities” is inaccurate and focuses only on what is going on in a small part of the world. FAOs also serve as political military advisers to commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the FAO assignments list includes such countries as Uzbekistan, Djibouti, Cambodia, Yemen, and numerous other places besides Western European cities. The Cold War is over and FAO missions are changing.

Vane and Fagundes correctly say a large number of Eurasian FAOs (48E) serve in Germany. Three of the six 48E colonies are serving at EUCOM, which is headquartered in Germany, and six 48Es (three majors, two lieutenant colonels, and one colonel) are assigned to the Marshall Center in Garmisch, which is responsible for supervising most Eurasian FAO trainees. Given the projected number of FAO trainees at the Marshall Center (six to eight slots per year), this might be an excessive number. However, Vane and Fagundes’ article implies the high number of 48E officers in EUCOM is because HRC FAO proponents or FAO career managers make unilateral determinations of structure and requirements.

Major or joint commands (in this case EUCOM) determine how many FAOs are assigned and where they will serve. Arguably, the number of 48E FAOs in Germany is larger than necessary and likely will change as Department of Defense (DOD) refocuses priorities and changes are reflected in EUCOM manning documents. (The FAO Branch Chief at the U.S. Army Human Resource Center provided information on the Marshall Center staffing and other Germany Army FAO assignments.)

Vane and Fagundes correctly call for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and theater commanders to review the number of attaché billets within Western Europe. However, when they criticize DIA priorities for
attaché assignments they include other than Army assignments, such as Navy or Air Force attachés. The criticisms might be valid, but addressing them is beyond the scope of the Army FAO assignments system. Updating manning documents to reflect changing strategic realities is a function of joint commands such as EUCOM or DIA, not Army FAO assignment officers.

I am puzzled why Vane and Fagundes would criticize the current FAO development model as incompatible with the Army policy of dual tracking. Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS)-3 was implemented 7 years ago to end the dual-tracking policy for officers. FAOs now occupy their own career fields, have their own professional development models, and compete against other FAOs for promotion. Without the promotion requirement to serve in operational branch-qualifying assignments, FAOs can serve in jobs that develop them as regional specialists.

The Army must continue to assess the FAO training program and assignments system and make adjustments as required. In the near term, DOD leaders are likely to make significant changes to the organization, training, and resourcing of the military. Army FAO programs must develop to support these changes or risk irrelevance. FAOs who serve in embassies worldwide or on high-level staffs will continue to make great contributions to national security and will make these contributions by developing regional expertise. Developing and maintaining a foreign language capability is a primary skill, not merely an enabler.

Controversial Photo

Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Hall, U. S. Army, Retired—You published an article entitled “Toxic Leadership” in your JUL-AUG ’04 edition of Military Review. The article was written by LTC George Reed. My beef is over the photo of me that appears within the article. The implication is that I am the prime example of someone with a “Toxic Leadership” style. I dispute that.

I was never contacted regarding use of my photo for any reason. I did not know the photo even existed.

The photo appears to be taken of me during CGSC, probably during the spring of 1996 Prairie Warrior.

I’ve already emailed the author of the article and requested a retraction and apology for this bit of libel. I believe you owe me the same.

Editor’s Reply

The photograph of Lieutenant Colonel Hall used in the article “Toxic Leadership” was selected from the library at Military Review. The final decision to use the article was mine, and the author of the article, Colonel George Reed, had nothing to with its selection. The photograph was selected because it seemed to display the face and body language of an individual who had just received a blistering surprise phone call from someone in authority.

Most of us in the military have at one time or another been on the receiving end of what we regard as an unwarranted “dressing down,” either personally or by phone call. It certainly was not meant to imply that Lieutenant Colonel Hall was an example of someone guilty of a “toxic” leadership style. We regret any embarrassment this photograph may have caused either Lieutenant Colonel Hall or Colonel Reed. Greater care will be exercised in the future to avoid photographs that have substantial potential for needlessly causing embarrassment to the individuals in the photographs or authors of articles.

—wmd

Bio Correction

Staff Sergeant George E. Anderson III, U.S. Army National Guard—During the editing process of my article, “Winning the Nationbuilding War,” which appeared in the September-October 2004 Military Review, I attempted to clarify several times that I was not a Ph.D. but, rather, studying for my Ph.D. Although it was a complimentary distinction next to my name, it was not accurate. Would you be kind enough to ensure it is corrected in the Spanish version?
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